Commentary on
Expositio in librum Boetii De hebdomadibus, lecture 2
(Quotations from the writings of R. A. te Velde)
In his commentary on Boethius’s De hebdomadibus Aquinas uses the expression actus essendi twice, in lecture 2: “Sicut possumus dicere de eo quod currit sive de currente quod currat inquantum subiicitur cursui et participat ipsum, ita possumus dicere quod ens sive id quod est sit inquantum participat actum essendi. (…) Sed id quod est, accepta essendi forma, scilicet suscipiendo ipsum actum essendi, est, atque consistit, idest in seipso subsistit; non enim ens dicitur proprie et per se nisi de substantia cuius est subsistere.”
Since the publication of Cornelio Fabro’s works on participation (in 1939 and 1960), the In librum Boetii De hebdomadibus expositio has
received considerable attention. Thus, before offering my own commentary on the
context surrounding the text where Aquinas explicitly employs the expression actus
essendi in his In De hebdomadibus, I shall first review some of
the comments that have been offered by other authors in the relatively recent
period since Fabro’s books.
“This difference articulates the fact that an
angel, as a fully determinate being, is in a determinate way distinguished from
other beings, and therefore distinguished in a determinate way from its being.
The scheme of id quod est—esse points
out that the angel cannot be understood as a distinct essence, which
subsequently is a subject of being. Precisely as something which has being (id quod est) it must be distinct from
its being, since in each case the id quod
est assumes a different character. Thus the difference is not prior to the
unity of id quod est and esse, it is a difference in the way
forms are related to their esse. The
difference does not pertain to the subject considered in itself, prior to the
being it receives” (Participation and
Substantiality, 82).
B. Rudi A. te Velde
From the passages from Rudi
A. te Velde’s Participation and
Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas reported below we take the following
points:
(a) R. te Velde stresses that
Aquinas explains his understanding of the diversity of esse and id quod est (or ens) first in terms of the diverse
logical functions that these terms possess. Esse
and id quod est (or ens) refer to one and the same reality,
but they signify this reality according to distinct modes of signification. Esse signifies abstractly what id quod est (or ens) signifies concretely. Both terms are defined in relation to
one another: ens = ‘id quod habet esse,’ esse = ‘id quo aliquid est ens.’
(b) Regarding Aquinas’s
affirmation that id quod est (or ens) participates in actus essendi in the way something concrete
participates in something abstract, R. te Velde notes that here Aquinas tacitly
introduces a new mode of participation, distinct from the ones previously
described, namely, participation of the subject in its accidents, of matter in
form, of the particular in the universal, and of the effect in its cause.
(c) According to R. te Velde, it
is from the analysis of composite things that Aquinas extends the Boethian
axiom diversus est esse and id quod est
to angelic creatures. Just as in composite things the diversity between esse and id quod est (or ens) is a
real diversity, so also in the separate substances esse and id quod est (or ens) are really distinct.
Here are excerpts from Rudi A. te
Velde’s Participation and
Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas (Leiden, The Netherlands: E. J. Brill,
1995):
“In his tractate De hebdomadibus Boethius first sets down a number of axioms by means of which he
intends to prove the thesis that whatever is is good insofar as it is. The most
interesting axiom is the statement that diversum
est esse et id quod est, ‘to be and that which is are diverse.’ Boethius
accounts for this diversity as follows: ‘Being-as
such is not yet, but that which is,
once it has received the form of being, is and subsists. That which is can participate in something else, but being-as-such participates in no way.
For participation comes about when something already is; but something is when
it has received being” (Participation and
Substantiality, 76-77).
Footnote: De hebd. (ed. Steward/Rand, p. 40): “diversum
est esse et id quod est; ipsum esse nondum est, at vero quod est accepta
essendi forma est atque consistit. Quod est participare aliquo modo potest, sed
ipsum esse nullo modo participat. Fit enim participatio cum aliquid iam est;
est autem aliquid, cum esse susceperit.” See for detailed analysis, McInerny,
“Boethius and St. Thomas Aquinas,” in Being
and Predication, pp. 97-110.
