Actus Essendi

0209: The Self-Evident Connotation of the Actus Essendi (VII)

2012-01-23T01:27:00.000-05:00

Entry 0209: The Self-Evident Connotation of the Actus Essendi (VII)

Remarks by Douglas B. Rasmussen

"We do not ever really have to wonder whether we are in cognitive contact with reality—that is a given. It should be noted that the Aristotelian approach to this issue does not confine knowledge to strictly that of knowing propositions. I have used the term ‘cognition’ here to indicate an intentional union or contact with reality. This certainly includes but is not confined to the propositional." [1]

Note

[1]↑ Douglas B. Rasmussen, “The Aristotelian Significance of the Section Titles of Atlas Shrugged,” in Ayn Rand's Atlas Shrugged: A Philosophical and Literary Companion, Edward W. Younkins, ed., (Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2007), p. 36.

0208: Remarks on the Principle of Non-Contradiction (V)

2012-01-16T01:02:00.002-05:00

Entry 0208: Remarks on the Principle of Non-Contradiction (V)

Remarks by Thomas D. D'Andrea:

“For both Aristotle and Aquinas, the first principle of understanding [is] the metaphysical principle of non-contradiction. Of this, Aristotle says:

The most certain principle of all is that regarding which it is impossible to be mistaken; for such a principle must be both the best known (for all men may be mistaken about things which they do not know), and non-hypothetical. For a principle that anyone must have who understands anything is not a hypothesis… Evidently then such a principle is the most certain of all; which principle this is let us proceed to say. It is, that the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject and in the same respect… This then is the most certain of all principles, since it answers to the definition given above. For it is impossible for any one to believe the same thing to be and not to be, as some think Heraclitus says. For what a man says, he does not necessarily believe… (Metaphysics IV, 1 005b12-25, Ross trans.)

“Aquinas glosses these remarks by referring to the principle as ‘the axiom of all axioms’ (Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, para. 604), and adds that, ‘evidently this principle is not based on an assumption. Indeed, insofar as it is by nature a starting point, it clearly comes unsought to the one having it and is not acquired by his own efforts’ (para. 605). Aquinas can plausibly be taken to hold here that the first principle is embedded (implicit and presupposed) in all human thought as such, from which it does not follow that all humans know that the principle is true (even philosophers such as Heraclitus seem confused about it), or that they know, moreover, that it is necessarily true, and even the most basic of necessary truths (i.e., as the truth presupposed by all other necessary truths).” [1]

Note

[1]↑ Thomas D. D'Andrea, Tradition, Rationality, and Virtue: The Thought of Alasdair MacIntyre, (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2006), 413.

0207: Remarks on the Principle of Non-Contradiction (IV)

2012-01-09T01:43:00.002-05:00

Entry 0207: Remarks on the Principle of Non-Contradiction (IV)

Human action presupposes the principle of non-contradiction:

People who act do something indicating that they have a goal and think that certain means, which they are undertaking, is the way to reach that goal.

We act because we believe certain things and have certain goals, which is to say that we do not believe the opposite things and have the oppose goals.

In any particular action, we do not act as though things were anything or everything.

Accordingly, action itself presupposes the principle of non-contradiction. [1]

Note

[1]↑ Trudy Govier, Socrates' Children: Thinking and Knowing in the Western Tradition, Peterborough, Ontario, Canada: Broadview Press, 1997, pp. 68-69.

0206: Remarks on the Principle of Non-Contradiction (III)

2012-01-02T01:12:00.001-05:00

Entry 0206: Remarks on the Principle of Non-Contradiction (III)

According to Franklin Perkins, Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz (1646-1716) “distinguishes between the explicit grasp of truths of reason or logic and an instinct for logic that everyone possesses. This instinct appears primarily in the avoidance of obvious contradictions. The capacity for reason depends [in part] on this instinctive use of the principle of non-contradiction.” [1]

Note

[1]↑ Franklin Perkins, “Interpreting China,” Chapter 4 in Leibniz and China: a commerce of light, Cambridge: Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 2004, p. 160.

0205: Remarks on the Principle of Non-Contradiction (II)

2011-12-26T01:45:00.001-05:00

Entry 0205: Remarks on the Principle of Non-Contradiction (II)

Remarks by Richard I. Aaron:

“We use the principle of non-contradiction or consistency long before we become aware of it and of the important part it plays in our thinking.

“No one does try to think without using consistency or non-contradiction as his guide.

“It is our experience of the world that first disposes us to think in terms of non-contradiction and consistency.

“Our experience of the world affects our minds leaving permanent dispositions which explain our thinking.

“The principle of consistency is not alien to that [the real] world; on the contrary, it is something we have learnt from that world itself.

“Even when, in abstract thinking, we find ourselves most removed from experience, there is still a link with the empirical in so far as non-contradiction is our guide. For in so far as it [thinking] is guided by non-contradiction it is guided by a principle which in the last resort is empirically derived.

“We cannot conceive thinking without the principle; more we cannot conceive any item of experience falsifying it.

“This shows the measure to which our experience of the world has moulded our thought. It shows the strength of the dispositions which our experience of the world has engendered within us.” [1]

Note

[1]↑ Richard I. Aaron, "The Rational and the Empirical," in Contemporary British Philosophy, Third Series, London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1956, pp. 3-20.

0204: Remarks on the Principle of Non-Contradiction (I)

2011-12-19T01:04:00.002-05:00

Entry 0204: Remarks on the Principle of Non-Contradiction (I)

Remarks on non-contradiction:

“A knower who violates the principle of non-contradiction cannot be said to know.” [1]

“The [principle] of non-contradiction is presupposed universally in any intelligible content of mind.” [2]

The principle of non-contradiction “is presupposed by every human being in every cognitive act.

“This principle is true of all possible facts, and its truth is presupposed by every cognitive act, from philosophy to science to balancing one’s check book.

“No matter what there is, it is what it is, and it cannot display contradictory characteristics at the same time and in the same respect.

“This applies to all past experience, all present experience, all future experience—and even to things we will never experience.

“If any truth has claim to both fundamentality and absoluteness, it is this.” [3]

Notes

[1]↑ John R. Bowlin, Contingency and Fortune in Aquinas' Ethics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 99.

[2]↑ Robert E. Gahringer, “The Foundation of Necessity in Practical Reason,” International Philosophical Quarterly, 1962, vol. 2, no. 1, pp 25-49.

[3]↑ Tibor R. Machan, Objectivity: Recovering Determinate Reality in Philosophy, Science, and Everyday Life, (Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2004), p. 33.

0203: Philosophy of Actus Essendi -- One Universally Valid Philosophy Recommended by Fides et Ratio (XI)

2011-12-12T01:09:00.002-05:00

Entry 0203: The Philosophy of the Actus Essendi -- One Universally Valid Philosophy Recommended by Fides et Ratio (XI)

“Without declaring a preference for any school, the Encyclical [Fides et Ratio] recognizes philosophy as the best way to reach the intellectus fidei and to articulate a renewed dogmatic theology: an open and dynamic philosophy of being that is based on the act of being (actus essendi).

“Here it is suggested that one of the greatest limitations of modern enquiry is to have bracketed being, not to have succeeded in positing itself as a philosophy of being, thus encountering greater difficulties in finding the sapiential dimension proper to philosophical thought and in addressing the fragmentation of knowledge.” [1]

[1]↑ Vittorio Possenti, “The Encyclical Letter Fides et Ratio in Relation to Modern and Contemporary Thought,” “Reflections on the Encyclical Fides et Ratio,” no. 17, in L'Osservatore Romano English Weekly Edition, 29 September 1999, p. 10.

0202: The Human Intellect’s Apprehension of the Actus Essendi

2011-12-05T01:59:00.001-05:00

Entry 0202: The Human Intellect’s Apprehension of the Actus Essendi

[Available in PDF format only]

0201: Science, Actus Essendi, and Revealed Truth -- Remarks on Methodology

2011-11-28T01:49:00.004-05:00

Entry 0201: Article in PDF format

Orestes J. Gonzalez, “Science, Actus Essendi, and Revealed Truth: Remarks on Methodology,” Actus Essendi Electronic Journal, Entry 0021, 2007.

Pope John Paul II explicitly identified some fundamental aspects of the 'philosophy of being' as reference point for the different philosophical schools.

A most authoritative statement in this regard is recorded in his encyclical letter Fides et Ratio when he says that "The 'philosophy of being' is strong and enduring because it is based upon the very 'act of being itself' (ipse actus essendi) which allows a full and comprehensive openness to reality as a whole." [1]

Earlier the Pope had explained that "The basis and source of this openness lie in the fact that the philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) is a 'philosophy of being,' that is, of the 'act of being' (actus essendi); it is the philosophy of the proclamation of being." [2]

[1]↑ Pope John Paul II, Encyclical Letter Fides et Ratio, 14 September 1998, Acta Apostolicae Sedis, 1999, vol. 91, pp. 5-88, no. 97.

[2]↑ John Paul II, "Address at the Angelicum, The Pontifical University of Saint Thomas Aquinas in Rome," 17 November 1979. The original, in Italian, was published in Acta Apostolicae Sedis, 1979, vol. 71, pp. 1472-1483. English translations are available in Angelicum, 1980, vol. 57, pp. 133-146; and in L'Osservatore Romano English Weekly Edition, December 17, 1979, pp. 6-8.

0200: Kant and Aquinas on Non-Contradiction

2011-11-21T01:52:00.007-05:00

Entry 0200: Kant and Aquinas on Non-Contradiction

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) does not deny the principle of non-contradiction. Kant, however, postulated that our knowledge of the principle of non-contradiction is a priori knowledge.

Albert L. Blackwell endorses Kant’s position in the following terms:

Kant is searching for a rational basis for natural science and moral philosophy, and he is correct in asserting that one must begin with the principle of non-contradiction as an a priori assumption. [1]

Aquinas’ position is different. For Aquinas (1225-1274), the human intellect, before it exercises its functions, is tamquam tabula rasa. The intellect, before it has access to the truth, is always “like a clean tablet on which nothing is written.” [2]

And with respect to the first principles in particular Aquinas expressly affirms that “it is from the sensible things of nature that we receive the knowledge of the first principles.” [3] Aquinas often accentuates that there is no access to these principles except through the sensible faculties in direct contact with the sensible things of nature. [4]

Aquinas grants that “the sensible faculties enjoy a certain superiority in regard to the capacity of acting on the intellect and causing knowledge. And this is due to their greater proximity to the exterior things of nature which are the cause and measure of our knowledge.” [5]

Aquinas is unyielding in this point as is seen, for example, when he reasons as follows: “the very habit of first principles is derived from the sensible things of nature, and thus, this habit is the effect of the agent intellect whose function is to act on the phantasm.” [6]

Kant does not postulate the existence of innate knowledge in the human intellect but only a priori forms.

But the fact that we are able to reach external reality through the intellectual conception of it does not justify the conclusion that thoughts and intellectual conceptions were present in our minds prior to our interaction with reality.

Our knowledge of the principle of non-contradiction is a knowledge caused by the sensible things of nature.

Notes

[1]↑ Albert L. Blackwell, Schleiermacher’s Early Philosophy of Life: Determinism, Freedom, and Phantasy, Harvard Theological Studies, no. 33 (Chico, California: Scholars Press, 1982) p. 48.

[2]↑ ST.1.79.2: “Intellectus autem humanus in principio est sicut tabula rasa in qua nihil est scriptum, ut Philosophus dicit in III De Anima.” Also: “Intellectus noster comparatur tabulae in qua nihil est scriptum;” De Ver.8.9. “Anima enim, secundum se considerata, est in potentia ad intelligibilia cognoscenda: est enim sicut tabula in qua nihil est scriptum;” ST.3.9.1.

[3]↑ Q. disp. De anima,4,ad 6: “Cognitio enim principiorum a sensiblilibus accipitur.” Also: “Sed ipsorum principiorum cognitio in nobis ex sensibilibus causatur;” SCG.2.83.

[4]↑ “Cognitio principiorum accipitur a sensu;” In Boet. De Trin.1.1.1.ad 4. “Cognitio principiorum provenit nobis ex sensu;” ST.1-2.51.1. “Sic igitur intellectus humanus habet aliquam formam, scilicet ipsum intelligibile lumen, quod est de se sufficiens ad quaedam intelligibilia cognoscenda: ad ea scilicet in quorum notitiam per sensibilia possumus devenire;” ST.1-2.109.1. “Oportet quod in intellectu nostro sint quaedam quae intellectus noster naturaliter cognoscit, scilicet prima principia, quamvis etiam ista cognitio in nobis non determinetur nisi per acceptionem a sensibus;” De Ver.8.15. “Quamvis intellectu sit superior sensu, accipit tamen aliquo modo a sensu, et eius objects prima et principalia in sensibilibus fundantur;” ST.1.84.8.ad 1. “In nobis perfectum iudicium intellectus habetur per conversionem ad sensibilia, quae sunt prima nostrae cognitions principia;” ST.2-2.73.3. “Primorum autem principiorum cognitio a sensibus (ex sensibilibus) ortum habet;” De Ver.10.13. "Prima autem principia scientiarum speculativarum sunt per sensum accepta;” ST.1-2.3.6.

[5]↑ De Ver.18.8.ad 3: “Vel dicendum, quod inferiores vires quantum ad aliqud superiores sunt, maxime in virtute agendi et causandi, ex hoc ipso quod sunt propinquiores rebus exterioribus, quae sunt causa et mensura cognitionis nostrae.” Also: “Illa quae habent deficiens esse, secundum hoc deficiunt a cognoscibilitate intellectus nostri, quod deficiunt a ratione agendi;” DeVer.2.5.ad 12.

[6]↑ SCG.2.78.n. 7: “Nec tamen intelligendum est quod intellectus agens sit habitus per modum quo habitus est in secunda specie qualitatis, secundum quod quidam dixerunt intellectum agentem esse habitum principiorum. Quia ille habitus principiorum est acceptus a sensibilibus (II Posteriorum) et sic oportet quod sit effectus intellectus agentis, cuius est phantasmata, quae sunt intellecta in potentia, facere intellecta in actu.”

0199: Transcendental Perfections and Actus Essendi

2011-11-14T01:04:00.003-05:00

Entry 0199: Transcendental Perfections and Actus Essendi

Concerning Aquinas’ treatment of the transcendental perfections, Edward A. Synan directs attention towards a distinction proposed by Aquinas in the Proemium of the Exposition of pseudo-Dionysius’ Divine Names. Synan attributes to Aquinas the view that

"Despite the superiority of an Aristotelian understanding of things in this world over that of the Platonists, Plato’s followers had done better on what is above this world: an implicit acceptance of Aristotelian earthly science but an explicit rejection of his views on higher things."

Here is the text on which Synan based his conclusion:

This reasoning of the Platonists, therefore, with respect to what it contains concerning separate, natural, specific forms, is in harmony with neither faith nor reason; but with respect to what they were accustomed to say about the First Principle of things, their opinion is the highest of truth and in harmony with the Christian faith. (Haec igitur Platonicorum ratio fidei non consonat nec veritati, quantum ad hoc quod continet de speciebus naturalibus separatis, sed quantum ad id quod dicebant de Primo rerum Principio, verissima est eorum opinio et fidei Christianae consona [Thomas Aquinas, In librum Beati Dionysius De divinis nominibus expositio, prooemium, 2.])

Edward A. Synan, “Albert and the Two Burleys: Citations and Allusions,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 70, (1996): 168-169.

0198: The Notions of Existence and Actus Essendi (IV)

2011-11-07T01:08:00.003-05:00

Entry 0198: Actus Essendi and Existence (IV)

The Notions of Existence and Actus Essendi

"Modern philosophers have failed to take seriously the difference between

(a) the kind of existence implied whenever we make a statement about a logical subject, e.g., about blindness, about a hole, about a colour or a number, or about a set, viz. that blindness exists, that the hole exists, that there is such a colour or number or set, and

(b) existence in the sense of the present actuality of something real enough to 'act.'

"In this sense they have ceased to talk about existence in the sense which most concerned Saint Thomas: 'esse in the sense of actus essendi.'

"Yet, this is the key to 'what is metaphysics' as the Pope [John Paul II] refers to it." [1]

[1]↑ David Braine, “The Relationship Between Philosophy and Cultures,” “Reflections on the Encyclical Fides et Ratio,” no. 14, in L'Osservatore Romano English Weekly Edition, 4 August 1999, pp. 5-6.

0197: Beauty and Being

2011-10-31T01:38:00.006-04:00

Entry 0197: Beauty and Being

"The beauty that perdures in the midst of the world's ceaseless becoming excites in the soul a longing for the infinite beauty that it reflects." (1)

(1)↑ David Bentley Hart, "The Mirror of the Infinite: Gregory of Nyssa on the Vestigia Trinitatis," in Re-Thinking Gregory of Nyssa, edited by Sarah Coakley, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), p.118.

0196: St. Thomas’ Aristotle and Actus Essendi

2011-10-24T01:05:00.003-04:00

Entry 0196: Orestes J. Gonzalez, “St. Thomas’ Aristotle and Actus Essendi,” Actus Essendi Electronic Journal, Entry 0155, 2011 (This article is also available in PDF format)

St. Thomas’ Aristotle and Actus Essendi

Orestes J. Gonzalez
3 January 2011

It is well known that Aquinas attributed to ‘his Aristotle’ a number of views and principles that the ‘real Aristotle’ didn’t have.

And there is no question that Aquinas employs the full force of his thought when he explains his understanding of the connection that exists between the concept of ‘creation’ and the concept of ‘actus essendi.’

The question then is this. Did Aquinas attribute to ‘his Aristotle’ the notions of ‘creation’ and ‘actus essendi’?

In what follows, I shall briefly examine the issue of which notion of ‘creation’ Aquinas made his own, and show why not even the expanded Aristotle of Aquinas can be said to have the notion of ‘actus essendi.’

The article presupposes solid knowledge of Aquinas’ Five Ways and some knowledge of why Aquinas shifted attention towards the self-evident ‘actus essendi’ of extramental subsisting things as the ultimate ground for metaphysical inquiry. [1]

I. Beginningless generation and corruption

Creation, the activity of bringing something into existence out of nothing, is to be distinguished radically from the production of a thing by way of generation and corruption.

When a thing comes into existence by way of generation and corruption the thing generated is preceded by pre-existing materials.

On the other hand, the phenomenon of passing from ‘non-being’ into ‘being’ with no intervention of intermediary pre-existing materials is what defines ‘creation.’

Activities such as the creative work of artists, the conservation in being of what is already in existence, or the eternal generation of the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity are activities in which the passage from ‘non-being’ into ‘being’ is absent. These activities cannot be called ‘creation.’

Now, for the ‘Aristotle of Aquinas’ the world was eternal and generation and corruption were perpetual. Thus, for the ‘Aristotle of Aquinas’ the world always existed with a constant uninterrupted flow of generation and corruption of things.

It is through this beginningless and endless chain of perishable pre-existing materials that the ‘Aristotle of Aquinas’ explains how things come into existence in the visible world.

Such a conception of the world, however, did not prevent Aquinas from crediting ‘his Aristotle’ with postulating a Being who was the cause of all things, a Being who is ‘Not Necessary through another but Necessary through itself.’

Thus, one initial reference point must be stated clearly: the Being ‘Necessary through itself’ of the ‘Aristotle of Aquinas’ cannot be said to be a Being who brings about the existence of other things from no pre-existing materials.

Aquinas did not credit his expanded Aristotle with a time in which there was nothing in existence. The world of the ‘Aristotle of Aquinas’ is a beginningless eternal world.

Such world, and the Being ‘Necessary through itself,’ are presented as co-eternal, co-existing realities in the teachings of the ‘Aristotle of Aquinas.’

II. The Christian notion of creation

There is valid point in the inference “If the world is eternal, then it was not created.”

Indeed, the Christian notion of ‘creation’ indicates that the world had a definite beginning. Revelation teaches that the world is not eternal.

But concerning the issue of the Christian notion of ‘creation,’ here is what I take to be a necessary and essential clarification. In its Christian sense,

The word ‘creation’ is used to mean both the causation of being and the definite origin of what is thus caused. It is contradictory to speak of a ‘created eternal world,’ for if created is what has a definite beginning, it cannot also be everlasting or without beginning.

For analytical clarity, it is absolutely necessary to use the word ‘creation’ with these two notes in its signification: (a) to create is to cause being; (b) to create is to cause to begin to be—understanding such ‘beginning,’ of course, as neither a change nor a motion of any kind.

In terms of such verbal usage, there should be no difficulty about understanding what is meant by saying that God can be the cause of being of either an everlasting world or a world with beginning. [2]

How can God be the ‘cause of being’ of an everlasting world?

It is instructive to observe here that, when it is a question of the most radical sense of being, the ‘causation of the beginning of the existence of something’ and the ‘holding of that something in existence’ are inseparable actions springing from one and the same cause.

Evidently an everlasting world does not need to account for its beginning. But how does an everlasting world hold itself in existence?

Here is how Aquinas explains it.

III. Causation of being with a beginning in time versus causation of being
without a beginning in time

Aquinas knew that, even before Christianity, philosophers had distinguished two kinds of causation with regard to the ‘cause of being’ of the world. [3] The positions underwent considerable refinement throughout history. But at the time of Aquinas they amounted to the following:

(a) A causation which is preservative of being with a beginning in time, in the sense that there was nothing before the material world was brought into existence by the ‘cause of being.’

(b) A causation which is preservative of being without a beginning in time, in the sense that there never was a time when there was nothing in existence because the world is beginninglessly eternal.

The former type of causation of being is properly speaking creation. The latter type of causation means only conservation of being.

In the first type of causation there are two activities, creation and preservation.

In the second type of causation there is only one activity, preservation.

For one thing is the activity that causes the staying in existence of things which have always existed; and another, the activity that causes the coming into existence of things which begin to exist for the first time, out of no pre-existing materials.

The activity of holding in existence a beginninglessly eternal world is not creation. And this is the type of causation that Aquinas attributes to ‘his Aristotle.’

A careful reading of Aquinas shows that he is not as imprecise as it may appear on the issue of how the world came to exist. Aquinas’ understanding of the notions involved when addressing this issue and the contexts in which the issue is confronted leave no room for doubt as to where Aquinas stands with respect to other philosophers and as to what he wanted to say himself about the creation of the world.

Aquinas explicitly declares himself at variance with ‘his Aristotle,’ for Aquinas embraces as his own the causation of being with a beginning in time.

IV. The notion of actus essendi

It is generally accepted that Aquinas' Five Ways of proving the existence of God have their ultimate source in Aristotle. Aquinas is not the originator of the arguments.

But did Aquinas say anything novel concerning the existence of God? The answer is a definite yes.

The discovery of the notion of ‘actus essendi’ equipped Aquinas with the metaphysical principle he needed to not only elevate the certitude of the reasoning towards the existence of God to a considerably higher level, but also to formulate the finest philosophical definition of the essence of God ever given, namely, that God is the ‘Ipse Actus Essendi subsistens,’ subsisting act of being.

The philosophical definition of the essence of God as the ‘Ipse Actus Essendi subsistens’ sets Aquinas apart from all other philosophers, including Aristotle.

As Pope John Paul II (1920-2005) remarked,

The transcendental value [of the ‘actus essendi’] paves the most direct way to rise to the knowledge of subsisting Being and pure Act, namely to God. [4]

Before further exploring other of Aquinas’ pronouncements, it will be helpful to recall here a few fundamental points concerning Aquinas’ understanding of the notion of ‘actus essendi.’

The expression ‘actus essendi’ is a technical term used by Aquinas in its restricted meaning. ‘Actus essendi’ is the metaphysical principle that goes side by side with the metaphysical principle ‘essence’ in a subsistent extramental thing.

Three points of reference are indicated here: one, the real finite thing itself existing in the external world; second, the ‘essence’ which makes the thing to be what it is; and third, the ‘actus essendi’ which places both the thing with its ‘essence’ in actual existence.

In the real world ‘essence’ and ‘actus essendi’ are inseparable metaphysical principles. The metaphysical principle of ‘actus essendi’ always appears instantiated in an ‘essence.’ And the ‘essence’ of the thing is what put limits to the thing’s participation in ‘actus essendi.’

For Aquinas, the ‘act of being’ is the deepest perfection of a thing; it is an internal incommunicable metaphysical principle inseparable from the thing itself, from the ‘essence’ of the thing, and from anything that exists in the thing. No ‘essence’ actually present in nature makes itself known to the intellect without simultaneously making known its proper participation in ‘act of being.’

Now, all subsisting finite things, in which the metaphysical principle of ‘actus essendi’ is other than the metaphysical principle of ‘essence’, have their ‘actus essendi’ caused by some extrinsic principle, since it is contradictory for a finite thing to be capable of producing itself previous to its own existence.