“This passage leads Thomas to
dwell in his commentary on the meaning of ‘participare’
and to distinguish different modes of participation. Thus he is able to explain
the rather enigmatic axiom of Boethius. The proposition ‘diversum est esse et
id quod est’ formulates a truth about the notion of being, ens. With regard to the term ‘being’ one can distinguish between
the abstractly signified ‘to be’ (esse)
and the concretely signified ‘that which is’ (id quod est). They are two logical forms of the term ‘being’ which
correspond with two different modes of signifying. The infinitive ‘to be’ (esse) is signified as something common
and indeterminate; seen from a logical point of view, this ‘to be’ is made
finite in two ways, either on the side of the subject which has being (quod esse habet), or on the side of the
predicate, as when we say of man not simply that he is but that he is
such-and-such, for example, white or black” (Participation and Substantiality, 77).
Footnote: In de hebd., lect. 2, n. 21: “Circa ens
autem consideratur ipsum esse quasi quiddam commune et indeterminatum: quod
quidem dupliciter determinatur; uno modo ex parte subiecti, quod esse habet; alio
modo ex parte praedicati, utpote cum dicimus de homine, vel de quacumque alia
re, non quidem quod sit simpliciter, sed quod sit aliquid, puta album vel
nigrum.”
“The indeterminate actuality
expressed by the infinitive thus becomes determined by the subject to ‘that
which is’ (e.g. ‘man is’) and by the predicate to ‘that which is such-and-such’
(e.g. ‘man is white’)” (Participation and
Substantiality, 77).
“We are now particularly
interested in the first way in which the infinitive ‘to be’ is made finite and
determined. According to Thomas, the diversity of ‘to be’ and ‘that which is’
must be interpreted in the light of the relation between being in its
infinitive form and the subject which has being (secundum comparationem esse ad id quod est). The subject which has
being is different from that being itself. In what way? Not because they refer
to diverse things, but because they have different mode of signifying and
accordingly a different logical function. A comparison can be drawn with the
different forms of the verb ‘to run.’ Just as ‘to run’ (currere) and ‘that which runs’ (currens)
differ, so ‘to be’ (esse) and ‘that
which is’ (ens) are different: the
one signifies abstractly what the other signifies concretely” (Participation and Substantiality, 77-78).
Footnote: Ibid., n. 22: “Dicit ergo primo, quod
diversum est esse, et id quod est. Quae quidem diversitas non est hic referenda
ad res, de quibus adhuc non loquitur, sed ad ipsas rationes seu intentiones.
Aliud autem significamus per hoc quod dicimus esse, et aliud per hoc quod
dicimus id quod est; sicut et aliud significamus cum dicimus currere, et aliud
per hoc quod dicitur currens. Nam
currere et esse significantur in abstracto, sicut et albedo; sed quod est,
idest ens et currens, significantur sicut in concreto, velut album.”
“So when Boethius says that “being-as-such
is not yet,” this means that the infinitive ‘to be’ does not have the required
logical form of a subject of which it can be said that it is. We cannot
properly say of the infinitive form ‘to be’ that it is, just as ‘to run’ cannot
be said to run. ‘To run’ signifies the activity of running, which is the
activity of someone who is running. In a similar way, ‘being’ is the actuality
belonging to ‘that which is.’ The expression ‘that which is’ signifies in the
mode of a subject. Just as ‘that which runs’ can be said to run, in the sense
that it is the bearer of the act of running, so ‘that which is’ or ‘being’ (ens) can be said to be, inasmuch as it
participates in the act of being (inquantum
participat actum essendi)” (Participation
and Substantiality, 78).
Footnote: Ibid., n. 23: “…ipsum esse non
significatur sicut ipsum subiectum essendi, sicut nec currere significatur
sicut subiectum cursus: unde, sicut non possumus dicere quod ipsum currere
currat, ita non possumus dicere quod ipsum esse sit: sed sicut id ipsum quod
est, significatur sicut subiectum essendi, sic id quod currit significatur
sicut subiectum currendi: et ideo sicut possumus dicere de eo quod currit, sive
de currente, quod currat, inquantum subiicitur cursui et participat ipsum; ita
possumus dicere quod ens, sive id quod est, sit, inquantum participat actum
essendi.”
“So far the analysis seems to be
mainly logical in character. There is only a diversity with respect to the intentiones according to which they
signify. What ens signifies
concretely, by way of subject, esse
signifies abstractly or, grammatically, in the infinitive mode” (Participation and Substantiality, 78).