In God, and only in Him, ‘essence’ puts no limit to the ‘actus essendi.’ God is the ‘Ipse Actus Essendi subsistens.’

Throughout his philosophical and theological writings, Aquinas forcefully identifies the ‘actus essendi’ of extramental subsisting things of nature as a proper effect of God.

V. Creation and the significance of the proof from motion

The passage from ‘non-being’ into ‘being’ (with no intervention of any intermediary pre-existing materials) is what characterizes the activity of creation. This activity, Aquinas emphatically remarks, is not motion.

A well-defined demarcation between the phenomenon of motion and the activity of creation makes evident that in his exposition of the proof for the existence of God based on the observation of motion, Aquinas does not intend to provide support for his doctrine of the ‘actus essendi.’

In his exposition of the proof from motion, Aquinas defines motion as the passage from ‘potency’ to ‘act.’ But contrasting this definition, Aquinas explains at length as well that the passage from ‘non-being’ into ‘being’ is not a passage from ‘potency’ to ‘act.’ The ‘non-being’ of the thing to be produced is not ‘potency.’ In the activity of creation, the starting point is nothingness. And nothingness cannot be considered to be an intermediary which at some point enters into a process of passing from ‘potency’ to ‘act.’

For the ‘Aristotle of Aquinas,’ on the other hand, motion is a beginninglessly eternal activity present in a beginninglessly eternal world. In such a world, the activity of passing from ‘non-being’ into ‘being’ with no intervention of pre-existing materials is radically excluded.

Aquinas nevertheless pays serious attention to the proof from motion because it provides valid support for the truth of the existence of God as the ‘cause of being’ of the world.

However, the difficulties he encountered in conceptualizing how an Unmoved Mover can be said to be the ultimate ‘cause of being’ of a beginninglessly eternal world made him exclaim, "this is hardly intelligible."

Here is what Aquinas says in In VIII Phys., lectio I, no. 6:

Both here [in the Physics] and in the Metaphysics, he [Aristotle] uses the eternity of motion to prove the first principle. This method of proving the existence of a first principle is most efficacious and irresistible.

For if on the supposition that both motion and the world existed forever, it is necessary to posit one first principle; then, if the eternity thereof should be rejected, it is all the more necessary, for it is clear that every new thing requires a principle bringing it into being.

Now the only reason why it could seem that no first principle would be necessary, would be if things were ab aeterno. But if the existence of a first principle follows even on that supposition, i.e., that the world existed ab aeterno, it is clear that the existence of a first principle is absolutely necessary. [5]

Thus, in Summa theologiae (part I, question 46, article 2, ad 1) and in De aeternitate mundi (Leonine ed., vol. 43, p. 88, lines 236-239), Aquinas remarks that in some “scarcely intelligible way” a beginninglessly eternal world “can be said to have a cause of being.”

VI. Illustration of how God outside time can be said to hold
an eternal world in existence

For the sake of clarity I shall present here a device which has been used to explain how an eternal God can be said to be the cause of a co-eternal world.

In his The Metaphysics of Theism, [6] Norman Kretzmann reports the following.

The role of a timeless God holding an eternal universe in being is sometimes illustrated schematically in the following way.

The diagram denotes a sequence of events with the letter ‘E.’ Stretching back in time, each event is causally dependent on the preceding one. Thus event E(-1) is caused by event E(-2), which in turn is caused by event E(-3), and so on.

The letter ‘L’ expresses the fact that one event causes the next through the operation of the laws of physics, ‘L.’ And the concept of a causal God is illustrated by placing God—denoted with the letter ‘G’—above the chain, sustaining it at every link.

VII. Explaining the position attributed to Aristotle
concerning the world’s beginning

Regarding the ‘cause of being’ of the world, a disjunction is clearly stated:

(a) The material world is either a beginningless eternal world, or

(b) The material world had a definite beginning in time.

According to Aquinas, the statement that the material world is a beginningless eternal world is a tenable philosophical supposition, although no demonstration has emerged to prove that this is the case.

Likewise, according to Aquinas, no convincing proof has been provided for the statement that the material world had a definite beginning. This statement, however, is known to be true through a non-philosophical source of knowledge, namely, through revelation.

Behind the metaphysical disjunction expressed in the two statements, there is only one firm fact on which to rely, the fact that the world exists.

Thus, on the supposition that the world is beginningless, the ‘cause of being’ would be needed to simply prevent things from falling into nothingness, because things have always existed.

In his effort to make sense of this position, Aquinas goes so far as to say that, although nothingness is never the case in a beginningless eternal world, nothingness is precisely the ‘property’ which in a beginningless eternal world a thing is competent to have of itself, because by metaphysical priority, if a thing were left to itself, it would be nothing.

Thus in the causation of being of what has always existed what is proper to the existing thing is ‘non-being.’ The role of the ‘causa essendi’ (God) is to always act against what is proper to the thing because the thing has always existed.

The intervention of God in things which have always existed is negative. The sustaining of things in existence in a beginninglessly eternal world is God’s acting against what is proper to things. This approach basically postulates that, in the things of the world, ‘non-being’ is by nature prior to ‘being.’

On the supposition that the world had a beginning in time, on the other hand, besides being needed to prevent things from falling into nothingness, the ‘cause of being’ is first of all needed to draw things out of nothingness in the beginning.

The intervention of God in the production of things out of nothing is a positive intervention. The being of created things is a proper effect of God and God causes this effect not only when things first begin to be, but as long as they are preserved in existence.

‘To be’ is that which is innermost in everything and most deeply set in all things. [7]

With respect to everything found in a thing, ‘to be’ is that which most immediately and intimately belongs to things. [8]

In the causation of being with a beginning in time, ‘being’ is by nature prior to ‘non-being.’

Aquinas gives serious consideration to the two statements. Nevertheless, Aquinas fairly explicitly says that the error of Aristotle was to think that the world was eternal. Three texts follow.

For the world leads more evidently to the knowledge of the divine creating power, if it was not always, than if it had always been; since everything which was not always manifestly has a cause; whereas this is not so manifest of what always was. [9]

Aristotle did not err in positing many principles, because he posited that the being of all things depends upon a first principle alone, and thus it remains that there is one first principle. He did, however, err on the eternity of the world. [10]

We must hold firmly that the world has not always existed. This cannot be disproved by any physical demonstration. Aristotle, however, maintained that the world has always existed. [11]

VIII. Actus essendi and the ‘being’ which responds to the question
whether a thing exists

Aquinas did not restrict the notion of ‘causa essendi’ to include only the cause of the ‘actus essendi.’

This is not incompatible, however, with the fact that, in the context of the causation of being with a beginning in time, a restriction is made perfectly clear. The cause of the ‘actus essendi’ of an extramental subsisting thing is God, the Creator. As mentioned above, the ‘actus essendi’ of an extramental subsisting thing is a proper effect of God.

But in a more general context, Aquinas also identified as ‘causa essendi’ a number of realities which do not cause the ‘actus essendi.’

The sun, for example, is said to be the ‘causa essendi’ of sun-shiny air. Sun-shiny air, however, has layers of being which do not have the sun as their ‘causa essendi.’

The ‘causa essendi’ of a thing is that upon which the existence of a thing depends somehow, as the existence of light in the air depends upon the sun. If the sun is taken away, there ceases the very existence of the light in the air. [12]

Aquinas also says in Summa contra gentiles that “Every operating agent is a ‘cause of being’ in some way.” [13] And again in the form of a general principle, Aquinas states in In III Sententiarum that, “In a composite, the conjunction of the components is the ‘cause of being’ of the composite.” [14]

It is from the observation of existing things that the question of the ‘causa essendi’ arises.

There must be some cause of the fact that a thing exists, for something is referred to as ‘causatum’—caused—by reason of the fact that it has a cause of its existing. [15]

Thus, anything that in any way whatsoever exists, has a ‘causa essendi’ of its being. Yet the being whereby a thing is said to be an existing thing is not always the ‘act of being.’

This leads us to a fundamental distinction:

(a) There is the being (esse) which responds to the question whether a thing exists.

(b) There is the being (esse) which refers to the metaphysical principle of ‘actus essendi.’

There is no question that these two connotations of being (esse) were a clearly defined doctrine in Aquinas’ mind.

Being (esse) is twofold. In one way it is considered as signifying the ‘actus essendi.’ In another sense being (esse) conveys the composition of a proposition effected by the mind in joining a predicate to a subject, and in this sense being (esse) is what answers the question whether a thing exists. [16]

Not everything that has the being (esse) that responds to the question whether a thing exists has ‘actus essendi.’

And the notion of ‘causa essendi’ does not refer exclusively to the cause of that being (esse) which Aquinas refers to with the technical expression ‘actus essendi.’

A ‘causa essendi’ is also needed to explain the being (esse) which responds to the question whether a thing exists.

In the case of sun-shiny air, the whole arrangement of material things whereby it can be affirmed that illuminated air exists is a ‘state of affairs’ which ultimately has God as its ‘causa essendi:’ “Agent causes are said to be the ‘cause of being’ of the definite forms received, in so far as they act by the power of the first and universal principle of being” [17]

The causal activity of God extends beyond that of being the cause of the ‘actus essendi’ of extramental subsisting things.

By way of a brief digression, it is worth pointing out in this context that some contemporary followers of Aquinas have used the expression ‘state of affairs’ to refer to the real, to refer to particular arrangements of things and situations actually present in the world, and to the existence of the uncaused cause. Obviously, the connotation of existence of an existing ‘state of affairs’ does not refer to Aquinas ‘actus essendi.’ But the examination of the causal connection that leads from one ‘state of affairs’ to another in a causally dependent series of ‘states of affairs’ certainly indicates that an uncaused cause is needed to avoid the absurdity of an infinite regress in a causal series of ‘states of affairs.’ [18]

In other words, a good enough point of departure to reach the existence of God as the uncaused cause is the being (esse) which responds to the question whether a thing exists. This is neatly expressed by Aquinas in the following terms:

Philosophers confess and prove that everything that in any way exists cannot exist unless it be caused by him who supremely and most truly has existence. [19]

Now, the use of the expression “everything that in any way exists” (omne quod est quocumque modo) gives an unmistakable indication that in this text Aquinas is not referring to the ‘actus essendi.’

IX. Conclusion

The examination of the highly elaborate doctrines needed to support the philosophical position which Aquinas assigned to ‘his Aristotle’ concerning the cause of being of the world clearly shows that Aquinas expanded Aristotle on this issue without having recourse to the notion of ‘actus essendi.’

In all of Aquinas’ Five Ways, the link that connects the point of departure with the conclusion that God exists is ultimately the question of the ‘causa essendi.’ The basic observations of particular instances of motion, efficient causality, contingency and necessity, gradation of perfection, and purpose, are indeed observations of particular ‘states of affairs’ which, in order to exist, require the existing of the uncaused cause. But to reach this conclusion, regardless of whether the world is considered to be beginninglessly eternal or not, there is no need to introduce in the discourse the metaphysical principle of ‘actus essendi.’

The process of reasoning that leads to God as the ‘causa essendi’ of the arrangement of things needed to explain the being (esse) which responds to the question whether a thing exists is an entirely different process from the one whereby one reaches God as the ‘Ipse Actus Essendi subsistens.’

Strong evidence suggests that in the serious effort made to explain the position attributed to Aristotle concerning the cause of being of the world, Aquinas stayed clear from crediting ‘his Aristotle’ with the notion of ‘actus essendi.’

Notes

[1]↑ For more on the ‘self-evident’ connotation of the ‘actus essendi’ of extramental subsisting things, I refer the interested reader to the resources available in the Actus Essendi Electronic Journal.

[2]↑ M. J. Adler, “The Demonstration of God’s Existence,” The Maritain Volume of the Thomist (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1943), 188-218.

[3]↑ In I De caelo, lectio 22, nos. 1 and 7: “After the Philosopher showed that the body of the whole universe is not infinite, and that it is not multiple in number, here he inquires whether it is infinite by eternal duration. And first he give the opinions of others. And he touches on three opinions. First of all, some said that, although it began to be at a certain beginning of time, yet it will endure forever, as first was said by certain poets, such as Orpheus and Hesiod, who are called ‘theologians’ because they presented divine things under the form of poetry and myths. Plato followed them in this position, holding the world to be generated but indestructible.” Postquam Philosophus ostendit quod corpus totius mundi non est infinitum, et quod non est multiplex numero, hic inquirit utrum sit infinitum durationis aeternitate. Et primo ponit opiniones aliorum. Et tangit tres opiniones. Quidam enim dicebant quod, quamvis incoeperit esse ab aliquo principio temporis, tamen in sempiternum durabit; sicut primo dixerunt quidam poetae, ut Orpheus et Hesiodus, qui dicti sunt theologi, quia res divinas poetice et fabulariter tradiderunt; quos in hac positione secutus est Plato, qui posuit mundum generatum, sed indissolubilem.

[4]↑ Pope John Paul II, "The Angelicum Address," speech delivered at the Pontifical University of Saint Thomas Aquinas in Rome on 17 November 1979, paragraph no. 6. The original, in Italian, was published in Acta Apostolicae Sedis 71 (1979): 1472-1483. English translations are available in L'Osservatore Romano English Weekly Edition (17 December 1979): 6-8; and in Angelicum 57 (1980): 133-146.

[5]↑ “Ad probandum primum principium, [Aristoteles] utitur aeternitate motus. Haec enim via probandi primum principium esse, est efficacissima, cui resisti non potest. Si enim mundo et motu existente sempiterno, necesse est ponere unum primum principium; multo magis sempiternitate eorum sublata; quia manifestum est quod omne novum indiget aliquo principio innovante. Hoc ergo solo modo poterat videri quod non est necessarium ponere primum principium, si res sunt ab aeterno. Unde si etiam hoc posito sequitur primum principium esse, ostenditur omnino necessarium primum principium esse.”

[6]↑ Norman Kretzmann, The Metaphysics of Theism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 108-109.

[7]↑ “Esse autem est illud quod est magis intimum cuilibet, et quod profundius omnibus inest, cum sit formale respectu omnium quae in re sunt” (Summa theologiae, part I, question 8, article 1, corpus).

[8]↑ “Inter omnia, esse est illud quod immediatius et intimius convenit rebus” (Quaestiones disputatae de anima, prooemium, article 9, corpus).

[9]↑ “Manifestius enim mundus ducit in cognitionem divinae potentiae creantis, si mundus non semper fuit, quam si semper fuisset, omne enim quod non semper fuit, manifestum est habere causam; sed non ita manifestum est de eo quod semper fuit” (Summa theologiae, part I, question 46, article 1, ad 6).

[10]↑ “Aristoteles non erravit in ponendo plura principia: quia posuit esse omnium tantum a primo principio dependere; et ita relinquitur unum esse primum principium. Erravit autem in positione aeternitatis mundi” (In II Sententiarum, distinction 1, question 2, article 5, expositio textus).

[11]↑ “Firmiter tenendum est mundum non semper fuisse. Nec hoc potest aliqua physica demonstratione efficaciter impugnari. Aristoteles vero posuit mundum semper fuisse” (De potentia, question 3, article 17, corpus).

[12]↑ “In causis inferioribus quaedam sunt causae fiendi, quaedam vero essendi. Causa vero essendi rem est illud a quo per se esse rei dependet, sicut esse luminis in aere dependet a sole. Ablato ergo fabro, cessat fieri cultelli, non autem esse eius; absente vero sole, cessat esse luminis in aere” (De veritate, question 5, article 8, ad 8).

[13]↑ “Omne enim operans est aliquo modo causa essendi” (Summa contra gentiles, book III, chapter 67, no. 1).

[14]↑ “Esse compositi causatur ex conjunctione componentium” (In III Sententiarum, distinction 6, question 2, article 3, corpus).

[15]↑ “Oportet quod eius quod est rem esse, sit aliqua causa: propter hoc enim dicitur aliquid causatum, quod habet causam sui esse” (In II Post. analyt., lectio 7, no. 2).

[16]↑ “Ad secundum dicendum quod esse dupliciter dicitur, uno modo, significat actum essendi. Alio modo, significat compositionem propositionis, quam anima adinvenit coniungens praedicatum subiecto” (Summa theologiae, part I, question 3, article 4, ad 2). “Esse et est significant compositionem propositionis. Unde veritas propositionis potest dici veritas rei per causam. Nam ex eo quod res est vel non est, oratio vera vel falsa est. Sciendum est autem quod iste secundus modus comparatur ad primum, sicut effectus ad causam. Ex hoc enim quod aliquid in rerum natura est, sequitur veritas et falsitas in propositione, quam intellectus significat per hoc verbum est prout est verbalis copula” (In V Metaphysicorum, lectio 9, nos. 11-12). “Illa compositio quam significat hoc verbum est, non potest intelligi sine componentibus. Ideo autem dicit quod hoc verbum est consignificat compositionem, quia non eam principaliter significat, sed ex consequenti; significat enim primo illud quod cadit in intellectu per modum actualitatis absolute: nam est, simpliciter dictum, significat in actu esse” (In I Perihermeneias, chapter 3, lectio 5, nos. 21-22). “Alio modo dicitur ens, quod significat veritatem propositionis, quae in compositione consistit, cuius nota est hoc verbum est, et hoc est ens quo respondetur ad quaestionem an est” (Summa theologiae, part I, question 48, article 2, ad 2). “Esse autem pertinere videtur ad quaestionem an est” (De spiritualibus creaturis, prooemium, article 8, ad 3). “Cum omne quod est praeter essentiam rei, dicatur accidens; esse quod pertinet ad quaestionem an est, est accidens” (Quaestiones quodlibetales, no. 2, question 2, article 1, corpus). “Et esse secundum quod signat veritatem propositionis potest dici non tantum de his quae sunt in re, sed de his quae sunt in intellectu” (In III Sententiarum, distinction 6, question 2, article 2, ad 5).

[17]↑ “Non enim causae agentes ad determinatas formas sunt causae essendi nisi inquantum agunt in virtute primi et universalis principii essendi” (De substantiis separatis, article 9).

[18]↑ See Lubor Velecky, Aquinas' Five Arguments in the Summa theologiae (I, 2, 3) (Kampen, The Netherlands: Kok Pharos Publishing House, 1994), 100-103. The term ‘states of affairs’ has provided an attractive modern equivalent to what Aquinas saw as the source from which the verb ‘est’ draws its second meaning, the being (esse) which responds to the question whether a thing exists. In fact, the observation that God is also the ‘causa essendi’ of the whole arrangement of material things whereby it can be affirmed that illuminated air exists is an example of a more general law, which has been stated in the terminology of ‘states of affairs’ as follows: “Our explanations of states of affairs in this world are radically insufficient unless there is one state of affairs whose existing is a prerequisite for the existing of all other states of affairs, but whose existing does not require any prerequisite condition, not included in that state of affairs itself. The conclusion that [such a state of affairs] exists and is an uncaused cause can be affirmed with philosophical certainty” (John Finnis, Fundamentals of Ethics [Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1983], 145-146).

[19]↑ “Omne quod est quocumque modo esse non posse, nisi sit causatum ab eo qui maxime et verissime esse habet” De aeternitate mundi, opusculum, (Rome: Leonine ed., 1976), vol. 43, p. 85, lines 11-13.

0195: John F. Wippel on Actus Essendi (IV)

2011-10-17T01:55:00.005-04:00

Entry 0195: Remarks by Professor John F. Wippel on the Originality of Aquinas’ Understanding of Actus Essendi

“Thomas views esse as the actuality of all acts and the perfection of all perfections, thereby introducing his understanding of it as intensive act or as the actus essendi.

“This, too, should be recognized as another important non-Aristotelian element of his [Aquinas'] metaphysics, and one which has been traced back to Dionysius and also to the Liber De Causis and to Proclus as likely influences.

“Nonetheless, Thomas's own understanding of this notion is original.” (1)

(1)↑ John F. Wippel, Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas II (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2007) 10.

0194: The Uniqueness of the Transcendental Perfection of Actus Essendi

2011-10-10T01:48:00.004-04:00

Entry 0194: Actus Essendi and Existence (II)

The Uniqueness of the Transcendental Perfection of Actus Essendi

The transcendental perfection of actus essendi has something unique to it, namely, that it cannot be conceived other than as pertaining to what actually exists as a subsisting extramental thing.

The notion of any other transcendental perfection, on the other hand, remains logically coherent regardless of whether or not the perfection has being, regardless of whether or not the perfection is instantiated in the real world—in what has actual existence.

By contrast, the notion of actus essendi changes radically if it is not understood as the innermost perfection of what actually exists as a subsisting extramental thing.

In other words, ‘existence’ is inseparable from the perfection of actus essendi.

Any of the transcendental perfections can be made the object of thought without considering whether or not the perfection exists in the real world. Not with actus essendi.

The perfection of actus essendi cannot be made the object of thought without considering that this perfection is the perfection of the real world.

The notion of actus essendi forces the mind to think of the real. No other notion, none of the notions of the other transcendental perfections, is so tied to the real as to be, even in thought, inseparable from the thought of the real itself.

And yet the notion of actus essendi cannot be reduced to ‘existence.’ ‘Existence’ is not something in which a thing can participate.

See Battista Mondin, “L’Oggeto e il metodo della metafisica secondo Aristotele e secondo S. Tommaso,” Sapienza, vol. 55, no. 2, 2002, pp. 129-153.

0193: Rudi A. te Velde on the Difference between Existence and "Actus Essendi"

2011-10-03T01:54:00.003-04:00

Entry 0193: Actus Essendi and Existence (VIII)

Rudi A. te Velde on the Difference between Existence and "Actus Essendi"

In his book, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas, Rudi A. te Velde writes,

It is not at all clear that ‘existence’ can be regarded as a universal perfection in which things can be said to participate.

It is true that, for Thomas [Aquinas], esse is connected with actual existence. But this does not mean that the notion of actus essendi can be harmlessly rendered by ‘act of existence.’

‘Existence’ may be more familiar and better known than the abstract esse, but it is also more restricted in its use, it seems to me.

One can say that a particular man, for instance Socrates, exists, but does it make sense to say that existence is received in human nature, by which it is contracted?

Existence is not something in which a thing can participate. It presupposes the distinct nature or quiddity to which it belongs, in such a way that the nature itself is of a different order than its actual existence.

Rudi A. te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas, (Leiden, The Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1995), 185.

0192: Antonio Millan Puelles on the Difference between Existence and "Actus Essendi"

2011-09-26T01:31:00.002-04:00

Entry 0192: Actus Essendi and Existence (VII)

Antonio Millan Puelles on the Difference between Existence and "Actus Essendi"

According to Antonio Millan Puelles,

Fabro did maintain two theses, namely, that existence forms part of the act of being, and that the act of being cannot be reduced to existence, but he did not do so with equal emphasis or clarity.

He [Fabro] paid more—in fact, incomparably greater—attention to the distinction between existence and the act of being. Now, this is not without foundation.

In the very philosophical tradition that developed on the basis of the teachings of Saint Thomas, esse had come to be reduced to existence, the latter term having been taken precisely with the connotation of something that is “inessential” to an entity by virtue of the fact that the latter is identified with essence, in the sense of a possible quiddity.

Esse, understood as the actus essendi—which Saint Thomas has regarded as the primordial and innermost core of every entity—was, in the final analysis, reduced to the status of something incidental in the eyes of a significant and numerous group of people participating in that tradition.

One must agree with Fabro in rejecting the reductionistic interpretation of esse as existence, which is already operative at the level of the thesis of the real distinction between essentia and esse, and one must do so because of the overwhelming documentary evidence produced by Fabro himself in his taking recourse to Saint Thomas’s own texts, and not on the basis of mere lucubrations more or less conjectural in character.

Suffice it to say that it is impossible to translate esse as “existence” when one is considering the gradations of being, a realization that does not however imply that it would be valid to take them as if they were gradations of essence, since that which can be participated in secundum magis et minus (in terms of the more or less) is not essence, but being.

Existence is part of the act of being but the act of being cannot be reduced to existence.

Thanks to Fabro (and in opposition to a long line of eminent interpreters of Saint Thomas’s thought) we have come clearly to see that the reduction of esse to existence is inadmissible always, not just so far as the real distinction between essence and esse is concerned.

It is thus impermissible to translate the statement “non possumus scire esse Dei” (Summa Theologiae, part I, question 3, article 4, ad 2) by means of the sentence, “we cannot clearly know the existence of God.”

In the passage under scrutiny, what Saint Thomas contended is that we are unable to know not just the manner of existence proper (propria) to God, but also the essence proper (propria) to Him, as well as whatever is present in the corresponding act of being which is irreducible to the existential dimension thereof.

And yet, if we are able to know—as Saint Thomas affirmed it too—that God exists, then we are capable of conceiving existence, since it is not possible to understand a proposition containing something unintelligible.

To [Frabro’s] exceptional metaphysical insightfulness we are indebted for having reclaimed and refined the idea of the act of being.

Antonio Millan Puelles, The Theory of the Pure Object, Transl. and ed. By Jorge Garcia Gomez, (Heidelberg: Universitatsverlag C. Winter, 1996), pp. 319-326.

0191: Fabro on the Difference between Existence and "Actus Essendi"

2011-09-19T01:06:00.004-04:00

Entry 0191: Actus Essendi and Existence (VI)

Fabro on the Difference between Existence and "Actus Essendi"

Fabro explains that "The term ‘esse,’ understood as the ‘act of being,’ is not just the fact of existence, or that by virtue of which something stands outside its causes (“id per quod aliquid constituitur extra suas causas.”) Rather, the fact of existence is the external effect of the ‘act of being,’ which is, according to Saint Thomas, of a deeper nature. The ‘act of being’ is that which indicates that a form is real, that which indicates that a form is distinct from any other reality. The ‘act of being’ indicates that the form is distinct not only conceptually but really, because when a form is actualized by the ‘act of being,’ that form exists as something separate in nature. The ‘act of being’ is the act of the ‘essence.’"

L’esse, come atto di essere, non è soltanto il fatto di esistere, o «id per quod aliquid constituitur extra suas causas»: ciò piuttosto è l’effetto esterno dell’atto di essere, ma secondo S. Tommaso l’atto di essere è di natura più profonda. Esso è anzitutto ciò per cui (quo) ogni formalità può essere indicata come reale, cioè distinta, non solo nozionalmente, da ogni altra, ma «separata» realmente in natura, è l’atto dell’essenza.

Cornelio Fabro, La Nozione Metafisica di Partecipazione, (Torino: Società Editrice Internazionale, 1963), p. 200.

0190: The Thirteen Texts in which Aquinas Uses the Expression "Actus Essendi"

2011-09-12T01:00:00.018-04:00

Entry 0190: The Thirteen Texts in which Aquinas Uses the Expression "Actus Essendi"

I. In I Sent., 8, 1, 1, c

II. In I Sent., 8, 4, 2, ad 2

III. In I Sent., 8, 5, 2, c

IV. In III Sent., 11, 1, 2, ad 2

V. De Veritate, 1, 1, c

VI. De Veritate, 1,1, ad 1

VII. De Veritate, 1, 1, ad sc 3

VIII. De Veritate, 10, 8, ad 13

IX. Summa Theologiae, I, 3, 4, ad 2

X. De Potentia, 7, 2, ad 1

XI. Quaestiones Quodlibetales, 9, 4, 1, c

XII. In Metaphysicorum, 4, 2, No. 6

XIII. In De Hebdomadibus, 2

Text XIII: In De Hebdomadibus, 2

Text

Deinde cum [Boetius] dicit, "ipsum enim esse," manifestat praedictam diversitatem [i.e., differentiam eius quod est esse ad id quod est] tribus modis: quorum primus est, quia ipsum esse non significatur sicut ipsum subiectum essendi, sicut nec currere significatur sicut subiectum cursus: unde, sicut non possumus dicere quod ipsum currere currat, ita non possumus dicere quod ipsum esse sit: sed sicut id ipsum quod est, significatur sicut subiectum essendi, sic id quod currit significatur sicut subiectum currendi: et ideo sicut possumus dicere de eo quod currit, sive de currente, quod currat, inquantum subiicitur cursui et participat ipsum; ita possumus dicere quod ens, sive id quod est, sit, inquantum participat actum essendi: et hoc est quod [Boetius] dicit: "ipsum esse nondum est," quia non attribuitur sibi esse sicut subiecto essendi; sed id quod est, accepta essendi forma, scilicet suscipiendo ipsum actum essendi, est, atque consistit, idest in seipso subsistit.

Translation

[In the paragraph] where it says, "For to be itself...," he [Boethius] states this difference [i.e., the difference between what is meant by "to be" and what is meant by "that which is"] in three ways, of which the first is this: [When attributed to something] "to be itself" is not signified as if it were the subject of being, any more than to run signifies the subject of running.

Just as we cannot say that "to run itself" runs, so we cannot say that "to be itself" is, and just as "that which is" is signified as the subject of being, so "that which runs" is signified as the subject of running.

Therefore, just as we can say of him who runs, or the runner, that he runs, insofar as he is the subject of running and participates in it, so we can say that an existent--a being--or "that which is," is.

That is what he [Boethius] means when he says, "to be itself is not yet," because to be is not attributed to something as to a subject of being; but "that which is," having received a form of being, that is to say, by receiving the very act of being, "is," and consists, that is to say, subsists in itself.

Commentary on Text XIII: In De Hebdomadibus, 2

In this text Aquinas further explains how he understands the notion of actus essendi. One cannot speak meaningfully about the 'act of being,' without referring to a particular subject in which 'act of being' is instantiated, because the 'act of being' is a metaphysical principle.

'Actus essendi' is the metaphysical principle that goes 'side by side' with the metaphysical principle 'essence' in a subsistent extramental thing. And metaphysical principles as such do not subsist by themselves in isolation.

In the real world 'essence' and 'actus essendi' are inseparable. The metaphysical principle of 'actus essendi' always appears instantiated in an 'essence.' And the 'essence' of the thing is what put limits to the thing's participation in 'actus essendi.

Text XII: In Metaphysicorum, 4, 2, No. 6

Text

Sciendum est enim quod hoc nomen homo, imponitur a quidditate, sive a natura hominis; et hoc nomen res imponitur a quidditate tantum; hoc vero nomen ens, imponitur ab actu essendi: et hoc nomen unum, ab ordine vel indivisione. Est enim unum ens indivisum. Idem autem est quod habet essentiam et quidditatem per illam essentiam, et quod est in se indivisum. Unde ista tria, res, ens, unum, significant omnino idem, sed secundum diversas rationes.

Translation

For it must be borne in mind that the term "man" is derived from the quiddity or the nature of man, and the term "thing" from the quiddity only; but the term "being" is derived from the 'act of being,' and the term "one" from order or lack of division; for what is one is an undivided being. Now what has an essence, and a quiddity by reason of that essence, and what is undivided in itself, are the same. Hence these three—thing, being, and one—signify absolutely the same thing but according to different concepts.

Commentary on Text XII: In Metaphysicorum, 4, 2, No. 6

Just as he did in De Veritate, 1, 1, c, in the present text, Aquinas once again clarifies his understanding of the transcendental notion of res (thing), a term which derives its content from the quiddity or essence of the thing.

The underlying principle of this doctrine is this. In the real world one cannot have the metaphysical principle of ‘essence’ in isolation from the metaphysical principle of actus essendi. One cannot have one without the other. In the real world essences exist with the actus essendi, and vice versa, the actus essendi always appears instantiated in an essence. It is for this reason that the term "res" (thing) expresses a transcendental notion; res stands for a universal mode of being that follows upon the fact of having an essence. Essences are found in every existing thing without exception.

It is this inherent unity of the two most fundamental metaphysical principles what allows Aquinas to provide a coherent metaphysical account of the transcendental ‘one’ and the charaterisctic ‘unity’ of a subsisting thing.

From the side of the actus essendi every existing thing is said to be ens and from the side of the essence every existing thing is said to be res. But it is from the internal inseparability of these two metaphysical principles that every existing thing is said to be unum. Unum is as well a transcedental notion; unum derives its content from the indivisibility of 'essence' and actus essendi.

Text XI: Quaestiones Quodlibetales, 9, 4, 1, c

Text

Sed quia substantia Angeli non est suum esse -- hoc enim soli Deo competit, cui esse debetur ex seipso, et non ab alio --; invenimus in Angelo et substantiam sive quidditatem eius, quae subsistit, et esse eius, quo subsistit, quo scilicet actu essendi dicitur esse, sicut actu currendi dicimur currere. Et sic dicimus Angelum esse compositum ex quo est et quod est, vel secundum verbum Boetii ex esse et quod est. Et quia ipsa substantia Angeli in se considerata est in potentia ad esse, cum habeat esse ab alio, et ipsum esse sit actus; ideo est in eo compositio actus et potentiae; et sic posset in eo concedi materia et forma, si omnis actus debeat dici forma, et omnis potentia materia. Sed hoc non competit in proposito; quia esse non est actus qui sit pars essentiae, sicut forma; ipsa quidditas Angeli vel substantia est per se subsistens, quod materiae non competit.

Commentary on Text XI: Quaestiones Quodlibetales, 9, 4, 1, c

This segment addresses the issue of the metaphysical identity of the substance of an angel. Two reference points are highlighted, namely, (a) the Aristotelian composition of primary matter and substantial form against (b) Aquinas’ distinction between the metaphysical principles of 'essence' and actus essendi.

With respect to the Aristotelian composition of primary matter and substantial form, the substance of an angel is not at all the result of two components coming together to generate a composite.

The substance of an angel is a substantial form that does not need primary matter to subsist. The substance of an angel is a substantial form that subsists by itself.

In the material world, on the other hand, a substantial form does not exist by itself. In the material world, a substantial form exists in the composite.

With respect to the distinction of 'essence' and actus essendi, the substance of an angel is called 'potency' in the most radical way: ipsa substantia Angeli in se considerata est in potentia ad esse, cum habeat esse ab alio. In other words, in Aquinas' metaphysics, angels can be thought of as not existing.

Of the two meanings of esse, in this context, Aquinas evidently is not referring to the truth of a proposition. The structure of the text unmistakably forces the term "esse" to mean actus essendi.

Here Aquinas departs from Aristotle. For Aquinas, a substantial form is a 'potency' with respect to the actus essendi.

Regardless of whether they are substantial or accidental, and of whether they belong to angels or to material things, all forms are 'potency' with respect to the actus essendi.

Text X: De Potentia, 7, 2, ad 1

Text

Ens et esse dicitur dupliciter, ut patet V Metaph. Quandoque enim significat essentiam rei, sive actum essendi; quandoque vero significat veritatem propositionis, etiam in his quae esse non habent: sicut dicimus quod caecitas est, quia verum est hominem esse caecum. Cum ergo dicat Damascenus, quod esse Dei est nobis manifestum, accipitur esse Dei secundo modo, et non primo. Primo enim modo est idem esse Dei quod est substantia: et sicut eius substantia est ignota, ita et esse. Secundo autem modo scimus quoniam Deus est, quoniam hanc propositionem in intellectu nostro concipimus ex effectibus ipsius.

Translation

"Ens and esse may be taken in two ways (Metaph. X, 13, 14). Sometimes they signify the essence of a thing and the ‘act of being,’ and sometimes they denote the truth of a proposition even in things that have no being: thus we say that ‘blindness is’ because it is true that a man is blind. Accordingly when Damascene says that God’s existence is evident to us, the esse of God is taken in the second sense and not the first. For in the first sense God's esse is the same as his essence, and as his essence is unknown so also is his esse. In the second sense we know that ‘God exists,’ because we conceive this proposition in our mind from his effects."

Commentary on Text X: De Potentia, 7, 2, ad 1

Although the text begins with an explicit reference to ens as the present active participle of esse, no mention is made of the fact that ens is more than just a verbal adjective. The stress is placed rather on the fact that esse has two well-defined meanings.

The text from De Potentia unequivocally differentiates esse in its restricted meaning of actus essendi from esse in its wider meaning of “the truth of a proposition.”

With the example of “blindness,” the text sends us back to the conception of “existence,” which I previously described as the consequence of an actual “state of affairs.”

A person lacking sight is a real person, an actual “state of affairs.” And “blindness” connotes the absence of a quality.

Thus, when we say that 'blindness exists,' 'caecitas est,' we are simply translating our knowledge of the fact of existence into a true statement. The statement is true because we affirm the existence of “that which is.”

This aspect of the verb est does not refer to the metaphysical principle of actus essendi; it refers to an actual “state of affairs,” to the fact of existing.

In its wider meaning, esse refers to “the truth of a proposition” which may simply state something about the absence of being.

Text IX: Summa Theologiae, I, 3, 4, ad 2

Text

Ad secundum dicendum quod esse dupliciter dicitur, uno modo, significat actum essendi; alio modo, significat compositionem propositionis, quam anima adinvenit coniungens praedicatum subiecto. Primo igitur modo accipiendo esse, non possumus scire esse Dei, sicut nec eius essentiam, sed solum secundo modo. Scimus enim quod haec propositio quam formamus de Deo, cum dicimus ‘Deus est,’ vera est. Et hoc scimus ex eius effectibus, ut supra dictum est.

Translation

"The Latin verb ‘esse’ can mean either of two things. It may mean the ‘act of being,’ or it may mean the composition of a proposition effected by the mind in joining a predicate to a subject. Taking ‘esse’ in the first sense, we cannot understand God’s ‘esse’ nor His ‘essence;’ but only in the second sense. We know that this proposition which we form about God when we say ‘God is,’ is true; and this we know from His effects, as said above in Question 2, Article 2."

Commentary on Text IX: Summa Theologiae, I, 3, 4, ad 2

Reading the works of Aquinas one finds that he used the Latin verb esse to signify in more than one way. In his Summa Theologiae (I, 3, 4, ad 2,) he is clear on this. Thus he writes,

It must be said that esse applies to a thing in two ways. In one way, it means the act of being, actus essendi. In another way, it means the composition of a proposition effected by the mind in joining a predicate to a subject.

In the first sense God’s esse is His actus essendi; in the second sense, esse applied to God means ‘God exists.’

By means of demonstration and reasoning one can prove the ‘existence’ of a thing without having to have recourse to the sense experience of an existing exemplifying individual. The grasping of the ‘act of being’ of a particular thing is indeed the strongest evidence that the thing exists, but the knowledge of the ‘existence’ of a particular thing and the grasping of its ‘act of being’ are entirely different issues. The grasping of the ‘act of being’ requires direct and immediate contact with individual, real sensible things. On the other hand, to answer the question of whether or not a thing exists, one does not have to interact directly with existing sensible things.

See also (a) This Journal, Entry 0048; and (b) Stephen L. Brock, "Thomas Aquinas and 'What Actually Exists,'" Wisdom Apprentice, P.A. Kwasniewski, Ed., The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C., 2007, pp 13-39.

Text VIII: De Veritate, 10, 8, ad 13

Text

Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod intellectiva potentia est forma ipsius animae quantum ad actum essendi, eo quod habet esse in anima, sicut proprietas in subiecto; sed quantum ad actum intelligendi nihil prohibet esse e converso.

Translation

"The intellective power is a form of the soul with reference to its ‘act of being,’ for it exists in the soul as a property in a subject. But there is nothing to prevent the opposite of this, from being true with reference to the act of understanding."

Commentary on Text VIII: De Veritate, 10, 8, ad 13

In this text Aquinas makes use of the principle of metaphysical priority. The application of metaphysical priority to the notion of ‘act’ results in the following gradation of acts:

First act:

Pure Act (God)

Second act:

Actus Essendi (the metaphysical principle that goes with ‘essence’)

Third act:

Substantial Form (which exists in both spiritual and material beings)

Fourth act:

Accidental Form (like the intelligence of men and angels)

Fifth act:

Activity of Accidental Forms (like reasoning in man)

Sixth act:

Products of Certain Activities of Accidental Forms (like a conclusion reached after a process of reasoning)

In the text, Aquinas mentions four acts: 1) the actus essendi, 2) the soul--a substantial form, 3) the faculty of the intellect--an accidental form, and 4) the act of understanding--an activity of an accidental form.

Now, from the perspective of the actus essendi, it makes sense to say that the intellectual faculty of man inheres in the soul because the metaphysical principle of actus essendi refers to a self-subsisting individual that is actually existing here and now.

De Veritate, 10, 8, ad 13, expresses this as follows: "The intellective power is a form of the soul with reference to its ‘act of being,’ for it exists in the soul as a property in a subject." (Intellectiva potentia est forma ipsius animae quantum ad actum essendi, eo quod habet esse in anima, sicut proprietas in subiecto.)

But with respect to the activity of the intellectual faculty, the soul could be made the content of our thinking. The intellectual faculty of man can direct its activity towards getting information about our soul. In this sense, the soul informs, ‘gives form,’ to our act of understanding.

Text VII: De Veritate, 1, 1, ad sc 3

Text

Cum dicitur: ‘diversum est esse et quod est,’ distinguitur actus essendi ab eo cui ille actus convenit. Nomen autem entis ab actu essendi sumitur, non ab eo cui convenit actus essendi.

Translation

"In the statement, ‘the term esse is not equivalent to the expression ‘that which is,’” we are saying that the ‘act of being’—which is one of the meanings of term esse—is being distinguished from ‘that, to which that act belongs.’ The term ens—translated as 'being'— refers indeed to the ‘act of being,’ and not to ‘that, whose act it is.’"

Commentary on Text VII: De Veritate, 1, 1, ad sc 3

It is to be noted that in this text Aquinas uses the term esse to signify actus essendi. This meaning of esse goes beyond the mere fact of existing; this meaning of esse refers to something deeper. It refers to a metaphysical principle, namely, to the metaphysical principle of actus essendi.

After clarifying that from the side of the actus essendi every existing thing is said to be ens and that from the side of the essence every existing thing is said to be res, Aquinas now examines the relationship that exists between ens and quod est.

An existing thing is both ‘that which is’ (quod est) and a thing possessing the ‘act of being’ (ens.)

The point is this: the term ens does not take its meaning from ‘that which is,’ that is to say, from the quod est. The term ens takes its meaning from the metaphysical principle of actus essendi.

Just as laudans (laudantis) is the present active participle for the Latin verb laudare (laudo, laudare, laudavi, laudatus),’ ens (entis) is the present active participle of the Latin verb esse (sum, esse, fui, futurus.)

The term ens (entis) indeed is at times taken to signify ‘that which in any way whatsoever is,’ but in the present context Aquinas clearly puts aside this aspect of the meaning of ens to stress the direct relationship that exists between ens and actus essendi.

Text VI: De Veritate, 1, 1, ad 1

Text

Cum dicitur verum est 'id quod est,' li 'est' non accipitur ibi secundum quod significat actum essendi, sed secundum quod est nota intellectus componentis, prout scilicet affirmationem propositionis significat, ut sit sensus: verum est 'id quod est,' id est cum dicitur esse de aliquo quod est.

Translation

"In the statement 'The true is that which is,' the word 'is' is not here understood as referring to the act of being, but rather as the mark of the intellectual act of judging, signifying the affirmation of a proposition. The meaning would then be this: 'The true is that which is'--'the true' is had when the existence of 'what is,' is affirmed."

Commentary on Text VI: De Veritate, 1, 1, ad 1

In this text Aquinas clarifies his understanding of the relationship that exists between “language” and the metaphysical principle of actus essendi. The underlying principle is this: The linguistic expression “est” does not necessarily refer to the metaphysical principle of actus essendi. In the text Aquinas clearly puts aside this aspect of the meaning of “est.” The text concentrates rather on the affirmation of the fact of existence.

Many philosophers define “existence” as “fact.” In realistic terms, when we say, for example, “It is a fact that the moon exists,” we simply acknowledge the presence of something having real, demonstrable existence. Whenever anything exists, its “existence” is a fact. In this context, “existence” is more rigorously defined as the consequence of an actual “state of affairs.” And consequently, a non-actual “state of affairs” is never credited with the connotation of “existence.”

Both artificial and natural things can be conceived as actual “states of affairs.” In an existing car, for example, because all the elements have been harmoniously put together, we find an actual “state of affairs” holding in reality. And, by the same token, a fox, an animal, that we suddenly catched crossing the garden, embodies within its being an actual “state of affairs,” namely, an entirety of internal constituents which holding together by the principle of life make it a living being. Because of the natural arrangement of these internal constituents, the fox exists as much as the car exists. The fox exists in accordance with God’s ordinance; the car exists according to the inventions of the human mind.

When we have evidence of a particular thing actually existing in the world and we proceed to affirm its existence, we are simply translating our knowledge of the fact of existence into a true statement. The statement is true because we affirm the existence of “that which is.” This aspect of the verb “est” does not refer to the metaphysical principle of actus essendi; it refers to an actual “state of affairs,” to the fact of existing.

Text V: De Veritate, 1, 1, c

Text

Probat etiam Philosophus in III Metaphys., quod ens non potest esse genus. Sed secundum hoc aliqua dicuntur addere super ens, in quantum exprimunt modum ipsius entis qui nomine entis non exprimitur.

Quod contingit uno modo ut modus expressus sit modus generalis consequens omne ens in se.

Et hoc affirmative:

Non autem invenitur aliquid affirmative dictum absolute quod possit accipi in omni ente, nisi essentia eius, secundum quam esse dicitur; et sic imponitur hoc nomen res, quod in hoc differt ab ente, secundum Avicennam in principio Metaphys., quod ens sumitur ab actu essendi, sed nomen rei exprimit quidditatem vel essentiam entis.

Commentary on Text V: De Veritate, 1, 1, c

The text establishes a clear demarcation between terms derived from the metaphysical principle of essence and terms derived from the metaphysical principle of actus essendi. The major concern here is to clarify the meaning of the transcendental notion of res (thing), a term which derives its content and its transcendental connotation from the quiddity or essence of the thing.

The underlying principle of this doctrine is that, in the real world, one cannot have one of these two metaphysical principles existing without the other being present. In the real world essences exist with the actus essendi, and vice versa, the actus essendi always appears instantiated in an essence. For this reason, the term res (thing) expresses a transcendental notion; it stands for a universal mode of being that follows upon the fact of having an essence. Essences are found in every existing thing without exception.

Thus, from the side of the actus essendi every existing thing is said to be ens and from the side of the essence every existing thing is said to be res.

Text IV: In III Sent., 11, 1, 2, ad 2

Text

The text addresses the following argument:

1) De quocumque praedicatur inferius, et superius.
(2) Sed creatura est superius ad hominem.
(3) Ergo cum homo praedicetur de Christo, creatura de ipso praedicabitur.And here is how Aquinas responds:

Creatura non est superius ad hominem: quia creatio magis respicit esse quam naturam. Esse autem non est genus, nec inducitur in significatione alicujus generis, ut dicit Avicenna, cum ea quae sunt in uno genere, non conveniant in uno esse, sed in natura communi. Vel dicendum, quod creatura non est superius ad hominem, significans quid est homo: quia creatio non respicit naturam vel essentiam, nisi mediante actu essendi; qui est primus terminus creationis.

Humana autem natura in Christo non habet aliud esse perfectum quod est esse hypostasis, quam esse divinae personae; et ideo, simpliciter loquendo, creatura dici non potest: quia intelligeretur quod esse perfectum hypostasis Christi per creationem esset acquisitum.

Commentary on Text IV: In III Sent., 11, 1, 2, ad 2

In this text Aquinas addresses the issues that arise when one treats the terms “creature” and “man” as if they were concepts coming form the same kind of intellection.

The initial assumption is that the concept “man” is included within the category of “creatures.” But, if this were the case then, from the affirmation “Christ is man,” one would have to conclude “Christ is a creature.”

The response begins with a flat negation of the initial assumption. Simply expressed, the term “creature” cannot be conceived as a more general and wider category than the category of “man.”

The supporting argument is drawn from the two metaphysical principles “essence” and actus essendi.

Both the term “creature” and the term “creation,” says Aquinas, are rooted on the metaphysical principle actus essendi; not on the metaphysical principle of “essence.” Due to this connection then, the term “creature” does not have the properties of a concept derived from ordinary abstraction.

In other words, just as we do not generate a genus from the metaphysical principle of actus essendi, because the individuals contained in a genus differt according to their actus essendi, so also we do not have a genus behind the term “creature.” The individuals contained within the term “creature” do not have something in common by virtue of having a univocally common “nature.” They are called “creatures” because of their actus essendi.

Christ is a man but Christ is not a creature. In Christ, the uncreated Divine Actus Essendi takes on a human nature and it is this Divine Actus Essendi what makes Christ a real existing human being. The Most Holy Humanity of Christ can be said to be a “creature” only as part of Christ in the uncreated Divine Actus Essendi. Compared to the human nature of ordinary men, the human nature of Christ is not instantiated on account of a substantial human actus essendi.

Text III: In I Sent., 8, 5, 2, c

Text

In compositis autem ex materia et forma ‘quo est’ potest dici tripliciter. Potest enim dici ‘quo est’ ipsa forma partis, quae dat esse materiae. Potest etiam dici ‘quo est’ ipse actus essendi, scilicet esse, sicut quo curritur, est actus currendi. Potest etiam dici ‘quo est’ ipsa natura quae relinquitur ex conjunctione formae cum materia, ut humanitas; praecipue secundum ponentes quod forma, quae est totum, quae dicitur quidditas, non est forma partis, de quibus est Avicenna.