“Thomas’s next step in his exposition
is to clarify the statement of Boethius that ipsum esse participates in no way, whereas id quod est is aid to be able to participate in something else. Ipsum esse is unable to participate,
either in the way the subject participates in the accident (or matter in form)
or in the way the particular participates in the universal. The first mode of
participation is excluded because ipsum
esse is signified as something abstract and not as subject. And what
prevents the second mode of participation—of the particular in the universal—is
that there is simply nothing more universal than ipsum esse. As such, as the most universal, it is shared in or
participated in by everything else, but does not itself participate in
something more universal” (Participation
and Substantiality, 78-79).
Footnote: Ibid., n. 24: “Praetermisso autem hoc
tertio modo participandi, impossibile est quod secundum duos primos modos ipsum
esse participet aliquid. Non enim potest participare aliquid per modum quo
materia vel subiectum participat formam vel accidens: quia, ut dictum est,
ipsum esse significatur ut quiddam abstractum. Similiter autem nec potest
aliquid participare per modum quo particulare participat universale: sic enim
ea quae in abstracto dicuntur, participare possunt, sicut albedo colorem; sed
ipsum esse est communissimum: unde ipsum quidem participatur in aliis, non
autem participat aliquid aliud.”
“By contrast, the concretely said
ens, though as universal as esse, does participate, namely in esse. That which is participates in
being, not in the way the less universal participates in the more universal,
but in the way the concrete is said to participate in the abstract” (Participation and Substantiality, 79).
Footnote: Ibid., n. 24: “Sed id quod est, sive
ens, quamvis sit communissimum, tamen concretive dicitur; et ideo participat
ipsum esse, non per modum quo magis commune participatur a minus communi; sed
participat ipsum esse per modum quo concretum participat abstractum.”
“It seems to me that Thomas has
tacitly introduced a new mode of participation here. The participation of the
concrete in the abstract does not fall under any of the three modes mentioned
earlier. This point has frequently been overlooked in the literature. McInerny,
for instance, identifies the way ens
is said to participate in esse with
the second mode of participation mentioned by Thomas, namely the
subject-accident type” (Participation and
Substantiality, 79).
Footnote: Cf. his Boethius and Aquinas, p. 205; however,
in the chapter “Boethius and St. Thomas Aquinas” from his book Being and Predication McInerny seems to
acknowledge that the participation of the concrete in the abstract, of ens in esse, cannot be reduced to any of the three modes of participation
(p. 104). Geiger too identifies the participation of the concrete in the
abstract with that of subject in form (La
participation, p. 78). See also Wippel (Aquinas
and Participation, p. 127) who rightly emphasizes the distinct character of
the participation in esse; cf. “…in
order for a subject to participate in its accidents, Thomas has noted, the
subject must first exist. And it exists only insofar as it participates in esse. Participation in esse is clearly more fundamental than
that of a substance in its accidents. The same may be said of participation of
matter in form.”
“It is this type of participation
which comes first in Boethius. For him participation is only possible if
something already exists. But Thomas does not just say (with Boethius): only on
the condition that something exists is it able to participate in something
else, in other words, a subject (an actual substance) can receive something
else in addition to what it is in itself. He goes a step further: that which is
(ens) participates, namely in being (ipsum esse). It is clear that the
concrete ens includes esse and cannot be conceived without it.
In ens there is nothing else to
understand besides the esse it has;
it is not yet determined by something else which differs from esse. So if ‘ens’ is said to signify in the mode of a subject, it cannot be the
subject of ‘esse’ in the sense of
something which has some being of its own over against the property it is
subjected to, as matter is the subject with respect to the form and substance
with respect to the accident. The reason for this is that both terms are
defined in relation to one another: ens
= ‘id quod habet esse,’ esse = ‘id
quo aliquid est ens’” (Participation and
Substantiality, 79-80).
Footnote: Cf.
McInerny, “Boethius and St. Thomas Aquinas,” op. cit. p. 101.
“Their diversity is a matter of
signifying the same in diverse ways, according to different intentiones” (Participation and Substantiality, 80).
“Further on in his commentary
Thomas comes to discuss another axiom of Boethius which says that ‘in every
composite entity esse is different
from what is.’ This time a real difference is meant, a difference in reality
itself between that which is and its esse”
(Participation and Substantiality, 80).