Commentary on Text III: In I Sent., 8, 5, 2, c

In this text Aquinas further clarifies his understanding of the metaphysical principles of ‘essence’ and actus essendi. The example with which Aquinas forcefully accentuates the validity of his insight is the human soul taken in its spiritual substantiality.

In essence, the text talks about three realities that can be described with the Latin expression quo est, (1) the ‘form,’ as in the Aristotelian distinction matter and form; (2) the actus essendi, as in the distinction ‘essence’ and actus essendi; and (3) the substance, as in the Aristotelian distinction substance and accidents. In this context, Aquinas explains that he takes the term quidditas to mean ‘essence’.

As for the Aristotelian distinction matter and form, the human soul, in its spiritual substantiality, is never composed of matter and form. The ones who are in fact composed of matter and form are individual men existing here on earth, as long as they are here on earth, as well as individual men who are already enjoying the state of glory with body and soul in heaven. For these, the composition of matter and form is the composition soul and body.

As for the distinction ‘essence’ and actus essendi, the human soul, in its spiritual substantiality, is always affected by the actus essendi. But the ones who participate in the actus essendi are individual existing men and only through them does the soul get its actuality.

As for the Aristotelian distinction substance and accidents, the human soul, in its spiritual substantiality, can in one sense be said to be a quidditas and in another sense, not to be. Here Aquinas speaks most clearly about how he conceives the metaphysical principle of ‘essence.’

For one thing is the existing real thing which has quidditas, another the quidditas which makes that thing to be what it is, and yet another the actus essendi of the thing which places both the thing itself and its quidditas in actual existence.

In material beings in general, Aquinas conceives quidditas or ‘essence’ as the bare support of matter and form at the exclusion of two "things," (1) all accidental perfections and (2) the actual existence of the thing in the external world. In describing this conception of ‘essence’ Aquinas stresses a double emphasis. On the one hand, the quidditas or ‘essence’ of a material thing must include the matter. On the other, the quidditas or ‘essence’ of a material thing must exclude all the accidental perfections and the actus essendi.

Now since man is not only a material creature composed of matter and form, but also an everlasting spiritual person, this conception of quidditas is applicable to men under certain circumstances but not, under others.

For the individual men existing with body and soul (either here on earth or in the state of glory), Aquinas takes ‘essence’ or quidditas to be not the soul in its spiritual substantiality but ‘humanity,’ the ‘humanity’ of an individual person. By ‘humanity’ Aquinas means what is essential for a man to be a man and nothing else, other than that. In this context, the term ‘humanity’ comprises everything in the individual person except (1) the accidental perfections and (2) the ‘act of being.’

For the individual men existing in heaven as they await the resurrection of the body, Aquinas takes ‘essence’ or quidditas to be the soul itself in its spiritual substantiality. In this regard the separated soul and the angels have something in common, namely this, that their ‘essence’ does not include matter. In “defining” the ‘essence’ of the separated soul and angels, there is only one emphasis, namely, that the ‘essence’ of a spiritual being excludes (1) all the accidental perfections that that spiritual being might have and (2) the actus essendi. The emphasis on excluding matter is not needed.

Thus we have the following.
(1) The form, as quo est for the matter, is that without which the matter cannot be matter.
(2) The actus essendi, as quo est for the essence, is that without which the essence cannot be real in an individual thing.
(3) The ‘essence,’ as quo est for the thing, is that without which the thing cannot be what it is.

Text II: In I Sent., 8, 4, 2, ad 2

Text

Hoc quod dico, ‘ens non est in subjecto,’ non dicit aliquod genus: quia in quolibet genere oportet significare quidditatem aliquam, ut dictum est, de cujus intellectu non est esse. Ens autem non dicit quidditatem, sed solum actum essendi, cum sit principium ipsum; et ideo non sequitur: ‘est non in subjecto:’ ergo ‘est in genere substantiae.’

Commentary on Text II: In I Sent., 8, 4, 2, ad 2

In this text Aquinas analyzes the expression ens non est in subjecto, to say that it refers to ‘beings’ which exist by themselves, that is to say, ‘beings’ which do not depend on another ‘being’ to subsist. Ens non est in subjecto means “a being that subsists in itself and not in another subject.”

As such, the meaning of ens does not include other ways of ‘being’ in which the reality signified is meant to exist as inhering in another subject. The latter meaning of ens applies to realities that fall within the Aristotelian categories of accidents; the former, to realities that fall within the category of substance.

The text is meant to show that from ens non est in subjecto one cannot conclude, therefore est in genere substantiae. In other words, from “an existing thing that does not need another subject on which to inhere” one cannot conclude that “it falls within the category of substance.”

To establish this Aquinas makes use of the two fundamental metaphysical principles of ‘essence’ and actus essendi.

Although properly speaking ‘substance’ cannot be defined, Aquinas proceeds as if one were able to define substance. When trying to explain what ‘substance’ is, Aquinas says that he is providing only a quasi definitio of substance. ‘Substance,’ as one of the supreme categories, cannot be defined by indicating its genus and specific difference.

In the present text, substance is first considered from the side of the metaphysical principle of 'essence' and then from the side of the metaphysical principle of actus essendi.

Thus, in trying to define substance from the side of the metaphysical principle ‘essence,’ Aquinas reasons that in this approach the emphasis falls on “that which has a quiddity” regardless of whether or not that quiddity actually exists in individual things.

From the side of the ‘essence,’ therefore, substance is conceived as “that which has a quiddity, a quiddity meant to be instantiated in something that does not inhere in another subject.” But the actual existence of individual things under that quiddity is irrelevant to conceive an answer to what substance is in this way.

Whereas, in trying to define substance from the side of the actus essendi, Aquinas reasons that in this other approach the emphasis falls on the actual existence of an individual thing.

Substance is still regarded as “that which has a quiddity” but now substance is more narrowly conceived.

From the side of the actus essendi, substance is ens, substance is something actually existing, it is an individual existing thing “which subsists in itself and not in another subject,” regardless of what exactly that thing is.

A key point is this. It is not on account of the actus essendi that individual things fall within a genus. The singular things contained in a genus are different in as much as one considers them from the side of their actus essendi. Contrariwise, the singular things contained in a genus are similar when considered from the side of their quiddity.

The metaphysical rigor of the philosophy of being makes known to us that the quiddity of a material thing is not its actus essendi. Thus quiddities can be conceived without making reference to actus essendi.

Now the expression ens non est in subjecto, as indicated, does not signify substance as “that which has a quiddity” because the expression ens non est in subjecto comes from the side of the metaphysical principle of the actus essendi, not from the side of ‘essence.’

And the fact is that the expression ens non est in subjecto include some things which are not substance at all, as is the case of the sacramental species remaining without a subject after the words of the consecration during holy Mass.

Therefore when going from ens non est in subjecto to ergo est in genere substantiae, Aquinas concludes with a non sequitur.

Text I: In I Sent., 8, 1, 1, c

Text

Cum in omni quod est sit considerare quidditatem suam, per quam subsistit in natura determinata, et esse suum, per quod dicitur de eo quod est in actu, hoc nomen res imponitur rei a quidditate sua, secundum Avicennam, hoc nomen qui est vel ens imponitur ab ipso actu essendi. Cum autem ita sit quod in qualibet re creata essentia sua differat a suo esse, res illa proprie denominatur a quidditate sua, et non ab actu essendi, sicut homo ab humanitate. In Deo autem ipsum esse suum est sua quidditas: et ideo nomen quod sumitur ab esse, proprie nominat ipsum, et est proprium nomen ejus: sicut proprium nomen hominis quod sumitur a quidditate sua.

Commentary on Text I: In I Sent., 8, 1, 1, c

In the text Aquinas addresses the issue of whether or not Qui est (He Who Is) is the proper name of God. The text highlights the familiar contrast between the metaphysical principle of actus essendi and the metaphysical principle of ‘essence.’ Here Aquinas begins with the things of nature where the 'essence' of the thing limits the actus essendi.

Accordingly, it is not on the basis of the actus essendi of the things of nature that we say what a thing is. It is the metaphysical principle of ‘essence’ what allows us to say what a thing of nature is.

God, however, is the only one in whom there is just one metaphysical principle, the actus essendi, and this metaphysical principle is his ‘essence.’

Names related to the principle of actus essendi are therefore most properly said of God because in Him and only in Him ‘essence’ puts no limit to the actus essendi—in God ‘essence’ and actus essendi are one and the same metaphysical principle.

Thus, just as the name ‘man’ is the proper term to refer to certain ‘living beings’ because the name ‘man’ is taken from their ‘essence,’ Qui est is the proper name of God because, as far as we are able to do so, with the expression Qui est we refer to God’s ‘essence,’ to His actus essendi.

As explained earlier, the Latin est has more than one meaning, and when applied to the things of nature, if there is direct and immediate contact with an individual real sensible thing, est signifies the actus essendi, not the ‘essence’ of the thing.

Now in the case of God we ordinarily do not have direct and immediate experience of Him, but still, the name Qui est, when applied to God, is applied in the way est is applied to the things of nature, that is to say, it is applied to God as coming from His actus essendi.

And properly so, because it turns out that this is equivalent to saying what God is, as if the name Qui est were taken as coming from His ‘essence.’ Qui est is the proper term to refer to God because ultimately the reference of Qui est is God's 'essence,' His actus essendi.

Note on Translation: The expression "actus essendi" is translated into English as "act of being," into Italian as "atto di essere," into French as "acte d'être," into Spanish as "acto de ser," and into German as "Akt des Seins" ("Seinsakt.")

0189: The Thirteen Texts in which Aquinas Uses the Expression "Actus Essendi" (XIII)

2011-09-05T01:55:00.001-04:00

Entry 0189: The Thirteen Texts in which Aquinas Uses the Expression "Actus Essendi" (XIII)

I. In I Sent., 8, 1, 1, c

II. In I Sent., 8, 4, 2, ad 2

III. In I Sent., 8, 5, 2, c

IV. In III Sent., 11, 1, 2, ad 2

V. De Veritate, 1, 1, c

VI. De Veritate, 1,1, ad 1

VII. De Veritate, 1, 1, ad sc 3

VIII. De Veritate, 10, 8, ad 13

IX. Summa Theologiae, I, 3, 4, ad 2

X. De Potentia, 7, 2, ad 1

XI. Quaestiones Quodlibetales, 9, 4, 1, c

XII. In Metaphysicorum, 4, 2, No. 6

XIII. In De Hebdomadibus, 2

Commentary on Text XIII: In De Hebdomadibus, 2

Text

Deinde cum [Boetius] dicit, "ipsum enim esse," manifestat praedictam diversitatem [i.e., differentiam eius quod est esse ad id quod est] tribus modis: quorum primus est, quia ipsum esse non significatur sicut ipsum subiectum essendi, sicut nec currere significatur sicut subiectum cursus: unde, sicut non possumus dicere quod ipsum currere currat, ita non possumus dicere quod ipsum esse sit: sed sicut id ipsum quod est, significatur sicut subiectum essendi, sic id quod currit significatur sicut subiectum currendi: et ideo sicut possumus dicere de eo quod currit, sive de currente, quod currat, inquantum subiicitur cursui et participat ipsum; ita possumus dicere quod ens, sive id quod est, sit, inquantum participat actum essendi: et hoc est quod [Boetius] dicit: "ipsum esse nondum est," quia non attribuitur sibi esse sicut subiecto essendi; sed id quod est, accepta essendi forma, scilicet suscipiendo ipsum actum essendi, est, atque consistit, idest in seipso subsistit.

Translation

[In the paragraph] where it says, "For to be itself...," he [Boethius] states this difference [i.e., the difference between what is meant by "to be" and what is meant by "that which is"] in three ways, of which the first is this: [When attributed to something] "to be itself" is not signified as if it were the subject of being, any more than to run signifies the subject of running.

Just as we cannot say that "to run itself" runs, so we cannot say that "to be itself" is, and just as "that which is" is signified as the subject of being, so "that which runs" is signified as the subject of running.

Therefore, just as we can say of him who runs, or the runner, that he runs, insofar as he is the subject of running and participates in it, so we can say that an existent--a being--or "that which is," is.

That is what he [Boethius] means when he says, "to be itself is not yet," because to be is not attributed to something as to a subject of being; but "that which is," having received a form of being, that is to say, by receiving the very act of being, "is," and consists, that is to say, subsists in itself.

Commentary

Note on Translation: The expression "actus essendi" is translated into English as "act of being," into Italian as "atto di essere," into French as "acte d'être," into Spanish as "acto de ser," and into German as "Akt des Seins" ("Seinsakt.")

0188: Knasas and Fides et Ratio

2011-08-29T01:31:00.004-04:00

Entry 0188: Knasas and Fides et Ratio

In his review of John F. X. Knasas’ Being and Some Twentieth-Century Thomists (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003. xxvi + 313 pp.), Anthony Dean Traylor writes:

Knasas has admirably heeded the call of John Paul II’s encyclical Fides et Ratio not to allow the actus essendi to become eclipsed as we enter into the twenty-first century.

The Review of Metaphysics 58 (2004): 447-449.

0187: Philosophy of Actus Essendi -- One Universally Valid Philosophy Recommended by Fides et Ratio (XII)

2011-08-22T01:56:00.003-04:00

Entry 0187: The Philosophy of the Actus Essendi -- The One Universally Valid Philosophy Recommended by Fides et Ratio (XII)

Thomas J. White writes:

Do we lack foundations or necessarily binding starting points through which natural reason might convey a universally compelling vision of the tasks of human thought?

Perhaps, in our frail and fallen state, it is only under the stimulating and strengthening effects of grace that weakened reason is healed.

It does not follow that there are no such things as essentially necessary rational arguments, but only that in the openness to a philosophical argument more is at work than the operation of a mere neutral rationality.

For I am more likely to consider arguments that I have a soul if at the same time I am otherwise seeing, through the eyes of faith, that the spiritual person who I am needs his soul to be saved.

The opposite is true as well, however: Even if by faith I believe in the reality of the soul, if I cannot see the rationality of the belief, the faith remains something extrinsic to reason and therefore inherently unstable for me, and potentially painful to embrace.

For without recourse to the explicit practice of philosophical study in its own right, Christians are unable to receive from the tradition they espouse its own classical practices of thought.

Ignorance of philosophy sterilizes the intellectual reception of the Christian tradition. [1]

[1]↑ Thomas J. White, “Whether Faith Needs Philosophy,” in First Things August/September, 2011, pp. 47-51.

0186: Aquinas as Guide and Model for Philosophical Thinking

2011-08-15T01:26:00.001-04:00

Entry 0186: Aquinas as Guide and Model for Philosophical Thinking

Cardinal Georges Cottier has explicitly affirmed that, in the Encyclical Letter Fides et Ratio, Saint Thomas Aquinas is presented as a model not only for those who have the vocation of theologians, but also for those who have the vocation of philosophers:

San Tommaso e presentato come modello sia per quanti hanno la vocazione di teologo, sia per quanti hanno la vocazione di filosofo. [1]

Here I report some excerpts from Fides et Ratio which confirm Cottier’s affirmation:

The Magisterium's intention has always been to show how Saint Thomas is an authentic model for all who seek the truth. In his thinking, the demands of reason and the power of faith found the most elevated synthesis ever attained by human thought, for he could defend the radical newness introduced by Revelation without ever demeaning the venture proper to reason. (no. 78)

This insistence on the need for a close relationship of continuity between contemporary philosophy and the philosophy developed in the Christian tradition is intended to avert the danger which lies hidden in some currents of thought which are especially prevalent today. (no. 86)

A renewed insistence upon the thought of the Angelic Doctor seemed to Pope Leo XIII the best way to recover the practice of a philosophy consonant with the demands of faith. "Just when Saint Thomas distinguishes perfectly between faith and reason," the Pope writes, "he unites them in bonds of mutual friendship, conceding to each its specific rights and to each its specific dignity." (no. 57)

If it has been necessary from time to time to intervene on this question, to reiterate the value of the Angelic Doctor's insights and insist on the study of his thought, this has been because the Magisterium's directives have not always been followed with the readiness one would wish. (no. 61)

The Church has been justified in consistently proposing Saint Thomas as a master of thought and a model of the right way to do theology. (no. 43)

Although he made much of the supernatural character of faith, the Angelic Doctor did not overlook the importance of its reasonableness; indeed he was able to plumb the depths and explain the meaning of this reasonableness. Faith is in a sense an “exercise of thought”; and human reason is neither annulled nor debased in assenting to the contents of faith, which are in any case attained by way of free and informed choice. (no. 43)

Precisely in the light of this consideration, and just as I have reaffirmed theology's duty to recover its true relationship with philosophy, I feel equally bound to stress how right it is that, for the benefit and development of human thought, philosophy too should recover its relationship with theology. (no. 101)

Looking unreservedly to truth, the realism of Thomas could recognize the objectivity of truth and produce not merely a philosophy of “what seems to be” but a philosophy of “what is.” (no. 44)

Set within the Christian metaphysical tradition, the philosophy of being is a dynamic philosophy which views reality in its ontological, causal and communicative structures. It is strong and enduring because it is based upon the very act of being itself (ipsum actus essendi,) which allows a full and comprehensive openness to reality as a whole, surpassing every limit in order to reach the One who brings all things to fulfilment. (no. 97)

I have judged it appropriate and necessary to emphasize the value of philosophy for the understanding of the faith, as well as the limits which philosophy faces when it neglects or rejects the truths of Revelation. (no. 100)

In itself, the term [Christian philosophy] is valid, but it should not be misunderstood: it in no way intends to suggest that there is an official philosophy of the Church, since the faith as such is not a philosophy. The term seeks rather to indicate a Christian way of philosophizing, a philosophical speculation conceived in dynamic union with faith. (no. 76)

Note

[1]↑ Georges Cottier, “Tommaso D’Aquino, Teologo e Filosofo, nella Fides et Ratio,” in Fede e Ragione: Opposizione, Composizione?, Mauro Mantovani, Scaria Thuruthiyil, and Mario Toso, eds. (Rome: Libreria Ateneo Salesiano, 1999), 187-194.

0185: The Self-Evident Connotation of the Actus Essendi (IX)

2011-08-08T01:09:00.005-04:00

Entry 0185: The Self-Evident Connotation of the Actus Essendi (IX)

In the article on Saint Thomas Aquinas in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy professor Ralph McInerny writes:

“Thomas accepts from Boethius that it is self-evident that what a thing is and its existing differ (diversum est esse et id quod est).” [1]

And earlier, in his Boethius and Aquinas, Ralph McInerny had made the following remark:

“That the diversity between esse and id quod est is self-evident is one of the great overlooked claims of De hebdomadibus and of Thomas's commentary on it.” [2]

Notes

[1]↑ Ralph McInerny and John O’Callaghan, “Saint Thomas Aquinas,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.). (First published online Mon Jul 12, 1999; substantive revision Wed Sep 30, 2009; accessed August 3, 2011.)

[2]↑ Ralph McInerny, Boethius and Aquinas, (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1990), p. xiv.

0184: Actus Essendi and Participation

2011-08-01T01:41:00.003-04:00

Entry 0184: Actus Essendi and Participation

The two fundamental metaphysical principles of essence and actus essendi are not instantiated in isolation in the real world. A subsisting extramental thing cannot not possess these two metaphysical principles.

However, in a subsisting extramental thing, the instatiation of the essence is not the same as the instatiation of the actus essendi.

In the line of essence, things that possess the same essence are said to possess the fulness of that essence. There are no degrees of horseness, for example, because the essence of horseness is shared by horses by way of a univocal predicamental participation. One individual horse is as much of a horse when compared to another individual horse.

In the line of actus essendi, on the other hand, only God instantiates the fulness of the metaphysical principle of actus essendi. All other subsisting extramental things receive their actus essendi with the limitations imposed by the particular essence which defines what the thing is. The essence of God is the only essence which does not limit the actus essendi.

Participation in actus essendi is therefere said to be a non-univocal transcendental participation because the perfection which is being participated is instantiated only up to a certain degree of participation in the individual thing.

In the words of Aquinas, “Nothing is assigned to a genus by reason of its act of being but by reason of its essence; and this is clear from the fact that the act of being of a thing is proper to that thing and distinct from the act being of anything else” (De Potentia, question 7, article 3, corpus.)

The essence principle of humanity is the same in two different human beings, but the act of being principle of Plato is not the same as the act of being principle of Socrates for it is impossible that there not be, of one thing, one act of being. And, again, in Aquinas words, “each thing has within itself its own act of being, distinct from all other things” (Summa Contra Gentiles, book I, chapter 14, no. 2.)

Thus, participation in essence is not the same as participation in actus essendi. In a subsisting extramental thing there always is a particular essence instantiated by way of a univocal predicamental participation and some degree of actus essendi instantiated by way of a non-univocal transcendental participation.

0183: Actus Essendi and Existence (V)

2011-07-25T01:31:00.004-04:00

Entry 0183: Actus Essendi and Existence (V)

The connotation of existence and the notion of actus essendi are closely related, but they are not equivalent concepts. In the present context it should suffice to say that existence applies to that which exists in any way whasoever, whereas actus essendi applies only to that which exists as a subsisting extramental thing.

The notion of existence reflects the facticity of any state of affairs. Of anything that in any way whatsoever exists, one can say that its existence is a fact.

Actus essendi, on the other hand, refers to an innermost principle which serves as the ultimate ground of all the actuality, perfection, and knowability instantiated in a subsisting extramental thing of nature.

The possession of actus essendi necessarily results in having existence, but among existing things there are many which are not subsisting extramental things.

With reference to God, for example, Aquinas explains that knowledge of the existence of God is not the same as the knowledge of His act of being, that while we cannot know God’s act of being nor His essence, we are able to know the existence of God.

0182: The Thirteen Texts in which Aquinas Uses the Expression "Actus Essendi" (XII)

2011-07-18T01:06:00.005-04:00

Entry 0182: The Thirteen Texts in which Aquinas Uses the Expression "Actus Essendi" (XII)

I. In I Sent., 8, 1, 1, c

II. In I Sent., 8, 4, 2, ad 2

III. In I Sent., 8, 5, 2, c

IV. In III Sent., 11, 1, 2, ad 2

V. De Veritate, 1, 1, c

VI. De Veritate, 1,1, ad 1

VII. De Veritate, 1, 1, ad sc 3

VIII. De Veritate, 10, 8, ad 13

IX. Summa Theologiae, I, 3, 4, ad 2

X. De Potentia, 7, 2, ad 1

XI. Quaestiones Quodlibetales, 9, 4, 1, c

XII. In Metaphysicorum, 4, 2, No. 6

XIII. In De Hebdomadibus, 2

Commentary on Text XII: In Metaphysicorum, 4, 2, No. 6

Text

Sciendum est enim quod hoc nomen homo, imponitur a quidditate, sive a natura hominis; et hoc nomen res imponitur a quidditate tantum; hoc vero nomen ens, imponitur ab actu essendi: et hoc nomen unum, ab ordine vel indivisione. Est enim unum ens indivisum. Idem autem est quod habet essentiam et quidditatem per illam essentiam, et quod est in se indivisum. Unde ista tria, res, ens, unum, significant omnino idem, sed secundum diversas rationes.

Translation

For it must be borne in mind that the term "man" is derived from the quiddity or the nature of man, and the term "thing" from the quiddity only; but the term "being" is derived from the 'act of being,' and the term "one" from order or lack of division; for what is one is an undivided being. Now what has an essence, and a quiddity by reason of that essence, and what is undivided in itself, are the same. Hence these three—thing, being, and one—signify absolutely the same thing but according to different concepts.

Commentary

Note on Translation: The expression "actus essendi" is translated into English as "act of being," into Italian as "atto di essere," into French as "acte d'être," into Spanish as "acto de ser," and into German as "Akt des Seins" ("Seinsakt.")

0181: The Thirteen Texts in which Aquinas Uses the Expression "Actus Essendi" (XI)

2011-07-11T01:32:00.004-04:00

Entry 0181: The Thirteen Texts in which Aquinas Uses the Expression "Actus Essendi" (XI)

I. In I Sent., 8, 1, 1, c

II. In I Sent., 8, 4, 2, ad 2

III. In I Sent., 8, 5, 2, c

IV. In III Sent., 11, 1, 2, ad 2

V. De Veritate, 1, 1, c

VI. De Veritate, 1,1, ad 1

VII. De Veritate, 1, 1, ad sc 3

VIII. De Veritate, 10, 8, ad 13

IX. Summa Theologiae, I, 3, 4, ad 2

X. De Potentia, 7, 2, ad 1

XI. Quaestiones Quodlibetales, 9, 4, 1, c

XII. In Metaphysicorum, 4, 2, No. 6

XIII. In De Hebdomadibus, 2

Commentary on Text XI: Quaestiones Quodlibetales, 9, 4, 1, c

Text

Sed quia substantia Angeli non est suum esse -- hoc enim soli Deo competit, cui esse debetur ex seipso, et non ab alio --; invenimus in Angelo et substantiam sive quidditatem eius, quae subsistit, et esse eius, quo subsistit, quo scilicet actu essendi dicitur esse, sicut actu currendi dicimur currere. Et sic dicimus Angelum esse compositum ex quo est et quod est, vel secundum verbum Boetii ex esse et quod est. Et quia ipsa substantia Angeli in se considerata est in potentia ad esse, cum habeat esse ab alio, et ipsum esse sit actus; ideo est in eo compositio actus et potentiae; et sic posset in eo concedi materia et forma, si omnis actus debeat dici forma, et omnis potentia materia. Sed hoc non competit in proposito; quia esse non est actus qui sit pars essentiae, sicut forma; ipsa quidditas Angeli vel substantia est per se subsistens, quod materiae non competit.

Commentary

Note on Translation: The expression "actus essendi" is translated into English as "act of being," into Italian as "atto di essere," into French as "acte d'être," into Spanish as "acto de ser," and into German as "Akt des Seins" ("Seinsakt.")

0180: Russell Hittinger on Actus Essendi

2011-07-04T02:37:00.000-04:00

Entry 0180: Russell Hittinger on Actus Essendi

In issue no. 184 of First Things (June/July, 2008, p 38) Professor Russell Hittinger writes,

“Speaking at his alma mater, the Angelicum, on the anniversary of Aeterni Patris in 1979, he [Pope John Paul II] said that ‘the philosophy of St. Thomas is a philosophy of being, that is, of the “act of existing” (actus essendi) whose transcendental value paves the most direct way to rise to the knowledge of subsisting Being and pure Act, namely to God.’ In his 1998 encyclical Fides et Ratio, he again warned that theology needs both analytic rigor and a sapiential dimension drawn from a philosophy of being.”

0179: The Self-Evident Connotation of the Actus Essendi (VIII)

2011-06-27T01:38:00.005-04:00

Entry 0179: The Self-Evident Connotation of the Actus Essendi (VIII)

In the history of thought, the discovery of a new concept often represents a major step for the advancement of knowledge.

Blessed Duns Scotus (1266-1308,) for example, introduced into theology the concept of “redemption by preservation,” according to which the Blessed Virgin Mary was redeemed in an even more wonderful way: not by being freed from sin, but by being preserved from sin. [1]

Similarly, Saint Thomas Aquinas discovered the notion of actus essendi in his Christianizing of Aristotle. In the Wikipedia article Actus Essendi, one reads that “In fact, the contribution of Aquinas to the philosophy of being is precisely this, that he discovered that all Aristotelian acts were in reality ‘potency’ with respect to the actus essendi.”

The discovery of the notion of actus essendi equipped Aquinas with the metaphysical principle he needed to formulate an original and incisive argument for the existence of God. The Actus Essendi Way developed by Aquinas sets him apart from all other philosophers, including Aristotle. [2]

Notes

[1]↑ John Paul II, General Audience, 5 June 1996.

[2]↑ See my article Does God Exist?

0178: Pope Benedict XVI on Aquinas (XVIII)

2011-06-20T02:02:00.002-04:00

Entry 0178: In his reflections on prayer in the General Audience of 11 May 2011, Pope Benedict XVI refers to Saint Thomas Aquinas as follows:

Man bears within him a thirst for the infinite, a longing for eternity, a quest for beauty, a desire for love, a need for light and for truth which impel him towards the Absolute; man bears within him the desire for God. And man knows, in a certain way, that he can turn to God, he knows he can pray to him.

St Thomas Aquinas, one of the greatest theologians of history, defines prayer as “an expression of man’s desire for God”. This attraction to God, which God himself has placed in man, is the soul of prayer, that then takes on a great many forms, in accordance with the history, the time, the moment, the grace and even the sin of every person praying.

Indeed in the Summa Theologiae (part II-II, question 83, article 9, corpus) Aquinas writes: "For since prayer interprets our desires, as it were, before God, then alone is it right to ask for something in our prayers when it is right that we should desire it." (Oratio est quodammodo desiderii nostri interpres apud Deum, illa solum recte orando petimus quae recte desiderare valemus.)

0177: The Saint of Ordinary Life

2011-06-13T02:56:00.004-04:00

Entry 0177: The Saint of Ordinary Life

Address of John Paul II
in Praise of Saint Josemaria Escriva
Founder of Opus Dei

Monday, 7 October 2002

Dear Brothers and Sisters,

1. I am happy to greet you cordially, the day after the canonization of the Bl. Josemaría Escrivá de Balaguer. I thank Archbishop Javier Echevarría, Prelate of Opus Dei, for his expression of gratitude on your behalf. With affection I greet the many Cardinals, Bishops and priests who have wanted to take part in this celebration.

This festive gathering brings together a great variety of faithful from many countries who belong to very different social and cultural backgrounds: priests and lay people, men and women, young and old, intellectuals and blue collar workers. This is a sign of the apostolic zeal that burned in the soul of St Josemaría.

2. In the Founder of Opus Dei, there is an extraordinary love for the will of God. There exists a sure criterion of holiness: fidelity in accomplishing the divine will down to the last consequences. For each one of us the Lord has a plan, to each he entrusts a mission on earth. The saint could not even conceive of himself outside of God's plan. He lived only to achieve it.

St Josemaría was chosen by the Lord to announce the universal call to holiness and to point out that daily life and ordinary activities are a path to holiness. One could say that he was the saint of ordinary life. In fact, he was convinced that for those who live with a perspective of faith, everything is an opportunity to meet God, everything can be an incentive for prayer. Seen in this light, daily life reveals an unexpected greatness. Holiness is truly within everyone's reach.

3. Escrivá de Balaguer was a very human saint. All those who met him, whatever their culture or social status, felt he was a father, totally devoted to serving others, for he was convinced that every soul is a marvellous treasure; indeed, every person is worth all of Christ's Blood. This attitude of service is obvious in his dedication to his priestly ministry and in the magnanimity with which he launched so many works of evangelization and human advancement for the poorest persons.

The Lord gave him a profound understanding of the gift of our divine sonship. He taught him to contemplate the tender face of a Father in the God who speaks to us through the most varied events of life. A Father who loves us, who follows us step by step, who protects us, understands us and awaits from each of us a response of love. The consideration of this fatherly presence which accompanies the Christian everywhere gives him steadfast confidence; he must trust in the heavenly Father at every moment. He should never feel lonely or frightened. When the Cross is present, he should not see it as a punishment, but a mission entrusted by the Lord himself. The Christian is necessarily optimistic, because he knows he is a son of God in Christ.

4. St Josemaría was profoundly convinced that the Christian life entails a mission and an apostolate: we are in the world to save it with Christ. He loved the world passionately, with a "redemptive love" (cf. Catechism of the Catholic Church, no. 604). Precisely for this reason his teachings have helped so many ordinary members of the faithful to discover the redemptive power of faith, its capacity to transform the earth.

This is a message that has abundant and fruitful implications for the evangelizing mission of the Church. It fosters the Christianization of the world "from within", showing that there can be no conflict between divine law and the demands of genuine human progress. This saintly priest taught that Christ must be the apex of all human activity (cf. Jn 12,32).

His message impels the Christian to act in places where the future of society is being shaped. From the laity's active presence in all the professions and at the most advanced frontiers of development, there can only come a positive contribution to the strengthening of that harmony between faith and culture which is one of the greatest needs of our time.

5. St Josemaría Escrivá spent his life for the service of the Church. In his writings, priests and lay people, men and women religious who follow the most varied paths, find a stimulating source of inspiration. Dear brothers and sisters, in imitating him with openness of spirit and heart, with a readiness to serve the local Churches, you contribute to strengthening the "spirituality of communion" which my Apostolic Letter Novo Millennio ineunte points out as one of the most important goals of our time (cf. nos. 42-45).

I welcome the chance to mention today's liturgical feast of Our Lady of the Rosary. St Josemaría wrote a beautiful small book called The Holy Rosary, which presents spiritual childhood, a real disposition of spirit of those who wish to attain total abandonment to the divine will. I heartily entrust all of you, with your families and your apostolate, to the motherly protection of Mary and I thank you for your presence.

6. I once again thank everyone present, especially those who have come from afar. Dear brothers and sisters, I invite you to take a visible witness of faith everywhere, in accord with the example and teaching of your holy Founder. I accompany you with my prayer and I warmly bless you, your families and your activities.

0176: The Self-Evident Connotation of the Actus Essendi (VII)

2011-06-06T02:49:00.007-04:00

Entry 0176: The Self-Evident Connotation of the Actus Essendi (VII)

Remarks by Douglas B. Rasmussen

"We do not ever really have to wonder whether we are in cognitive contact with reality—that is a given. It should be noted that the Aristotelian approach to this issue does not confine knowledge to strictly that of knowing propositions. I have used the term ‘cognition’ here to indicate an intentional union or contact with reality. This certainly includes but is not confined to the propositional." [1]

0175: Remarks on the Principle of Non-Contradiction (V)

2011-05-30T02:17:00.002-04:00

Entry 0175: Remarks on the Principle of Non-Contradiction (V)

Remarks by Thomas D. D'Andrea:

“For both Aristotle and Aquinas, the first principle of understanding [is] the metaphysical principle of non-contradiction. Of this, Aristotle says:

the most certain principle of all is that regarding which it is impossible to be mistaken; for such a principle must be both the best known (for all men may be mistaken about things which they do not know), and non-hypothetical. For a principle that anyone must have who understands anything is not a hypothesis… Evidently then such a principle is the most certain of all; which principle this is let us proceed to say. It is, that the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject and in the same respect… This then is the most certain of all principles, since it answers to the definition given above. For it is impossible for any one to believe the same thing to be and not to be, as some think Heraclitus says. For what a man says, he does not necessarily believe… (Metaphysics IV, 1 005b12-25, Ross trans.)

“Aquinas glosses these remarks by referring to the principle as ‘the axiom of all axioms’ (Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, para. 604), and adds that, ‘evidently this principle is not based on an assumption. Indeed, insofar as it is by nature a starting point, it clearly comes unsought to the one having it and is not acquired by his own efforts’ (para. 605). Aquinas can plausibly be taken to hold here that the first principle is embedded (implicit and presupposed) in all human thought as such, from which it does not follow that all humans know that the principle is true (even philosophers such as Heraclitus seem confused about it), or that they know, moreover, that it is necessarily true, and even the most basic of necessary truths (i.e., as the truth presupposed by all other necessary truths).” [1]

Note

[1]↑ Thomas D. D'Andrea, Tradition, Rationality, and Virtue: The Thought of Alasdair MacIntyre, (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2006), 413.

0174: Pope Benedict XVI on the Most Convincing Demonstration of the Truth of the Christian Faith (II)

2011-05-23T02:03:00.002-04:00

Entry 0174: Pope Benedict XVI on the Most Convincing Demonstration of the Truth of the Christian Faith (II)

"I have often affirmed my conviction that the true apology of Christian faith, the most convincing demonstration of its truth against every denial, are the saints, and the beauty that the faith has generated. Today, for faith to grow, we must lead ourselves and the persons we meet to encounter the saints and to enter into contact with the Beautiful." [1]

[1]↑ Pope Benedict XVI, "The Feeling of Things, the Contemplation of Beauty" in L'Osservatore Romano English Weekly Edition, 6 November 2002, pp. 6-7.

0173: Pope Benedict XVI on the Most Convincing Demonstration of the Truth of the Christian Faith (I)

2011-05-16T02:11:00.007-04:00

Entry 0173: Pope Benedict XVI on the Most Convincing Demonstration of the Truth of the Christian Faith (I)

"I would like to add that for me not only a few great saints whom I love and whom I know well are 'signposts', but precisely also the simple saints, that is, the good people I see in my life who will never be canonized. They are ordinary people, so to speak, without visible heroism but in their everyday goodness I see the truth of faith. This goodness, which they have developed in the faith of the Church, is for me the most reliable apology of Christianity and the sign of where the truth lies,"

the Holy Father said at the General Audience on Wednesday, 13 April 2011.

Here I report the full text of the General Audience. (The original Italian, the English translation reported here, and translations into other languages can be found in the Official Web Site of the Holy See,

http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/audiences/2011/documents/hf_ben-xvi_aud_20110413_en.html, accessed 15 May 2011.)

BENEDICT XVI

GENERAL AUDIENCE

Saint Peter's Square

Wednesday, 13 April 2011

The holiness

Dear Brothers and Sisters,

At the General Audiences in the past two years we have been accompanied by the figures of so many saints: we have learned to know them more closely and to understand that the whole of the Church’s history is marked by these men and women who with their faith, with their charity, and with their life have been beacons for so many generations, as they are for us too. The saints expressed in various ways the powerful and transforming presence of the Risen One. They let Jesus so totally overwhelm their life that they could say with St Paul “it is no longer I who live, but Christ who lives in me” (Gal 2:20). Following their example, seeking their intercession, entering into communion with them, “brings us closer to Christ, so our companionship with the saints joins us to Christ, from whom as from their fountain and head issue every grace and the life of the People of God itself” (cf. Second Vatican Council, Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, Lumen Gentium, n. 50).

At the end of this series of Catecheses, therefore, I would like to offer some thoughts on what holiness is. What does it mean to be holy? Who is called to be holy? We are often led to think that holiness is a goal reserved for a few elect. St Paul, instead, speaks of God’s great plan and says: “even as he (God) chose us in him [Christ] before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and blameless before him” (Eph 1:4). And he was speaking about all of us. At the centre of the divine plan is Christ in whom. God shows his Face, in accord with the favour of his will. The Mystery hidden in the centuries is revealed in its fullness in the Word made flesh. And Paul then says: “in him all the fullness of God was pleased to dwell” (Col 1:19).

In Christ the living God made himself close, visible, audible and tangible so that each one might draw from his fullness of grace and truth (cf. Jn 1:14-16). Therefore, the whole of Christian life knows one supreme law, which St Paul expresses in a formula that recurs in all his holy writings: in Jesus Christ. Holiness, the fullness of Christian life, does not consist in carrying out extraordinary enterprises but in being united with Christ, in living his mysteries, in making our own his example, his thoughts, his behaviour. The measure of holiness stems from the stature that Christ achieves in us, in as much as with the power of the Holy Spirit, we model our whole life on his.

It is being conformed to Jesus, as St Paul says: “For those whom he foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son” (Rom 8:29). And St Augustine exclaimed: “my life shall be a real life, being wholly filled by you” (Confessions, 10, XXVIII).

The Second Vatican Council, in the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, speaks with clarity of the universal call to holiness, saying that no one is excluded: “The forms and tasks of life are many but holiness is one — that sanctity which is cultivated by all who act under God’s Spirit and… follow Christ, poor, humble and cross-bearing, that they may deserve to be partakers of his glory” (Lumen Gentium, n. 41).

However, the question remains: how can we take the path to holiness, in order to respond to this call? Can I do this on my own initiative? The answer is clear. A holy life is not primarily the result of our efforts, of our actions, because it is God, the three times Holy (cf. Is 6:3) who sanctifies us, it is the Holy Spirit’s action that enlivens us from within, it is the very life of the Risen Christ that is communicated to us and that transforms us. To say so once again with the Second Vatican Council, “the followers of Christ, called by God not in virtue of their works but by his design and grace, and justified in the Lord Jesus, have been made sons of God in the baptism of faith and partakers of the divine nature, and so are truly sanctified. They must therefore hold onto and perfect in their lives that sanctification which they have received” (ibid., n. 40).

Holiness, therefore, has its deepest root in the grace of baptism, in being grafted on to the Paschal Mystery of Christ, by which his Spirit is communicated to us, his very life as the Risen One. St Paul strongly emphasizes the transformation that baptismal grace brings about in man and he reaches the point of coining a new terminology, forged with the preposition “with”: dead-with, buried-with, raised-with, brought to life-with, with Christ; our destiny is indissolubly linked to his. “We were buried therefore with him by baptism” he writes, “into death, so that as Christ was raised from the dead ... we too might walk in newness of life” (Rom 6:4). Yet God always respects our freedom and asks that we accept this gift and live the requirements it entails and he asks that we let ourselves be transformed by the action of the Holy Spirit, conforming our will to the will of God.

How can it happen that our manner of thinking and our actions become thinking and action with Christ and of Christ? What is the soul of holiness? Once again the Second Vatican Council explains; it tells us that Christian holiness is nothing other than charity lived to the full. “God is love, and he who abides in love abides in God, and God abides in him” (1 Jn 4:16). Now God has poured out his love in our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us (cf. Rom 5:5); therefore the first and most necessary gift is charity, by which we love God above all things and our neighbour through love of him. But if charity, like a good seed, is to grow and fructify in the soul, each of the faithful must willingly hear the word of God and carry out his will with deeds, with the help of his grace. He must frequently receive the sacraments, chiefly the Eucharist, and take part in the holy liturgy; he must constantly apply himself to prayer, self-denial, active brotherly service and the exercise all the virtues. This is because love, as the bond of perfection and fullness of the law (cf. Col 3:14; Rom 13:10) governs, gives meaning to, and perfects all the means of sanctification” (cf. Lumen Gentium, n. 42).

Perhaps this language of the Second Vatican Council is a little too solemn for us, perhaps we should say things even more simply. What is the essential? The essential means never leaving a Sunday without an encounter with the Risen Christ in the Eucharist; this is not an additional burden but is light for the whole week. It means never beginning and never ending a day without at least a brief contact with God. And, on the path of our life it means following the “signposts” that God has communicated to us in the Ten Commandments, interpreted with Christ, which are merely the explanation of what love is in specific situations. It seems to me that this is the true simplicity and greatness of a life of holiness: the encounter with the Risen One on Sunday; contact with God at the beginning and at the end of the day; following, in decisions, the “signposts” that God has communicated to us, which are but forms of charity.

“Hence the true disciple of Christ is marked by love both of God and of neighbour” (Lumen Gentium, n. 42). This is the true simplicity, greatness and depth of Christian life, of being holy. This is why St Augustine, in commenting on the fourth chapter of the First Letter of St John, could make a bold statement: “Dilige et fac quod vis [Love and do what you will]” And he continued: “If you keep silent, keep silent by love: if you speak, speak by love; if you correct, correct by love; if you pardon, pardon by love; let love be rooted in you, and from the root nothing but good can grow” (7,8 pl 35). Those who are guided by love, who live charity to the full, are guided by God, because God is love. Hence these important words apply: “Dilige et fac quod vis”, “Love and do what you will”.

We might ask ourselves: can we, with our limitations, with our weaknesses, aim so high? During the Liturgical Year, the Church invites us to commemorate a host of saints, the ones, that is, who lived charity to the full, who knew how to love and follow Christ in their daily lives. They tell us that it is possible for everyone to take this road. In every epoch of the Church’s history, on every latitude of the world map, the saints belong to all the ages and to every state of life, they are actual faces of every people, language and nation. And they have very different characters.

Actually I must say that also for my personal faith many saints, not all, are true stars in the firmament of history. And I would like to add that for me not only a few great saints whom I love and whom I know well are “signposts”, but precisely also the simple saints, that is, the good people I see in my life who will never be canonized. They are ordinary people, so to speak, without visible heroism but in their everyday goodness I see the truth of faith. This goodness, which they have developed in the faith of the Church, is for me the most reliable apology of Christianity and the sign of where the truth lies.

In the Communion of Saints, canonized and not canonized, which the Church lives thanks to Christ in all her members, we enjoy their presence and their company and cultivate the firm hope that we shall be able to imitate their journey and share one day in the same blessed life, eternal life.

Dear friends, how great and beautiful, as well as simple is the Christian vocation seen in this light! We are all called to holiness: it is the very measure of Christian living. Once again St Paul expresses it with great intensity when he writes: “grace was given to each of us according to the measure of Christ’s gift…. His gifts were that some should be apostles, some prophets, some evangelists, some pastors and teachers, to equip the saints for the work of ministry, for building up the body of Christ, until we all attain to the unity of the faith and of the knowledge of the Son of God, to mature manhood, to the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ” (Eph 4:7, 11-13).

I would like to ask all to open themselves to the action of the Holy Spirit, who transforms our life, to be, we too, as small pieces in the great mosaic of holiness that God continues to create in history, so that the face of Christ may shine out in the fullness of its splendour. Let us not be afraid to aim high, for God’s heights; let us not be afraid that God will ask too much of us, but let ourselves be guided by his Word in every daily action, even when we feel poor, inadequate, sinners. It will be he who transforms us in accordance with his love. Many thanks.

0172: Remarks on the Principle of Non-Contradiction (IV)

2011-05-09T02:50:00.002-04:00

Entry 0172: Remarks on the Principle of Non-Contradiction (IV)

Human action presupposes the principle of non-contradiction:

People who act do something indicating that they have a goal and think that certain means, which they are undertaking, is the way to reach that goal.

We act because we believe certain things and have certain goals, which is to say that we do not believe the opposite things and have the oppose goals.

In any particular action, we do not act as though things were anything or everything.

Accordingly, action itself presupposes the principle of non-contradiction. [1]

Note

[1]↑ Trudy Govier, Socrates' Children: Thinking and Knowing in the Western Tradition, Peterborough, Ontario, Canada: Broadview Press, 1997, pp. 68-69.

0171: Beatification of Pope John Paul II

2011-05-02T02:35:00.006-04:00

Entry 0171: Beatification of Pope John Paul II

Papal Mass

on the occasion of the

Beatification

of the Servant of God

John Paul II

Saint Peter's Square
Sunday, 1 May 2011

Homily of His Holiness Benedict XVI

Dear Brothers and Sisters,

Six years ago we gathered in this Square to celebrate the funeral of Pope John Paul II. Our grief at his loss was deep, but even greater was our sense of an immense grace which embraced Rome and the whole world: a grace which was in some way the fruit of my beloved predecessor’s entire life, and especially of his witness in suffering. Even then we perceived the fragrance of his sanctity, and in any number of ways God’s People showed their veneration for him.

For this reason, with all due respect for the Church’s canonical norms, I wanted his cause of beatification to move forward with reasonable haste. And now the longed-for day has come; it came quickly because this is what was pleasing to the Lord: John Paul II is blessed!

I would like to offer a cordial greeting to all of you who on this happy occasion have come in such great numbers to Rome from all over the world – cardinals, patriarchs of the Eastern Catholic Churches, brother bishops and priests, official delegations, ambassadors and civil authorities, consecrated men and women and lay faithful, and I extend that greeting to all those who join us by radio and television.

Today is the Second Sunday of Easter, which Blessed John Paul II entitled Divine Mercy Sunday. The date was chosen for today’s celebration because, in God’s providence, my predecessor died on the vigil of this feast.

Today is also the first day of May, Mary’s month, and the liturgical memorial of Saint Joseph the Worker. All these elements serve to enrich our prayer, they help us in our pilgrimage through time and space; but in heaven a very different celebration is taking place among the angels and saints!

Even so, God is but one, and one too is Christ the Lord, who like a bridge joins earth to heaven. At this moment we feel closer than ever, sharing as it were in the liturgy of heaven.

“Blessed are those who have not seen and yet have come to believe” (Jn 20:29). In today’s Gospel Jesus proclaims this beatitude: the beatitude of faith.

For us, it is particularly striking because we are gathered to celebrate a beatification, but even more so because today the one proclaimed blessed is a Pope, a Successor of Peter, one who was called to confirm his brethren in the faith. John Paul II is blessed because of his faith, a strong, generous and apostolic faith.

We think at once of another beatitude: “Blessed are you, Simon, son of Jonah! For flesh and blood has not revealed this to you, but my Father in heaven” (Mt 16:17). What did our heavenly Father reveal to Simon? That Jesus is the Christ, the Son of the living God. Because of this faith, Simon becomes Peter, the rock on which Jesus can build his Church.

The eternal beatitude of John Paul II, which today the Church rejoices to proclaim, is wholly contained in these sayings of Jesus: “Blessed are you, Simon” and “Blessed are those who have not seen and yet have come to believe!” It is the beatitude of faith, which John Paul II also received as a gift from God the Father for the building up of Christ’s Church.

Our thoughts turn to yet another beatitude, one which appears in the Gospel before all others. It is the beatitude of the Virgin Mary, the Mother of the Redeemer. Mary, who had just conceived Jesus, was told by Saint Elizabeth: “Blessed is she who believed that there would be a fulfilment of what was spoken to her by the Lord” (Lk 1:45).

The beatitude of faith has its model in Mary, and all of us rejoice that the beatification of John Paul II takes place on this first day of the month of Mary, beneath the maternal gaze of the one who by her faith sustained the faith of the Apostles and constantly sustains the faith of their successors, especially those called to occupy the Chair of Peter.