Footnote: De hebd. (ed. Steward/Rand, p. 42):
“Omne simplex esse suum et id quod est unum habet. Omni composito aliud est
esse, aliud ipsum est.” Cf. In de hebd.,
lect. 2, n. 31: “Deinde cum dicit, ‘Omni composito,’ ponit conceptiones de
composito et simplici, quae pertinent ad rationem unius. Est autem
considerandum, quod ea quae supra dicta sunt de diversitate ipsius esse et eius
quod est, est secundum ipsas intentiones; hic autem ostendit quomodo applicetur
ad res.”
“When something is conceived as a
being, this way of conceiving admits of a difference in that thing, a
difference which must be assumed in the case of composite things. Why is it
that in the case of composite things the esse
is different from the id quod est? It
was found, Thomas explains, that ipsum
esse does not participate in anything else. For it cannot be reduced to
something more universal, nor can it be mixed up with something external in the
sense of being composed with an accident. Ipsum
esse is therefore not composed, it is logically simple and pure. From this
one must conclude that a composite thing cannot be its esse, otherwise it would not be composed” (Participation and Substantiality, 80).
Footnote: In de hebd., lect. 2, n. 32: “Est ergo
primo considerandum, quod sicut esse et quod est differunt in simplicibus
secundum intentiones, ita in compositis differunt realiter: quod quidem
manifestum est ex praemissis; dictum est enim supra, quod ipsum esse neque
participat aliquid, ut eius ratio constituatur ex multis; neque habet aliquid
extraneum admixtum, ut sit in eo compositio accidentis; et ideo ipsum esse non
est compositum. Res ergo composita non est suum esse: et ideo dicit, quod in omni composito
aliud est esse, et aliud ipsum
compositum, quod est participatum ipsum esse.”
“So far Thomas simply clarifies
the meaning of Boethius’s statement. Composite things cannot be identical with
their being, as being itself is something simple” (Participation and Substantiality, 80-81).
“For Boethius composition here
refers to material things. What he means is the composition of matter and form.
But Thomas extends the composition even to forms without matter, separate forms
which from a physical point of view are simple. Even in separate forms there is
a difference between that which is and its being. And this is because separate
forms are still different from each other, each determined according to its own
species; therefore, the esse which
they have in common must be determined differently in each of them according to
a different form. As each of these forms determines the esse which is proper to it (determinativa
ipsius esse), none of them coincides with its esse, but is something which has esse” (Participation and
Substantiality, 81).
Footnote: Ibid., n.
34: “Si ergo inveniantur aliquae formae non in materia, unaquaeque earum est
quidem simplex quantum ad hoc quod caret materia (..); quia tamen quaelibet
forma est determinativa ipsius esse, nulla earum est ipsum esse, sed est habens
esse.”
“Thus as regards to the
composition in reality, not only are material things composite, but even pure
forms count as composite from a metaphysical point of view. In order to account
for the multiplicity of separate forms, each form must be distinguished from
the other; and since it has no matter, each form must be distinct by itself, as
a special form of being. Each form plays the role of id quod est, but in each case it must be a different id quod est, thus a different way of
having esse. So it is clear that id quod est must be different from its esse; in each id quod est the esse is
differently determined. And therefore none of the forms is absolutely simple,
but they participate, each in a different way, in being” (Participation and Substantiality, 81).
Footnote: Ibid., n.
34: “manifestum erit quod ipsa forma immaterialis subsistens, cum sit quiddam
determinatum ad speciem, non est ipsum esse commune, sed participat illud: (…) unaquaeque
illarum, inquantum distinguitur ab alia, quaedam specialis forma est
participans ipsum esse; et sic nulla earum erit vere simplex.”
“What is the significance of the
participative structure of ‘being’ as described in the commentary on the De hebdomadibus? This tractate is the
source of one of the ways in which Thomas conceives the essence-esse
distinction. The Boethian pair of ‘id
quod est’ and ‘esse’ is
especially applied by Aquinas to the mode of being of separate substances
(angels). In the angel, and a fortiori
in every creature, ‘that which is’ differs from its ‘be-ing,’ for ‘that which
is’ is the subsistent form and its ‘be-ing’ is that by which the substance of
the angel is” (Participation and
Substantiality, 82).
Footnote: S.Th. I, q. 50, a. 2 ad 3. This text
will be discussed in detail in chapter 8.3 (part II).