Mary does not appear in the accounts of Christ’s resurrection, yet hers is, as it were, a continual, hidden presence: she is the Mother to whom Jesus entrusted each of his disciples and the entire community. In particular we can see how Saint John and Saint Luke record the powerful, maternal presence of Mary in the passages preceding those read in today’s Gospel and first reading.

In the account of Jesus’ death, Mary appears at the foot of the cross (Jn 19:25), and at the beginning of the Acts of the Apostles she is seen in the midst of the disciples gathered in prayer in the Upper Room (Acts 1:14).

Today’s second reading also speaks to us of faith. Saint Peter himself, filled with spiritual enthusiasm, points out to the newly-baptized the reason for their hope and their joy.

I like to think how in this passage, at the beginning of his First Letter, Peter does not use language of exhortation; instead, he states a fact. He writes: “you rejoice”, and he adds: “you love him; and even though you do not see him now, you believe in him and rejoice with an indescribable and glorious joy, for you are receiving the outcome of your faith, the salvation of your souls” (1 Pet 1:6, 8-9). All these verbs are in the indicative, because a new reality has come about in Christ’s resurrection, a reality to which faith opens the door. “This is the Lord’s doing”, says the Psalm (118:23), and “it is marvelous in our eyes”, the eyes of faith.

Dear brothers and sisters, today our eyes behold, in the full spiritual light of the risen Christ, the beloved and revered figure of John Paul II. Today his name is added to the host of those whom he proclaimed saints and blesseds during the almost twenty-seven years of his pontificate, thereby forcefully emphasizing the universal vocation to the heights of the Christian life, to holiness, taught by the conciliar Constitution on the Church Lumen Gentium.

All of us, as members of the people of God – bishops, priests, deacons, laity, men and women religious – are making our pilgrim way to the heavenly homeland where the Virgin Mary has preceded us, associated as she was in a unique and perfect way to the mystery of Christ and the Church.

Karol Wojtyła took part in the Second Vatican Council, first as an auxiliary Bishop and then as Archbishop of Kraków. He was fully aware that the Council’s decision to devote the last chapter of its Constitution on the Church to Mary meant that the Mother of the Redeemer is held up as an image and model of holiness for every Christian and for the entire Church.

This was the theological vision which Blessed John Paul II discovered as a young man and subsequently maintained and deepened throughout his life. A vision which is expressed in the scriptural image of the crucified Christ with Mary, his Mother, at his side.

This icon from the Gospel of John (19:25-27) was taken up in the episcopal and later the papal coat-of-arms of Karol Wojtyła: a golden cross with the letter “M” on the lower right and the motto “Totus tuus”, drawn from the well-known words of Saint Louis Marie Grignion de Montfort in which Karol Wojtyła found a guiding light for his life: “Totus tuus ego sum et omnia mea tua sunt. Accipio te in mea omnia. Praebe mihi cor tuum, Maria – I belong entirely to you, and all that I have is yours. I take you for my all. O Mary, give me your heart” (Treatise on True Devotion to the Blessed Virgin, 266).

In his Testament, the new Blessed wrote: “When, on 16 October 1978, the Conclave of Cardinals chose John Paul II, the Primate of Poland, Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński, said to me: ‘The task of the new Pope will be to lead the Church into the Third Millennium’”.

And the Pope added: “I would like once again to express my gratitude to the Holy Spirit for the great gift of the Second Vatican Council, to which, together with the whole Church – and especially with the whole episcopate – I feel indebted. I am convinced that it will long be granted to the new generations to draw from the treasures that this Council of the twentieth century has lavished upon us. As a Bishop who took part in the Council from the first to the last day, I desire to entrust this great patrimony to all who are and will be called in the future to put it into practice. For my part, I thank the Eternal Shepherd, who has enabled me to serve this very great cause in the course of all the years of my Pontificate”.

And what is this “cause”? It is the same one that John Paul II presented during his first solemn Mass in Saint Peter’s Square in the unforgettable words: “Do not be afraid! Open, open wide the doors to Christ!”

What the newly-elected Pope asked of everyone, he was himself the first to do: society, culture, political and economic systems he opened up to Christ, turning back with the strength of a titan – a strength which came to him from God – a tide which appeared irreversible.

By his witness of faith, love and apostolic courage, accompanied by great human charisma, this exemplary son of Poland helped believers throughout the world not to be afraid to be called Christian, to belong to the Church, to speak of the Gospel. In a word: he helped us not to fear the truth, because truth is the guarantee of liberty. To put it even more succinctly: he gave us the strength to believe in Christ, because Christ is Redemptor hominis, the Redeemer of man. This was the theme of his first encyclical, and the thread which runs though all the others.

When Karol Wojtyła ascended to the throne of Peter, he brought with him a deep understanding of the difference between Marxism and Christianity, based on their respective visions of man. This was his message: man is the way of the Church, and Christ is the way of man.

With this message, which is the great legacy of the Second Vatican Council and of its “helmsman”, the Servant of God Pope Paul VI, John Paul II led the People of God across the threshold of the Third Millennium, which thanks to Christ he was able to call “the threshold of hope”.

Throughout the long journey of preparation for the great Jubilee he directed Christianity once again to the future, the future of God, which transcends history while nonetheless directly affecting it. He rightly reclaimed for Christianity that impulse of hope which had in some sense faltered before Marxism and the ideology of progress.

He restored to Christianity its true face as a religion of hope, to be lived in history in an “Advent” spirit, in a personal and communitarian existence directed to Christ, the fullness of humanity and the fulfillment of all our longings for justice and peace.

Finally, on a more personal note, I would like to thank God for the gift of having worked for many years with Blessed Pope John Paul II. I had known him earlier and had esteemed him, but for twenty-three years, beginning in 1982 after he called me to Rome to be Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, I was at his side and came to revere him all the more.

My own service was sustained by his spiritual depth and by the richness of his insights. His example of prayer continually impressed and edified me: he remained deeply united to God even amid the many demands of his ministry.

Then too, there was his witness in suffering: the Lord gradually stripped him of everything, yet he remained ever a “rock”, as Christ desired. His profound humility, grounded in close union with Christ, enabled him to continue to lead the Church and to give to the world a message which became all the more eloquent as his physical strength declined.

In this way he lived out in an extraordinary way the vocation of every priest and bishop to become completely one with Jesus, whom he daily receives and offers in the Church.

Blessed are you, beloved Pope John Paul II, because you believed! Continue, we implore you, to sustain from heaven the faith of God’s people. You often blessed us in this Square from the Apostolic Palace: Bless us, Holy Father! Amen.

http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/homilies/2011/documents/hf_ben-xvi_hom_20110501_beatificazione-gpii_en.html

© Copyright 2011 - Libreria Editrice Vaticana

0170: The Event of Easter

2011-04-25T02:19:00.003-04:00

Entry 0170: The Event of Easter

"The resurrection of Christ is an event which, while it surpasses history, nevertheless happens at a precise moment in history and leaves an indelible mark upon it. The light which dazzled the guards keeping watch over Jesus’ tomb has traversed time and space.

"Easter morning brings us news that is ancient yet ever new: Christ is risen!

"Right down to our own time – even in these days of advanced communications technology – the faith of Christians is based on that same news, on the testimony of those sisters and brothers who saw firstly the stone that had been rolled away from the empty tomb and then the mysterious messengers who testified that Jesus, the Crucified, was risen.

"And then Jesus himself, the Lord and Master, living and tangible, appeared to Mary Magdalene, to the two disciples on the road to Emmaus, and finally to all eleven, gathered in the Upper Room (cf. Mk 16:9-14).

"The echo of this event, which issued forth from Jerusalem twenty centuries ago, continues to resound in the Church, deep in whose heart lives the vibrant faith of Mary, Mother of Jesus, the faith of Mary Magdalene and the other women who first discovered the empty tomb, and the faith of Peter and the other Apostles." [1]

Note

[1]↑ Pope Benedict XVI, Urbi et Orbi Message, Easter Sunday, 24 April 2011. Copyright 2011 - Libreria Editrice Vaticana.

0169: Remarks on the Principle of Non-Contradiction (III)

2011-04-18T02:25:00.004-04:00

Entry 0169: Remarks on the Principle of Non-Contradiction (III)

According to Franklin Perkins, Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz (1646-1716) “distinguishes between the explicit grasp of truths of reason or logic and an instinct for logic that everyone possesses. This instinct appears primarily in the avoidance of obvious contradictions. The capacity for reason depends [in part] on this instinctive use of the principle of non-contradiction.” [1]

Note

[1]↑ Franklin Perkins, “Interpreting China,” Chapter 4 in Leibniz and China: a commerce of light, Cambridge: Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 2004, p. 160.

0168: Remarks on the Principle of Non-Contradiction (II)

2011-04-11T02:10:00.003-04:00

Entry 0168: Remarks on the Principle of Non-Contradiction (II)

Remarks by Richard I. Aaron:

“We use the principle of non-contradiction or consistency long before we become aware of it and of the important part it plays in our thinking.

“No one does try to think without using consistency or non-contradiction as his guide.

“It is our experience of the world that first disposes us to think in terms of non-contradiction and consistency.

“Our experience of the world affects our minds leaving permanent dispositions which explain our thinking.

“The principle of consistency is not alien to that [the real] world; on the contrary, it is something we have learnt from that world itself.

“Even when, in abstract thinking, we find ourselves most removed from experience, there is still a link with the empirical in so far as non-contradiction is our guide. For in so far as it [thinking] is guided by non-contradiction it is guided by a principle which in the last resort is empirically derived.

“We cannot conceive thinking without the principle; more we cannot conceive any item of experience falsifying it.

“This shows the measure to which our experience of the world has moulded our thought. It shows the strength of the dispositions which our experience of the world has engendered within us.” [1]

Note

[1]↑ Richard I. Aaron, "The Rational and the Empirical," in Contemporary British Philosophy, Third Series, London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1956, pp. 3-20.

0167: Remarks on the Principle of Non-Contradiction (I)

2011-04-04T02:17:00.001-04:00

Entry 0167: Remarks on the Principle of Non-Contradiction (I)

Remarks on non-contradiction:

“A knower who violates the principle of non-contradiction cannot be said to know.” [1]

“The [principle] of non-contradiction is presupposed universally in any intelligible content of mind.” [2]

The principle of non-contradiction “is presupposed by every human being in every cognitive act.

“This principle is true of all possible facts, and its truth is presupposed by every cognitive act, from philosophy to science to balancing one’s check book.

“No matter what there is, it is what it is, and it cannot display contradictory characteristics at the same time and in the same respect.

“This applies to all past experience, all present experience, all future experience—and even to things we will never experience.

“If any truth has claim to both fundamentality and absoluteness, it is this.” [3]

0166: Habitual Awareness of the Actuality of the Real and Knowledge of the Principle of Non-Contradiction

2011-03-28T02:13:00.002-04:00

Final draft submitted for publication.

0166: Habitual Awareness of the Actuality of the Real and Knowledge of the Principle of Non-Contradiction

2011-03-25T02:36:00.005-04:00

Final draft submitted for publication.

0165: The Immediate Intellection of the Actus Essendi

2011-03-21T06:05:00.001-04:00

Entry 0165: The Immediate Intellection of the Actus Essendi

[Available in PDF format only]

0164: Philosophy of Actus Essendi -- One Universally Valid Philosophy Recommended by Fides et Ratio (XI)

2011-03-14T02:03:00.010-04:00

Entry 0164: The Philosophy of the Actus Essendi -- One Universally Valid Philosophy Recommended by Fides et Ratio (XI)

“Without declaring a preference for any school, the Encyclical [Fides et Ratio] recognizes philosophy as the best way to reach the intellectus fidei and to articulate a renewed dogmatic theology: an open and dynamic philosophy of being that is based on the act of being (actus essendi).

“Here it is suggested that one of the greatest limitations of modern enquiry is to have bracketed being, not to have succeeded in positing itself as a philosophy of being, thus encountering greater difficulties in finding the sapiential dimension proper to philosophical thought and in addressing the fragmentation of knowledge.” [1]

0163: The Human Intellect’s Apprehension of the Actus Essendi

2011-03-07T02:06:00.004-05:00

Entry 0163: The Human Intellect’s Apprehension of the Actus Essendi

[Available in PDF format only]

0162: Kant and Aquinas on Non-Contradiction

2011-02-28T02:35:00.003-05:00

Entry 0162: Kant and Aquinas on Non-Contradiction

Kant is searching for a rational basis for natural science and moral philosophy, and he is correct in asserting that one must begin with the principle of non-contradiction as an a priori assumption. [1]

0161: Discorso di Giovanni Paolo II al Pontificio Ateneo Angelicum English Translation

2011-02-21T02:28:00.008-05:00

Entry 0161: Discorso di Giovanni Paolo II al Pontificio Ateneo Angelicum - English Translation

The reader will find the full text of the English translation of the Discorso di Giovanni Paolo II al Pontificio Ateneo Angelicum in this blog in Entry 0082.

The Discorso di Giovanni Paolo II al Pontificio Ateneo Angelicum is also kown as (a) “Perennial Philosophy of Saint Thomas for the Youth of Our Times” and (b) The Angelicum Address.

The address was delivered on 17 November 1979 at the Pontifical University of Saint Thomas Aquinas in Rome.

In this address, Pope John Paul II remarks that the transcendental value of the actus essendi “paves the most direct way to rise to the knowledge of subsisting Being and pure Act, namely to God.”

English translations of the address appeared in the following publications:

1. Angelicum, vol. 57, fasc. 2, 1980, pp. 133-146.

2. L’Osservatore Romano, English Weekly Edition, 17 December 1979, pp. 6-8.

0160: Transcendental Perfections and Actus Essendi

2011-02-14T02:45:00.003-05:00

Entry 0160: Transcendental Perfections and Actus Essendi

Concerning Aquinas’ treatment of the transcendental perfections, Edward A. Synan directs attention towards a distinction proposed by Aquinas in the Proemium of the Exposition of pseudo-Dionysius’ Divine Names. Synan attributes to Aquinas the view that

"Despite the superiority of an Aristotelian understanding of things in this world over that of the Platonists, Plato’s followers had done better on what is above this world: an implicit acceptance of Aristotelian earthly science but an explicit rejection of his views on higher things."

Here is the text on which Synan based his conclusion:

This reasoning of the Platonists, therefore, with respect to what it contains concerning separate, natural, specific forms, is in harmony with neither faith nor reason; but with respect to what they were accustomed to say about the First Principle of things, their opinion is the highest of truth and in harmony with the Christian faith. (Haec igitur Platonicorum ratio fidei non consonat nec veritati, quantum ad hoc quod continet de speciebus naturalibus separatis, sed quantum ad id quod dicebant de Primo rerum Principio, verissima est eorum opinio et fidei Christianae consona [Thomas Aquinas, In librum Beati Dionysius De divinis nominibus expositio, prooemium, 2].)

Edward A. Synan, “Albert and the Two Burleys: Citations and Allusions,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 70, (1996): 168-169.

0159: The Notions of Existence and Actus Essendi

2011-02-07T02:46:00.006-05:00

Entry 0159: Actus Essendi and Existence (IV)

The Notions of Existence and Actus Essendi

"Modern philosophers have failed to take seriously the difference between

(a) the kind of existence implied whenever we make a statement about a logical subject, e.g., about blindness, about a hole, about a colour or a number, or about a set, viz. that blindness exists, that the hole exists, that there is such a colour or number or set, and

(b) existence in the sense of the present actuality of something real enough to 'act.'

0158: Progress in the Beatification Process of Pope John Paul II (IV)

2011-01-31T02:12:00.005-05:00

Entry 0158: Progress in the Beatification Process of Pope John Paul II (IV)

On Sunday, 16 January 2011, after the recitation of the Angelus, the Holy Father, Pope Benedict XVI, commented on the beatification of Pope John Paul II.

"Dear Brothers and Sisters,

"As you know, next 1 May I shall have the joy of beatifying my beloved Predecessor, Venerable Pope John Paul II. The date chosen is deeply meaningful: it will in fact be the Second Sunday of Easter, which he himself entitled Divine Mercy Sunday, on the eve of which his life on earth ended. Those who knew him, those who esteemed and loved him, cannot but rejoice with the Church in this event. We are glad!" (1)

Then, during the greetings to particular groups, the Pope addressed the people of Poland.

"Beloved Brothers and Sisters of Poland,

"I greet all of you gathered here in Rome, those in Poland and around the whole world.

"I share with you the joy at the announcement of the beatification of the Holy Father John Paul II, which will take place in Rome on 1 May 2011. This news was much awaited by everyone and, in a particular way, by you—the people from Poland, for whom my venerable Predecessor has been the guide in faith, in truth and in freedom.

"It is my wish for you that there be a profound spiritual preparation for this event and I cordially bless you all." (2)

(1) Official Web Site of the Holy See.
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/angelus/2011/documents/hf_ben-xvi_ang_20110116_en.html

(2) Official Web Site of the Holy See.
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/angelus/2011/documents/hf_ben-xvi_ang_20110116_it.html

0157a: Actus Essendi: Science, Actus Essendi, and Revealed Truth: Remarks on Methodology

2011-01-27T14:27:00.004-05:00

Entry 0157a: Article in PDF format

Orestes J. Gonzalez, “Science, Actus Essendi, and Revealed Truth: Remarks on Methodology,” Actus Essendi Electronic Journal, Entry 0021, 2007.

Pope John Paul II explicitly identified some fundamental aspects of the 'philosophy of being' as reference point for the different philosophical schools.

A most authoritative statement in this regard is recorded in his encyclical letter Fides et Ratio when he says that "The 'philosophy of being' is strong and enduring because it is based upon the very 'act of being itself' (ipse actus essendi) which allows a full and comprehensive openness to reality as a whole." [1]

Earlier the Pope had explained that "The basis and source of this openness lie in the fact that the philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) is a 'philosophy of being,' that is, of the 'act of being' (actus essendi); it is the philosophy of the proclamation of being." [2]

[1]↑ Pope John Paul II, Encyclical Letter Fides et Ratio, 14 September 1998, Acta Apostolicae Sedis, 1999, vol. 91, pp. 5-88, no. 97.

[2]↑ John Paul II, "Address at the Angelicum, The Pontifical University of Saint Thomas Aquinas in Rome," 17 November 1979. The original, in Italian, was published in Acta Apostolicae Sedis, 1979, vol. 71, pp. 1472-1483. English translations are available in Angelicum, 1980, vol. 57, pp. 133-146; and in L'Osservatore Romano English Weekly Edition, December 17, 1979, pp. 6-8.

0157: Progress in the Beatification Process of Pope John Paul II (III)

2011-01-24T02:45:00.005-05:00

Entry 0157: Progress in the Beatification Process of Pope John Paul II (III)

Pope Benedict XVI will beatify John Paul II on 1 May 2011

On 1 May 2011, the second Sunday of Easter and Divine Mercy Sunday, Benedict XVI will preside at the rite of beatification for John Paul II in the Vatican.

According to a note released by the Congregation for the Causes of Saints, on 14 January 2011, during an audience granted to Cardinal Angelo Amato S.D.B., prefect of the Congregation for the Causes of Saints, "Benedict XVI authorized the dicastery to promulgate the decree of the miracle attributed to the intercession of Venerable Servant of God John Paul II (Karol Wojtyla). This concludes the process which precedes the rite of beatification.

"It is well known that, by pontifical dispensation, his cause began before the end of the five-year period which the current norms stipulate must pass following the death of a Servant of God. This provision was solicited by the great fame of sanctity which Pope John Paul II enjoyed during his life, in his death and after his death. In all other ways, the normal canonical dispositions concerning causes of beatification and canonization were observed in full.

"Between June 2005 and April 2007 the principal diocesan investigation was held in Rome, accompanied by secondary investigations in various other dioceses, on his life, virtues, fame of sanctity and miracles. The juridical validity of these canonical processes was recognized by the Congregation for the Causes of Saints with a decree of 4 May 2007. In June 2009, having examined the relative 'Positio', nine of the dicastery's theological consultors expressed their positive judgment concerning the heroic nature of the virtues of the Servant of God. The following November, in keeping with the usual procedure, the 'Positio' was submitted for the judgment of the cardinals and bishops of the Congregation for the Causes of Saints, who gave their approval.

"On 19 December 2009, Benedict XVI authorized the promulgation of the decree on John Paul II's heroic virtues.

"With a view to the beatification of the Venerable Servant of God, the postulator of the cause invited the Congregation for the Causes of Saints to examine the recovery from Parkinson's disease of Sr. Marie Simon Pierre Normand, a religious of the 'Institut des Petites Soeurs des Maternites Catholiques'.

"As is customary, the voluminous acts of the regularly-instituted canonical investigation, along with detailed reports from medical and legal experts, were submitted for scientific examination by the medical consultors of the Congregation for the Causes of Saints on 21 October 2010. The experts of the congregation, having studied the depositions and the entire documentation with their customary scrupulousness, expressed their agreement concerning the scientifically inexplicable nature of the healing. On 14 December the theological consultors, having examined the conclusions reached by the medical experts, undertook a theological evaluation of the case and unanimously recognized the unicity, antecedence and choral nature of the invocation made to Servant of God John Paul II, whose intercession was effective in this prodigious healing.

"Finally, on 11 January 2011 the ordinary session of the cardinals and bishops of the Congregation for the Causes of Saints took place. They expressed their unanimous approval, believing the recovery of Sr. Marie Simon Pierre to be miraculous, having been achieved by God in a scientifically inexplicable manner following the intercession of the Supreme Pontiff John Paul II, trustingly invoked both by Sr. Simon herself and by many other faithful".

Vatican City, 14 Jan 2011 (Vatican Information Service)

0156: Progress in the Beatification Process of Pope John Paul II (II)

2011-01-17T02:15:00.003-05:00

Entry 0156: Progress in the Beatification Process of Pope John Paul II (II)

The beatification process of Pope John Paul II began on June 28, 2005, two months after the death of the Roman Pontiff thanks to a dispensation granted by Pope Benedict XVI.

The Holy Father Benedict XVI waived the normal five-year waiting period before beginning the cause of beatification and canonization of Pope John Paul II on April 28, 2005.

The dispensation waived the normal period of time that the Roman Catholic Church requires before a cause for canonization can be opened after a person dies.

The cause was officially opened by Cardinal Camillo Ruini, vicar general for the diocese of Rome, on June 28, 2005.

The decree proclaiming Pope John Paul II’s life of heroic virtue was prepared by the Congregation for the Causes of Saints and authorized by Pope Benedict XVI on 19 December 2009.

With the approval of the decree on heroic virtue, the servant of God Pope John Paul II qualified for the title "Venerable."

On 14 January 2011, Pope Benedict XVI authorized the Congregation for the Causes of Saints to promulgate the decree on the approval of a miracle by the Venerable Servant of God John Paul II (Karol Wojtyla), Polish Supreme Pontiff (1920-2005):

Decree of the Congregation for the Causes of Saints

Vatican City, 14 Jan 2011 (Vatican Information Service) - Today, during a private audience with Cardinal Angelo Amato S.D.B., prefect of the Congregation for the Causes of Saints, the Pope authorized the congregation to promulgate the following decree:

Miracle

- Venerable Servant of God John Paul II (Karol Wojtyla), Polish Supreme Pontiff (1920-2005).

0155: St. Thomas’ Aristotle and Actus Essendi

2011-01-10T02:56:00.008-05:00

Go to previous post.

0155: St. Thomas’ Aristotle and Actus Essendi

2011-01-03T03:55:00.026-05:00

Entry 0155: Orestes J. Gonzalez, “St. Thomas’ Aristotle and Actus Essendi,” Actus Essendi Electronic Journal, Entry 0155, 2011 (This article is also available in PDF format)

St. Thomas’ Aristotle and Actus Essendi

Orestes J. Gonzalez
3 January 2011

I. Beginningless generation and corruption

II. The Christian notion of creation

The word ‘creation’ is used to mean both the causation of being and the definite origin of what is thus caused. It is contradictory to speak of a ‘created eternal world,’ for if created is what has a definite beginning, it cannot also be everlasting or without beginning.

For analytical clarity, it is absolutely necessary to use the word ‘creation’ with these two notes in its signification: (a) to create is to cause being; (b) to create is to cause to begin to be—understanding such ‘beginning,’ of course, as neither a change nor a motion of any kind.

In terms of such verbal usage, there should be no difficulty about understanding what is meant by saying that God can be the cause of being of either an everlasting world or a world with beginning. [2]

III. Causation of being with a beginning in time versus causation of being
without a beginning in time

IV. The notion of actus essendi

The transcendental value [of the ‘actus essendi’] paves the most direct way to rise to the knowledge of subsisting Being and pure Act, namely to God. [4]

V. Creation and the significance of the proof from motion

Both here [in the Physics] and in the Metaphysics, he [Aristotle] uses the eternity of motion to prove the first principle. This method of proving the existence of a first principle is most efficacious and irresistible.

For if on the supposition that both motion and the world existed forever, it is necessary to posit one first principle; then, if the eternity thereof should be rejected, it is all the more necessary, for it is clear that every new thing requires a principle bringing it into being.

Now the only reason why it could seem that no first principle would be necessary, would be if things were ab aeterno. But if the existence of a first principle follows even on that supposition, i.e., that the world existed ab aeterno, it is clear that the existence of a first principle is absolutely necessary. [5]

VI. Illustration of how God outside time can be said to hold
an eternal world in existence

VII. Explaining the position attributed to Aristotle
concerning the world’s beginning

‘To be’ is that which is innermost in everything and most deeply set in all things. [7]

With respect to everything found in a thing, ‘to be’ is that which most immediately and intimately belongs to things. [8]

For the world leads more evidently to the knowledge of the divine creating power, if it was not always, than if it had always been; since everything which was not always manifestly has a cause; whereas this is not so manifest of what always was. [9]

Aristotle did not err in positing many principles, because he posited that the being of all things depends upon a first principle alone, and thus it remains that there is one first principle. He did, however, err on the eternity of the world. [10]

We must hold firmly that the world has not always existed. This cannot be disproved by any physical demonstration. Aristotle, however, maintained that the world has always existed. [11]

VIII. Actus essendi and the ‘being’ which responds to the question
whether a thing exists

The ‘causa essendi’ of a thing is that upon which the existence of a thing depends somehow, as the existence of light in the air depends upon the sun. If the sun is taken away, there ceases the very existence of the light in the air. [12]

There must be some cause of the fact that a thing exists, for something is referred to as ‘causatum’—caused—by reason of the fact that it has a cause of its existing. [15]

Being (esse) is twofold. In one way it is considered as signifying the ‘actus essendi.’ In another sense being (esse) conveys the composition of a proposition effected by the mind in joining a predicate to a subject, and in this sense being (esse) is what answers the question whether a thing exists. [16]

Philosophers confess and prove that everything that in any way exists cannot exist unless it be caused by him who supremely and most truly has existence. [19]

IX. Conclusion

0154: Pope Benedict XVI on Aquinas (XVII)

2010-12-27T02:40:00.004-05:00

Entry 0154: In the Apostolic Exhortation Verbum Domini of 30 September 2010, Pope Benedict XVI refers to Saint Thomas Aquinas three times as follows:

(1)

In Part I of Verbum Domini, in the section on “The creation of man,” the Pope writes:

“Every human being who comes to consciousness and to responsibility has the experience of an inner call to do good” and thus to avoid evil. As Saint Thomas Aquinas says, this principle is the basis of all the other precepts of the natural law. [28]

Footnote [28]: Cf. Summa Theologiae, Ia-IIae, q. 94, art. 2.

Here is what Aquinas says in Summa Theologiae, Ia-IIae, q. 94, art. 2.

Original Latin:

“Primum principium in ratione practica est quod fundatur supra rationem boni, quae est, bonum est quod omnia appetunt. Hoc est ergo primum praeceptum legis, quod bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum vitandum. Et super hoc fundantur omnia alia praecepta legis naturae.”

English Translation:

“The first principle of practical reason is one founded on the notion of good, namely, that 'good is that which all things seek after.' Hence this is the first precept of law, that 'good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided.' All other precepts of the natural law are based upon this principle.”

(2)

In Part I of Verbum Domini, in the section on “The Church as the primary setting for biblical hermeneutics,” the Pope writes:

And Saint Thomas Aquinas, citing Saint Augustine, insists that “the letter, even that of the Gospel, would kill, were there not the inward grace of healing faith”.[85]

Footnote [85]: Summa Theologiae, Ia-IIae, q. 106, art. 2.

Here is what Aquinas says in Summa Theologiae, Ia-IIae, q. 106, art. 2.

Original Latin:

“Ad Legem Evangelii duo pertinent. Unum quidem principaliter, scilicet ipsa gratia Spiritus Sancti interius data. Et quantum ad hoc, Nova Lex iustificat. Aliud pertinet ad Legem Evangelii secundario, scilicet documenta fidei, et praecepta ordinantia affectum humanum et humanos actus. Et quantum ad hoc, Lex Nova non iustificat. Unde Apostolus dicit, II ad Cor. III, ‘Littera occidit, Spiritus autem vivificat.’ Et Augustinus exponit quod per litteram intelligitur quaelibet Scriptura extra homines existens, etiam moralium praeceptorum qualia continentur in Evangelio. Unde etiam littera Evangelii occideret, nisi adesset interius gratia fidei sanans.”

English Translation:

“There is a twofold element in the Law of the Gospel. There is the chief element, namely, the grace of the Holy Spirit bestowed inwardly. And as to this, the New Law justifies. The other element of the Evangelical Law is secondary: namely, the teachings of faith, and those commandments which direct human affections and human actions. And as to this, the New Law does not justify. Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:6) ‘The letter killeth, but the spirit quickeneth.’ And Augustine explains this by saying that the letter denotes any writing external to man, even that of the moral precepts such as are contained in the Gospel. Wherefore the letter, even of the Gospel would kill, unless there were the inward presence of the healing grace of faith.”

(3)

In Part I of Verbum Domini, in the section on “Literal sense and spiritual sense,” the Pope writes:

Saint Thomas of Aquinas, for example, states that “all the senses of sacred Scripture are based on the literal sense”.[121] It is necessary, however, to remember that in patristic and medieval times every form of exegesis, including the literal form, was carried out on the basis of faith, without there necessarily being any distinction between the literal sense and the spiritual sense.

Footnote [121]: Summa Theologiae, I, q. 1, art. 10, ad 1.

Here is what Aquinas says in Summa Theologiae, I, q. 1, art. 10, ad 1.

Original Latin:

“Auctor sacrae Scripturae est Deus, in cuius potestate est ut non solum voces ad significandum accommodet (quod etiam homo facere potest), sed etiam res ipsas. Et ideo, cum in omnibus scientiis voces significent, hoc habet proprium ista scientia, quod ipsae res significatae per voces, etiam significant aliquid. Illa ergo prima significatio, qua voces significant res, pertinet ad primum sensum, qui est sensus historicus vel litteralis. Illa vero significatio qua res significatae per voces, iterum res alias significant, dicitur sensus spiritualis; qui super litteralem fundatur, et eum supponit.

“Hic autem sensus spiritualis trifariam dividitur. Lex Vetus figura est Novae Legis. In Nova etiam Lege, ea quae in Capite sunt gesta, sunt signa eorum quae nos agere debemus. Et ipsa Nova Lex est figura futurae gloriae.

“Secundum ergo quod ea quae sunt Veteris Legis, significant ea quae sunt Novae Legis, est sensus allegoricus, secundum vero quod ea quae in Christo sunt facta, vel in his quae Christum significant, sunt signa eorum quae nos agere debemus, est sensus moralis, prout vero significant ea quae sunt in aeterna gloria, est sensus anagogicus.

“Sensus isti non multiplicantur propter hoc quod una vox multa significet; sed quia ipsae res significatae per voces, aliarum rerum possunt esse signa. Et ita etiam nulla confusio sequitur in Sacra Scriptura, cum omnes sensus fundentur super unum, scilicet litteralem; ex quo solo potest trahi argumentum, non autem ex his quae secundum allegoriam dicuntur.”

English Translation:

“The author of Sacred Scripture is God, in whose power it is to signify His meaning, not by words only (as man also can do), but also by things themselves. So, whereas in every other science things are signified by words, this science [the science of Sacred Scripture] has the property, that the things signified by the words have themselves also a signification. Therefore that first signification whereby words signify things belongs to the first sense, the historical or literal. That signification whereby things signified by words have themselves also a signification is called the spiritual sense, which is based on the literal, and presupposes it.

“Now this spiritual sense has a threefold division. First, the Old Law is a figure of the New Law. Again, in the New Law, whatever our Head has done is a type of what we ought to do. And the New Law itself is a figure of future glory.

“Therefore, so far as the things of the Old Law signify the things of the New Law, there is the allegorical sense; so far as the things done in Christ, or so far as the things which signify Christ, are types of what we ought to do, there is the moral sense. But so far as they signify what relates to eternal glory, there is the anagogical sense.

“These senses are not multiplied because one word signifies several things, but because the things signified by the words can be themselves types of other things. Thus in Sacred Scripture no confusion results, for all the senses are founded on one---the literal---from which alone can any argument be drawn, and not from those intended in allegory.”

The original Italian of the Apostolic Exhortation Verbum Domini, the English translation of the document, and translations into other languages can be found in the Official Web Site of the Holy See. (Accessed December 12, 2010.)
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/apost_exhortations/documents/hf_ben-xvi_exh_20100930_verbum-domini_en.html.

0153: John F. Wippel on Actus Essendi (III)

2010-12-20T03:19:00.004-05:00

Entry 0153: Remarks by Professor John F. Wippel on Actus Essendi

“Nothing enjoys actuality except insofar as it exists. Therefore esse itself is the actuality of all things, including forms themselves.

“Hence [esse] is related to other things not as that which receives is related to that which is received, but rather as that which is received to that which receives it.

“As he uses the term esse in this discussion, [Aquinas] has in mind the intrinsic act of being (actus essendi). It is this … which accounts for the fact that things exist.

“The term esse [signifies] not mere facticity but a principle within every finite substance which serves as its intrinsic act of being (actus essendi) and which accounts for the fact that it exists.” (1)

(1)↑ John F. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000) pp. 410 and 489.

0152: Pope Benedict XVI on Aquinas (XVI)

2010-12-13T03:08:00.004-05:00

Entry 0152: Pope Benedict XVI invokes Saint Thomas Aquinas to assist him

In the General Audience of 25 August 2010, the Holy Father Pope Benedict XVI spoke about his devotion to saints:

Everyone must have some Saint with whom he or she is on familiar terms, to feel close to with prayer and intercession but also to emulate.

As you know, I too am especially attached to certain Saints: among them in addition to Saint Joseph and Saint Benedict, whose names I bear is Saint Augustine whom I have had the great gift to know, so to speak, close at hand through study and prayer and who has become a good "travelling companion" in my life and my ministry.

And in the book Light of the World (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2010), the Pope remarked:

Naturally I always pray first and foremost to our Lord, with whom I am united simply by old acquaintance, so to speak. But I also invoke the saints.

I am friends with Augustine, with Bonaventure, with Thomas Aquinas.

Then one says to such saints also: Help me!

And the Mother of God is, in any case, always a major point of reference.

In this sense I commend myself to the communion of saints.

With them, strengthened by them, I then talk with the dear Lord also, begging, for the most part, but also in thanksgiving--or quite simply being joyful.

0151: Pope Benedict XVI on Aquinas (XV)

2010-12-06T03:11:00.008-05:00

Entry 0151: General Audience on Saint Juliana of Cornillon

On Wednesday, November 17, 2010, the Holy Father devoted the Catechesis of the General Audience to Saint Juliana of Cornillon (1191-1258), the saint who worked to promote a liturgical feast of Corpus Christi. She is better known as Saint Juliana of Liege. And the feast of Corpus Christi was instituted as a solemnity for the universal Church by Pope Urban IV in 1264.

Benedict XVI pointed out also that it was Pope Urban IV who entrusted Saint Thomas Aquinas with composing the texts of the liturgical office of Corpus Christi:

Urban IV asked one of the greatest theologians of history, St. Thomas Aquinas -- who at that time was accompanying the Pope and was in Orvieto -- to compose texts of the liturgical office for this great feast. These are masterpieces in which theology and poetry fuse, still in use today in the Church. They are texts that make the cords of the heart vibrate to express praise and gratitude to the Most Holy Sacrament, while the intelligence, penetrating the mystery with wonder, recognizes in the Eucharist the living and true presence of Jesus, of his sacrifice of love that reconciles us with the Father, and gives us salvation.

Here is the text of the Audience. (The original Italian, the English translation reported here, and translations into other languages can be found in the Official Web Site of the Holy See,
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/audiences/2010/documents/hf_ben-xvi_aud_20101117_en.html, accessed November 26, 2010.)

BENEDICT XVI

GENERAL AUDIENCE

Saint Peter's Square

Wednesday, 17 November 2010

Saint Juliana of Cornillon

Dear Brothers and Sisters,

This morning too I would like to introduce a female figure to you. She is little known but the Church is deeply indebted to her, not only because of the holiness of her life but also because, with her great fervour, she contributed to the institution of one of the most important solemn Liturgies of the year: Corpus Christi.

She is St Juliana de Cornillon, also known as St Juliana of Liège. We know several facts about her life, mainly from a Biography that was probably written by a contemporary cleric; it is a collection of various testimonies of people who were directly acquainted with the Saint.

Juliana was born near Liège, Belgium between 1191 and 1192. It is important to emphasize this place because at that time the Diocese of Liège was, so to speak, a true “Eucharistic Upper Room”. Before Juliana, eminent theologians had illustrated the supreme value of the Sacrament of the Eucharist and, again in Liège, there were groups of women generously dedicated to Eucharistic worship and to fervent communion. Guided by exemplary priests, they lived together, devoting themselves to prayer and to charitable works.

Orphaned at the age of five, Juliana, together with her sister Agnes, was entrusted to the care of the Augustinian nuns at the convent and leprosarium of Mont-Cornillon.

She was taught mainly by a sister called “Sapienza” [wisdom], who was in charge of her spiritual development to the time Juliana received the religious habit and thus became an Augustinian nun.

She became so learned that she could read the words of the Church Fathers, of St Augustine and St Bernard in particular, in Latin. In addition to a keen intelligence, Juliana showed a special propensity for contemplation from the outset. She had a profound sense of Christ’s presence, which she experienced by living the Sacrament of the Eucharist especially intensely and by pausing frequently to meditate upon Jesus’ words: “And lo, I am with you always, to the close of the age” (Mt 28:20).

When Juliana was 16 she had her first vision which recurred subsequently several times during her Eucharistic adoration. Her vision presented the moon in its full splendour, crossed diametrically by a dark stripe. The Lord made her understand the meaning of what had appeared to her. The moon symbolized the life of the Church on earth, the opaque line, on the other hand, represented the absence of a liturgical feast for whose institution Juliana was asked to plead effectively: namely, a feast in which believers would be able to adore the Eucharist so as to increase in faith, to advance in the practice of the virtues and to make reparation for offences to the Most Holy Sacrament.

Juliana, who in the meantime had become Prioress of the convent, kept this revelation that had filled her heart with joy a secret for about 20 years. She then confided it to two other fervent adorers of the Eucharist, Blessed Eva, who lived as a hermit, and Isabella, who had joined her at the Monastery of Mont-Cornillon. The three women established a sort of “spiritual alliance” for the purpose of glorifying the Most Holy Sacrament.

They also chose to involve a highly regarded Priest, John of Lausanne, who was a canon of the Church of St Martin in Liège. They asked him to consult theologians and clerics on what was important to them. Their affirmative response was encouraging.

What happened to Juliana of Cornillon occurs frequently in the lives of Saints. To have confirmation that an inspiration comes from God it is always necessary to be immersed in prayer to wait patiently, to seek friendship and exchanges with other good souls and to submit all things to the judgement of the Pastors of the Church.

It was in fact Bishop Robert Torote, Liège who, after initial hesitation, accepted the proposal of Juliana and her companions and first introduced the Solemnity of Corpus Christi in his diocese. Later other Bishops following his example instituted this Feast in the territories entrusted to their pastoral care.

However, to increase their faith the Lord often asks Saints to sustain trials. This also happened to Juliana who had to bear the harsh opposition of certain members of the clergy and even of the superior on whom her monastery depended.

Of her own free will, therefore, Juliana left the Convent of Mont-Cornillon with several companions. For 10 years — from 1248 to 1258 — she stayed as a guest at various monasteries of Cistercian sisters.

She edified all with her humility, she had no words of criticism or reproach for her adversaries and continued zealously to spread Eucharistic worship.

She died at Fosses-La-Ville, Belgium, in 1258. In the cell where she lay the Blessed Sacrament was exposed and, according to her biographer’s account, Juliana died contemplating with a last effusion to love Jesus in the Eucharist whom she had always loved, honoured and adored. Jacques Pantaléon of Troyes was also won over to the good cause of the Feast of Corpus Christi during his ministry as Archdeacon in Lièges. It was he who, having become Pope with the name of Urban IV in 1264, instituted the Solemnity of Corpus Christi on the Thursday after Pentecost as a feast of precept for the universal Church.

In the Bull of its institution, entitled Transiturus de hoc mundo, (11 Aug. 1264), Pope Urban even referred discreetly to Juliana's mystical experiences, corroborating their authenticity. He wrote: “Although the Eucharist is celebrated solemnly every day, we deem it fitting that at least once a year it be celebrated with greater honour and a solemn commemoration.

“Indeed we grasp the other things we commemorate with our spirit and our mind, but this does not mean that we obtain their real presence. On the contrary, in this sacramental commemoration of Christ, even though in a different form, Jesus Christ is present with us in his own substance. While he was about to ascend into Heaven he said ‘And lo, I am with you always, to the close of the age’ (Matthew 28:20)”.

The Pontiff made a point of setting an example by celebrating the solemnity of Corpus Christi in Orvieto, the town where he was then residing. Indeed, he ordered that the famous Corporal with the traces of the Eucharistic miracle which had occurred in Bolsena the previous year, 1263, be kept in Orvieto Cathedral — where it still is today.

While a priest was consecrating the bread and the wine he was overcome by strong doubts about the Real Presence of the Body and Blood of Christ in the sacrament of the Eucharist. A few drops of blood began miraculously to ooze from the consecrated Host, thereby confirming what our faith professes.

Urban iv asked one of the greatest theologians of history, St Thomas Aquinas — who at that time was accompanying the Pope and was in Orvieto — to compose the texts of the Liturgical Office for this great feast. They are masterpieces, still in use in the Church today, in which theology and poetry are fuse. These texts pluck at the heartstrings in an expression of praise and gratitude to the Most Holy Sacrament, while the mind, penetrating the mystery with wonder, recognizes in the Eucharist the Living and Real Presence of Jesus, of his Sacrifice of love that reconciles us with the Father, and gives us salvation.

Although after the death of Urban IV the celebration of the Feast of Corpus Christi was limited to certain regions of France, Germany, Hungary and Northern Italy, it was another Pontiff, John XXII, who in 1317 re-established it for the universal Church. Since then the Feast experienced a wonderful development and is still deeply appreciated by the Christian people.

I would like to affirm with joy that today there is a “Eucharistic springtime” in the Church: How many people pause in silence before the Tabernacle to engage in a loving conversation with Jesus! It is comforting to know that many groups of young people have rediscovered the beauty of praying in adoration before the Most Blessed Sacrament.

I am thinking, for example, of our Eucharistic adoration in Hyde Park, London. I pray that this Eucharistic “springtime” may spread increasingly in every parish and in particular in Belgium, St Juliana’s homeland.

Venerable John Paul II said in his Encyclical Ecclesia de Eucharistia: “In many places, adoration of the Blessed Sacrament is also an important daily practice and becomes an inexhaustible source of holiness. The devout participation of the faithful in the Eucharistic procession on the Solemnity of the Body and Blood of Christ is a grace from the Lord which yearly brings joy to those who take part in it. Other positive signs of Eucharistic faith and love might also be mentioned” (n. 10).

In remembering St Juliana of Cornillon let us also renew our faith in the Real Presence of Christ in the Eucharist. As we are taught by the Compendium of the Catechism of the Catholic Church, “Jesus Christ is present in the Eucharist in a unique and incomparable way. He is present in a true, real and substantial way, with his Body and his Blood, with his Soul and his Divinity. In the Eucharist, therefore, there is present in a sacramental way, that is, under the Eucharistic Species of bread and wine, Christ whole and entire, God and Man” (n. 282).

Dear friends, fidelity to the encounter with the Christ in the Eucharist in Holy Mass on Sunday is essential for the journey of faith, but let us also seek to pay frequent visits to the Lord present in the Tabernacle! In gazing in adoration at the consecrated Host, we discover the gift of God's love, we discover Jesus' Passion and Cross and likewise his Resurrection. It is precisely through our gazing in adoration that the Lord draws us towards him into his mystery in order to transform us as he transforms the bread and the wine.

The Saints never failed to find strength, consolation and joy in the Eucharistic encounter. Let us repeat before the Lord present in the Most Blessed Sacrament the words of the Eucharistic hymn “Adoro te devote”: [Devoutly I adore Thee]: Make me believe ever more in you, “Draw me deeply into faith, / Into Your hope, into Your love”.

Thank you.

0150: John F. Wippel on Actus Essendi (II)

2010-11-29T03:45:00.006-05:00

Entry 0150: Remarks by Professor John F. Wippel

“In the case of matter-form union, specification of the kind of being enjoyed by the composite essence, human being or canine being, for instance, is determined by the act principle within the essence, that is, by the substantial form.

“But in the composition of essence and esse within any finite entity, the specification or determination of the kind of being comes not from the side of the act principle – the actus essendi – but from the side of the potency principle, that is, from the essence.

“This is not surprising, of course, since the essence principle itself either is or at least includes a substantial form. While the form is an act principle within the line of essence, in the line of esse that same form, either in itself in the case of a separate substance or together with its matter in the case of a composite entity, is in potency with respect to its act of being.” (1)

(1)↑ John F. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000) pp. 104-105.

0149: Stephen L. Brock on Actus Essendi

2010-11-22T03:17:00.005-05:00

Entry 0149: Actus Essendi and Existence (III)

Remarks by Stephen L. Brock

"It is not nonsense to speak of the potential an actual existence of blindness. Its actual existence, of course, can hardly be an actus essendi. The lesson is rather that not every actual existence is an actus essendi.

"The extension comes quite naturally to our minds. And it serves to explain the broader notion of 'existence,' the one that applies both to real natures and to their privations and negations." (1)

(1)↑ Stephen L. Brock, "Thomas Aquinas and 'What Actually Exists,'" Wisdom Apprentice, P.A. Kwasniewski, Ed., (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2007) pp. 29 and 35.

0148: John F. Wippel on Actus Essendi (I)

2010-11-15T03:47:00.010-05:00

Entry 0148: Remarks by Professor John F. Wippel

"If one finds limited instances of act, especially of the actus essendi, this can only be because in every such case the act principle [the actus essendi] is received and limited by a really distinct potency principle.

"It is also true, of course, that according to Aquinas, the essence principle and the act of being (actus essendi) of any creature are both created by God simultaneously, since the entire being is created, including both." (1)

(1)↑ John F. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000) 128.

0147: The Thirteen Texts in which Aquinas Uses the Expression "Actus Essendi" (X)

2010-11-08T03:48:00.009-05:00

Entry 0147: The Thirteen Texts in which Aquinas Uses the Expression "Actus Essendi" (X)

I. In I Sent., 8, 1, 1, c

II. In I Sent., 8, 4, 2, ad 2

III. In I Sent., 8, 5, 2, c

IV. In III Sent., 11, 1, 2, ad 2

V. De Veritate, 1, 1, c

VI. De Veritate, 1,1, ad 1

VII. De Veritate, 1, 1, ad sc 3

VIII. De Veritate, 10, 8, ad 13

IX. Summa Theologiae, I, 3, 4, ad 2

X. De Potentia, 7, 2, ad 1

XI. Quaestiones Quodlibetales, 9, 4, 1, c

XII. In Metaphysicorum, 4, 2, No. 6

XIII. In De Hebdomadibus, 2

Commentary on Text X: De Potentia, 7, 2, ad 1

Text

Ens et esse dicitur dupliciter, ut patet V Metaph. Quandoque enim significat essentiam rei, sive actum essendi; quandoque vero significat veritatem propositionis, etiam in his quae esse non habent: sicut dicimus quod caecitas est, quia verum est hominem esse caecum. Cum ergo dicat Damascenus, quod esse Dei est nobis manifestum, accipitur esse Dei secundo modo, et non primo. Primo enim modo est idem esse Dei quod est substantia: et sicut eius substantia est ignota, ita et esse. Secundo autem modo scimus quoniam Deus est, quoniam hanc propositionem in intellectu nostro concipimus ex effectibus ipsius.

Translation

"Ens and esse may be taken in two ways (Metaph. X, 13, 14). Sometimes they signify the essence of a thing and the ‘act of being,’ and sometimes they denote the truth of a proposition even in things that have no being: thus we say that ‘blindness is’ because it is true that a man is blind. Accordingly when Damascene says that God’s existence is evident to us, the esse of God is taken in the second sense and not the first. For in the first sense God's esse is the same as his essence, and as his essence is unknown so also is his esse. In the second sense we know that ‘God exists,’ because we conceive this proposition in our mind from his effects."

Commentary

Note on Translation: The expression "actus essendi" is translated into English as "act of being," into Italian as "atto di essere," into French as "acte d'être," into Spanish as "acto de ser," and into German as "Akt des Seins" ("Seinsakt.")

0146: Progress in the Beatification Process of Pope John Paul II (I)

2010-11-01T03:16:00.003-04:00

Entry 0146: Progress in the Beatification Process of Pope John Paul II (I)

The beatification process of Pope John Paul II began on June 28, 2005, two months after the death of the Roman Pontiff thanks to a dispensation granted by Pope Benedict XVI.

The Holy Father Benedict XVI waived the normal five-year waiting period before beginning the cause of beatification and canonization of Pope John Paul II on April 28, 2005.

The dispensation waived the normal period of time that the Roman Catholic Church requires before a cause for canonization can be opened after a person dies.

The cause was officially opened by Cardinal Camillo Ruini, vicar general for the diocese of Rome, on June 28, 2005.

The decree proclaiming Pope John Paul II’s life of heroic virtue was prepared by the Congregation for the Causes of Saints and authorized by Pope Benedict XVI on 19 December 2009.

With the approval of the decree on heroic virtue, the servant of God Pope John Paul II qualified for the title "Venerable" and may be beatified with the approval of a miracle.

0145: Aquinas on Catholic Anchor Online

2010-10-25T03:22:00.004-04:00

Entry 0145: Anchorage presentation on the “Angelic Doctor” Saint Thomas Aquinas

On 8 October 2010, the Catholic Anchor Online, the Newspaper of the Archdiocese of Anchorage, reported the following:

Saint Thomas Aquinas is the famous 13th century Dominican philosopher, theologian and “Angelic Doctor” of the Catholic Church. According to Pope Benedict XVI, St. Thomas Aquinas’s work has had “fundamental importance” in philosophy, theology, as well as for history and culture.

Among other achievements, explained the Pope in June, “Thomas Aquinas showed that a natural harmony exists between Christian faith and reason… He created a new synthesis which formed the culture of the centuries to come.”

0144: The Uniqueness of the Transcendental Perfection of Actus Essendi

2010-10-18T03:12:00.011-04:00

Entry 0144: Actus Essendi and Existence (II)

The Uniqueness of the Transcendental Perfection of Actus Essendi

0143: The Thirteen Texts in which Aquinas Uses the Expression "Actus Essendi" (IX)

2010-10-11T03:21:00.005-04:00

Entry 0143: The Thirteen Texts in which Aquinas Uses the Expression "Actus Essendi" (IX)

I. In I Sent., 8, 1, 1, c

II. In I Sent., 8, 4, 2, ad 2

III. In I Sent., 8, 5, 2, c

IV. In III Sent., 11, 1, 2, ad 2

V. De Veritate, 1, 1, c

VI. De Veritate, 1,1, ad 1

VII. De Veritate, 1, 1, ad sc 3

VIII. De Veritate, 10, 8, ad 13

IX. Summa Theologiae, I, 3, 4, ad 2

X. De Potentia, 7, 2, ad 1

XI. Quaestiones Quodlibetales, 9, 4, 1, c

XII. In Metaphysicorum, 4, 2, No. 6

XIII. In De Hebdomadibus, 2

Commentary on Text IX: Summa Theologiae, I, 3, 4, ad 2

Text

Ad secundum dicendum quod esse dupliciter dicitur, uno modo, significat actum essendi; alio modo, significat compositionem propositionis, quam anima adinvenit coniungens praedicatum subiecto. Primo igitur modo accipiendo esse, non possumus scire esse Dei, sicut nec eius essentiam, sed solum secundo modo. Scimus enim quod haec propositio quam formamus de Deo, cum dicimus ‘Deus est,’ vera est. Et hoc scimus ex eius effectibus, ut supra dictum est.

Translation

"The Latin verb ‘esse’ can mean either of two things. It may mean the ‘act of being,’ or it may mean the composition of a proposition effected by the mind in joining a predicate to a subject. Taking ‘esse’ in the first sense, we cannot understand God’s ‘esse’ nor His ‘essence;’ but only in the second sense. We know that this proposition which we form about God when we say ‘God is,’ is true; and this we know from His effects, as said above in Question 2, Article 2."

Commentary

Reading the works of Aquinas one finds that he used the Latin verb esse to signify in more than one way. In his Summa Theologiae (I, 3, 4, ad 2,) he is clear on this. Thus he writes,

It must be said that esse applies to a thing in two ways. In one way, it means the act of being, actus essendi. In another way, it means the composition of a proposition effected by the mind in joining a predicate to a subject.

Note on Translation: The expression "actus essendi" is translated into English as "act of being," into Italian as "atto di essere," into French as "acte d'être," into Spanish as "acto de ser," and into German as "Akt des Seins" ("Seinsakt.")

0142: The Self-Evident Connotation of the Actus Essendi (VI)

2010-10-04T03:21:00.004-04:00

Entry 0142: The Self-Evident Connotation of the Actus Essendi (VI)

Aristotle maintains in the Posterior Analytics that it would not be possible to know the essential nature of anything and yet be ignorant of its existence: “Thus it follows that the degree of our knowledge of a thing’s essential nature is determined by the sense in which we are aware that it exists” (Post. Anal., 93a 28.) Such essential natures are known without mediation, i.e., without demonstration. Their existence, likewise, is known without mediation—as self-evident.

Our knowledge of the existence of any individual thing which comes under the purview of our immediate experience is self-evident. To Aristotle, “it would be absurd to try to prove that nature exists” (Physics, 193a 8.)

(Ralph J. Masiello, “A Note on Essence and Existence,” The New Scholasticism 45 [1971]: 491-494.)

It should be noted here that while actus essendi is inseparable from existence, existence as such is separable from actus essendi. There are in the external world things which are self-subsisting and things which are not self-subsisting.

The actus essendi of a self-subsiting extramental thing is what causes the thing—and everything in it—to stand actually present in the real world. And the presence of a self-subsiting extramental thing in the real world, the fact of its existence, is inseparable from the actus essendi of the thing.

In the real world, however, there are many things which are not self-subsiting. Things which are not self-subsisting, despite the fact of their actually existing in the real extramental world and that their actuality is real, do not possess actus essendi. And yet their existence is a fact.

The point I want to stress is this, that the connotation of existence is self-evident in both, in things which are not self-subsiting things and in the self-subsiting extramental things of nature. And more importantly, that in the self-subsiting extramental things of nature not only is existence self-evident, their actus essendi is also self-evident.

0141: Blessed John Henry Newman on Aquinas

2010-09-27T03:37:00.003-04:00

Entry 0141: Blessed John Henry Newman on Aquinas

Blessed John Henry Newman was responsible for organizing the translation and publication of Aquinas’ Catena aurea. In the preface to the translation Newman writes:

It is impossible to read the Catena of S. Thomas, without being struck with the masterly and architectonic skill with which it is put together. A learning of the highest kind,—not a mere literary book-knowledge, which might have supplied the place of indexes and tables in ages destitute of those helps, and when every thing was to be read in unarranged and fragmentary manuscripts—but a thorough acquaintance with the whole range of ecclesiastical antiquity, so as to be able to bring the substance of all that had been written on any point to bear upon the text which involved it—a familiarity with the style of each writer, so as to compress into few words the pith of a whole page, and a power of clear and orderly arrangement in this mass of knowledge, are qualities which make this Catena perhaps nearly perfect as a conspectus of Patristic interpretation. Other compilations exhibit research, industry, learning; but this, though a mere compilation, evinces a masterly command over the whole subject of Theology (Preface from Catena Aurea of Saint Thomas Aquinas, Oxford, 1841.)

0140: Beatification of Cardinal John Henry Newman

2010-09-20T03:56:00.002-04:00

Entry 0140: Beatification of Cardinal John Henry Newman

PRAYER VIGIL ON THE EVE OF THE BEATIFICATION: ADDRESS OF HIS HOLINESS BENEDICT XVI (Hyde Park – London, Saturday, 18 September 2010)

My Brothers and Sisters in Christ,

This is an evening of joy, of immense spiritual joy, for all of us. We are gathered here in prayerful vigil to prepare for tomorrow’s Mass, during which a great son of this nation, Cardinal John Henry Newman, will be declared Blessed. How many people, in England and throughout the world, have longed for this moment! It is also a great joy for me, personally, to share this experience with you. As you know, Newman has long been an important influence in my own life and thought, as he has been for so many people beyond these isles. The drama of Newman’s life invites us to examine our lives, to see them against the vast horizon of God’s plan, and to grow in communion with the Church of every time and place: the Church of the apostles, the Church of the martyrs, the Church of the saints, the Church which Newman loved and to whose mission he devoted his entire life.

I thank Archbishop Peter Smith for his kind words of welcome in your name, and I am especially pleased to see the many young people who are present for this vigil. This evening, in the context of our common prayer, I would like to reflect with you about a few aspects of Newman’s life which I consider very relevant to our lives as believers and to the life of the Church today.

Let me begin by recalling that Newman, by his own account, traced the course of his whole life back to a powerful experience of conversion which he had as a young man. It was an immediate experience of the truth of God’s word, of the objective reality of Christian revelation as handed down in the Church. This experience, at once religious and intellectual, would inspire his vocation to be a minister of the Gospel, his discernment of the source of authoritative teaching in the Church of God, and his zeal for the renewal of ecclesial life in fidelity to the apostolic tradition. At the end of his life, Newman would describe his life’s work as a struggle against the growing tendency to view religion as a purely private and subjective matter, a question of personal opinion. Here is the first lesson we can learn from his life: in our day, when an intellectual and moral relativism threatens to sap the very foundations of our society, Newman reminds us that, as men and women made in the image and likeness of God, we were created to know the truth, to find in that truth our ultimate freedom and the fulfilment of our deepest human aspirations. In a word, we are meant to know Christ, who is himself “the way, and the truth, and the life” (Jn 14:6).

Newman’s life also teaches us that passion for the truth, intellectual honesty and genuine conversion are costly. The truth that sets us free cannot be kept to ourselves; it calls for testimony, it begs to be heard, and in the end its convincing power comes from itself and not from the human eloquence or arguments in which it may be couched. Not far from here, at Tyburn, great numbers of our brothers and sisters died for the faith; the witness of their fidelity to the end was ever more powerful than the inspired words that so many of them spoke before surrendering everything to the Lord. In our own time, the price to be paid for fidelity to the Gospel is no longer being hanged, drawn and quartered but it often involves being dismissed out of hand, ridiculed or parodied. And yet, the Church cannot withdraw from the task of proclaiming Christ and his Gospel as saving truth, the source of our ultimate happiness as individuals and as the foundation of a just and humane society.

Finally, Newman teaches us that if we have accepted the truth of Christ and committed our lives to him, there can be no separation between what we believe and the way we live our lives. Our every thought, word and action must be directed to the glory of God and the spread of his Kingdom. Newman understood this, and was the great champion of the prophetic office of the Christian laity. He saw clearly that we do not so much accept the truth in a purely intellectual act as embrace it in a spiritual dynamic that penetrates to the core of our being. Truth is passed on not merely by formal teaching, important as that is, but also by the witness of lives lived in integrity, fidelity and holiness; those who live in and by the truth instinctively recognize what is false and, precisely as false, inimical to the beauty and goodness which accompany the splendour of truth, veritatis splendor.

Tonight’s first reading is the magnificent prayer in which Saint Paul asks that we be granted to know “the love of Christ which surpasses all understanding” (Eph 3:14-21). The Apostle prays that Christ may dwell in our hearts through faith (cf. Eph 3:17) and that we may come to “grasp, with all the saints, the breadth and the length, the height and the depth” of that love. Through faith we come to see God’s word as a lamp for our steps and light for our path (cf. Ps 119:105). Newman, like the countless saints who preceded him along the path of Christian discipleship, taught that the “kindly light” of faith leads us to realize the truth about ourselves, our dignity as God’s children, and the sublime destiny which awaits us in heaven. By letting the light of faith shine in our hearts, and by abiding in that light through our daily union with the Lord in prayer and participation in the life-giving sacraments of the Church, we ourselves become light to those around us; we exercise our “prophetic office”; often, without even knowing it, we draw people one step closer to the Lord and his truth. Without the life of prayer, without the interior transformation which takes place through the grace of the sacraments, we cannot, in Newman’s words, “radiate Christ”; we become just another “clashing cymbal” (1 Cor 13:1) in a world filled with growing noise and confusion, filled with false paths leading only to heartbreak and illusion.

One of the Cardinal’s best-loved meditations includes the words, “God has created me to do him some definite service. He has committed some work to me which he has not committed to another” (Meditations on Christian Doctrine). Here we see Newman’s fine Christian realism, the point at which faith and life inevitably intersect. Faith is meant to bear fruit in the transformation of our world through the power of the Holy Spirit at work in the lives and activity of believers. No one who looks realistically at our world today could think that Christians can afford to go on with business as usual, ignoring the profound crisis of faith which has overtaken our society, or simply trusting that the patrimony of values handed down by the Christian centuries will continue to inspire and shape the future of our society. We know that in times of crisis and upheaval God has raised up great saints and prophets for the renewal of the Church and Christian society; we trust in his providence and we pray for his continued guidance. But each of us, in accordance with his or her state of life, is called to work for the advancement of God’s Kingdom by imbuing temporal life with the values of the Gospel. Each of us has a mission, each of us is called to change the world, to work for a culture of life, a culture forged by love and respect for the dignity of each human person. As our Lord tells us in the Gospel we have just heard, our light must shine in the sight of all, so that, seeing our good works, they may give praise to our heavenly Father (cf. Mt 5:16).

Here I wish to say a special word to the many young people present. Dear young friends: only Jesus knows what “definite service” he has in mind for you. Be open to his voice resounding in the depths of your heart: even now his heart is speaking to your heart. Christ has need of families to remind the world of the dignity of human love and the beauty of family life. He needs men and women who devote their lives to the noble task of education, tending the young and forming them in the ways of the Gospel. He needs those who will consecrate their lives to the pursuit of perfect charity, following him in chastity, poverty and obedience, and serving him in the least of our brothers and sisters. He needs the powerful love of contemplative religious, who sustain the Church’s witness and activity through their constant prayer. And he needs priests, good and holy priests, men who are willing to lay down their lives for their sheep. Ask our Lord what he has in mind for you! Ask him for the generosity to say “yes!” Do not be afraid to give yourself totally to Jesus. He will give you the grace you need to fulfil your vocation. Let me finish these few words by warmly inviting you to join me next year in Madrid for World Youth Day. It is always a wonderful occasion to grow in love for Christ and to be encouraged in a joyful life of faith along with thousands of other young people. I hope to see many of you there!

And now, dear friends, let us continue our vigil of prayer by preparing to encounter Christ, present among us in the Blessed Sacrament of the Altar. Together, in the silence of our common adoration, let us open our minds and hearts to his presence, his love, and the convincing power of his truth. In a special way, let us thank him for the enduring witness to that truth offered by Cardinal John Henry Newman. Trusting in his prayers, let us ask the Lord to illumine our path, and the path of all British society, with the kindly light of his truth, his love and his peace. Amen.

MASS WITH THE BEATIFICATION

OF VENERABLE CARDINAL JOHN HENRY NEWMAN

HOMILY OF HIS HOLINESS BENEDICT XVI

Cofton Park of Rednal – Birmingham

Sunday, 19 September 2010

http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/homilies/2010/documents/hf_ben-xvi_hom_20100919_beatif-newman_en.html

Dear Brothers and Sisters in Christ,

This day that has brought us together here in Birmingham is a most auspicious one. In the first place, it is the Lord’s day, Sunday, the day when our Lord Jesus Christ rose from the dead and changed the course of human history for ever, offering new life and hope to all who live in darkness and in the shadow of death. That is why Christians all over the world come together on this day to give praise and thanks to God for the great marvels he has worked for us. This particular Sunday also marks a significant moment in the life of the British nation, as it is the day chosen to commemorate the seventieth anniversary of the Battle of Britain. For me as one who lived and suffered through the dark days of the Nazi regime in Germany, it is deeply moving to be here with you on this occasion, and to recall how many of your fellow citizens sacrificed their lives, courageously resisting the forces of that evil ideology. My thoughts go in particular to nearby Coventry, which suffered such heavy bombardment and massive loss of life in November 1940. Seventy years later, we recall with shame and horror the dreadful toll of death and destruction that war brings in its wake, and we renew our resolve to work for peace and reconciliation wherever the threat of conflict looms. Yet there is another, more joyful reason why this is an auspicious day for Great Britain, for the Midlands, for Birmingham. It is the day that sees Cardinal John Henry Newman formally raised to the altars and declared Blessed.

I thank Archbishop Bernard Longley for his gracious welcome at the start of Mass this morning. I pay tribute to all who have worked so hard over many years to promote the cause of Cardinal Newman, including the Fathers of the Birmingham Oratory and the members of the Spiritual Family Das Werk. And I greet everyone here from Great Britain, Ireland, and further afield; I thank you for your presence at this celebration, in which we give glory and praise to God for the heroic virtue of a saintly Englishman.

England has a long tradition of martyr saints, whose courageous witness has sustained and inspired the Catholic community here for centuries. Yet it is right and fitting that we should recognize today the holiness of a confessor, a son of this nation who, while not called to shed his blood for the Lord, nevertheless bore eloquent witness to him in the course of a long life devoted to the priestly ministry, and especially to preaching, teaching, and writing. He is worthy to take his place in a long line of saints and scholars from these islands, Saint Bede, Saint Hilda, Saint Aelred, Blessed Duns Scotus, to name but a few. In Blessed John Henry, that tradition of gentle scholarship, deep human wisdom and profound love for the Lord has borne rich fruit, as a sign of the abiding presence of the Holy Spirit deep within the heart of God’s people, bringing forth abundant gifts of holiness.

Cardinal Newman’s motto, Cor ad cor loquitur, or “Heart speaks unto heart”, gives us an insight into his understanding of the Christian life as a call to holiness, experienced as the profound desire of the human heart to enter into intimate communion with the Heart of God. He reminds us that faithfulness to prayer gradually transforms us into the divine likeness. As he wrote in one of his many fine sermons, “a habit of prayer, the practice of turning to God and the unseen world in every season, in every place, in every emergency – prayer, I say, has what may be called a natural effect in spiritualizing and elevating the soul. A man is no longer what he was before; gradually … he has imbibed a new set of ideas, and become imbued with fresh principles” (Parochial and Plain Sermons, iv, 230-231). Today’s Gospel tells us that no one can be the servant of two masters (cf. Lk 16:13), and Blessed John Henry’s teaching on prayer explains how the faithful Christian is definitively taken into the service of the one true Master, who alone has a claim to our unconditional devotion (cf. Mt 23:10). Newman helps us to understand what this means for our daily lives: he tells us that our divine Master has assigned a specific task to each one of us, a “definite service”, committed uniquely to every single person: “I have my mission”, he wrote, “I am a link in a chain, a bond of connexion between persons. He has not created me for naught. I shall do good, I shall do his work; I shall be an angel of peace, a preacher of truth in my own place … if I do but keep his commandments and serve him in my calling” (Meditations and Devotions, 301-2).

The definite service to which Blessed John Henry was called involved applying his keen intellect and his prolific pen to many of the most pressing “subjects of the day”. His insights into the relationship between faith and reason, into the vital place of revealed religion in civilized society, and into the need for a broadly-based and wide-ranging approach to education were not only of profound importance for Victorian England, but continue today to inspire and enlighten many all over the world. I would like to pay particular tribute to his vision for education, which has done so much to shape the ethos that is the driving force behind Catholic schools and colleges today. Firmly opposed to any reductive or utilitarian approach, he sought to achieve an educational environment in which intellectual training, moral discipline and religious commitment would come together. The project to found a Catholic University in Ireland provided him with an opportunity to develop his ideas on the subject, and the collection of discourses that he published as The Idea of a University holds up an ideal from which all those engaged in academic formation can continue to learn. And indeed, what better goal could teachers of religion set themselves than Blessed John Henry’s famous appeal for an intelligent, well-instructed laity: “I want a laity, not arrogant, not rash in speech, not disputatious, but men who know their religion, who enter into it, who know just where they stand, who know what they hold and what they do not, who know their creed so well that they can give an account of it, who know so much of history that they can defend it” (The Present Position of Catholics in England, ix, 390). On this day when the author of those words is raised to the altars, I pray that, through his intercession and example, all who are engaged in the task of teaching and catechesis will be inspired to greater effort by the vision he so clearly sets before us.

While it is John Henry Newman’s intellectual legacy that has understandably received most attention in the vast literature devoted to his life and work, I prefer on this occasion to conclude with a brief reflection on his life as a priest, a pastor of souls. The warmth and humanity underlying his appreciation of the pastoral ministry is beautifully expressed in another of his famous sermons: “Had Angels been your priests, my brethren, they could not have condoled with you, sympathized with you, have had compassion on you, felt tenderly for you, and made allowances for you, as we can; they could not have been your patterns and guides, and have led you on from your old selves into a new life, as they can who come from the midst of you” (“Men, not Angels: the Priests of the Gospel”, Discourses to Mixed Congregations, 3). He lived out that profoundly human vision of priestly ministry in his devoted care for the people of Birmingham during the years that he spent at the Oratory he founded, visiting the sick and the poor, comforting the bereaved, caring for those in prison. No wonder that on his death so many thousands of people lined the local streets as his body was taken to its place of burial not half a mile from here. One hundred and twenty years later, great crowds have assembled once again to rejoice in the Church’s solemn recognition of the outstanding holiness of this much-loved father of souls. What better way to express the joy of this moment than by turning to our heavenly Father in heartfelt thanksgiving, praying in the words that Blessed John Henry Newman placed on the lips of the choirs of angels in heaven:

Praise to the Holiest in the height
And in the depth be praise;
In all his words most wonderful,
Most sure in all his ways!
(The Dream of Gerontius).

APOSTOLIC JOURNEY TO THE UNITED KINGDOM

(SEPTEMBER 16-19, 2010)

BENEDICT XVI

ANGELUS

Cofton Park of Rednal - Birmingham
Sunday, 19 September 2010

http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/angelus/2010/documents/hf_ben-xvi_ang_20100919_regno-unito_en.html

Brothers and Sisters in Jesus Christ,

I am pleased to send my greetings to the people of Seville where, just yesterday, Madre María de la Purísima de la Cruz was beatified. May Blessed María be an inspiration to young women to follow her example of single-minded love of God and neighbour.

When Blessed John Henry Newman came to live in Birmingham, he gave the name “Maryvale” to his first home here. The Oratory that he founded is dedicated to the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin. And the Catholic University of Ireland he placed under the patronage of Mary, Sedes Sapientiae. In so many ways, he lived his priestly ministry in a spirit of filial devotion to the Mother of God. Meditating upon her role in the unfolding of God’s plan for our salvation, he was moved to exclaim: “Who can estimate the holiness and perfection of her, who was chosen to be the Mother of Christ? What must have been her gifts, who was chosen to be the only near earthly relative of the Son of God, the only one whom He was bound by nature to revere and look up to; the one appointed to train and educate Him, to instruct Him day by day, as He grew in wisdom and in stature?” (Parochial and Plain Sermons, ii, 131-2). It is on account of those abundant gifts of grace that we honour her, and it is on account of that intimacy with her divine Son that we naturally seek her intercession for our own needs and the needs of the whole world. In the words of the Angelus, we turn now to our Blessed Mother and commend to her the intentions that we hold in our hearts.

0139: Pope Benedict XVI on Aquinas (XIV)

2010-09-13T03:32:00.004-04:00

Entry 0139: Pope Benedict XVI on Aquinas (XIV)

On Sunday, September 5, 2010, the Holy Father paid a short visit to Carpineto Romano (in Italy,) the birthplace of his predecessor Pope Leo XIII. The short visit included the celebration of Holy Mass commemorating the 200th anniversary of the birth of Leo XIII. In the homily Benedict XVI mentioned the appreciation Leo XIII had for the teachings of the Angelic Doctor and stressed the importance of the philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas. Here is what the Pope said:

Every Pastor is called to pass on to the People of God "wisdom" not abstract truths; in other words a message that combines faith and life, truth and practical reality. Pope Leo XIII, with the help of the Holy Spirit was able to do this in one of the most difficult periods of history for the Church by, staying faithful to tradition and, at the same time, measuring up to the great open questions. And he succeeded precisely on the basis of "Christian wisdom", founded on the Sacred Scriptures, on the immense theological and spiritual patrimony of the Catholic Church and also on the sound and crystal clear philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas, whom he esteemed highly and promoted throughout the Church.

The original Italian, the English translation reported here, and translations into other languages can be found in the Official Web Site of the Holy See, at
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/homilies/2010/documents/hf_ben-xvi_hom_20100905_carpineto_en.html (accessed September 12, 2010).