Commentary on
Expositio in librum Boetii De hebdomadibus, lecture 2
(Quotations from the writings of R. McInerny)
In his commentary on
Boethius’s De hebdomadibus Aquinas
uses the expression actus essendi twice,
in lecture 2: “Sicut possumus dicere de
eo quod currit sive de currente quod currat inquantum subiicitur cursui et
participat ipsum, ita possumus dicere quod ens sive id quod est sit inquantum
participat actum essendi. (…) Sed
id quod est, accepta essendi forma, scilicet suscipiendo ipsum actum essendi,
est, atque consistit, idest in seipso subsistit; non enim ens dicitur proprie
et per se nisi de substantia cuius est subsistere.”
Since the publication of Cornelio Fabro’s works on participation (in 1939 and 1960), the In librum Boetii De hebdomadibus expositio has received considerable attention. Thus, before offering my own commentary on the context surrounding the text where Aquinas explicitly employs the expression actus essendi in his In De hebdomadibus, I shall first review some of the comments that have been offered by other authors in the relatively recent period since Fabro’s books.
Since the publication of Cornelio Fabro’s works on participation (in 1939 and 1960), the In librum Boetii De hebdomadibus expositio has received considerable attention. Thus, before offering my own commentary on the context surrounding the text where Aquinas explicitly employs the expression actus essendi in his In De hebdomadibus, I shall first review some of the comments that have been offered by other authors in the relatively recent period since Fabro’s books.
D. Ralph McInerny
(Regarding the philosophical nature of
Boethius’s De hebdomadibus, see also Jan
A. Aertsen, “What is First and Most Fundamental? The Beginnings
of Transcendental Philosophy,” in Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter? ed. Jan A. Aertsen and Andreas Speer [Berlin :
Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. , 1998], 179.)
From the passages from Ralph
McInerny’s Boethius and Aquinas reported below we take the following
points:
(a) McInerny emphasizes that both Boethius and Aquinas explicitly affirmed that the axiom diversum est esse et id
quod est is a self-evident axiom.
(b) McInerny underscores the philosophical
nature of Boethius’s De hebdomadibus.
Here are excerpts from Ralph
McInerny’s Boethius and Aquinas, (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University
of America Press, 1990):
“That the diversity between esse
and id quod est is self-evident is one of the great overlooked claims of
De hebdomadibus and of Thomas’s commentary on it” (Boethius and
Aquinas, xiv).
“De hebdomadibus makes no appeal to the Catholic faith. Indeed, it
proceeds on the basis of truths which need only be heard to command assent” (Boethius
and Aquinas, 130).
“(3a) Omni composito aliud est esse,
aliud ipsum est.
(3b) Omne simplex esse suum et
id quod est unum habet. This is the order in which the
axioms turning on the one occur in Thomas [in his commentary on Boethius’s De hebdomadibus,]
and, as we shall see, it is fitting that they should, whatever the textual
situation might be. In any case, it is clear that simple and composed are modes
of oneness. Moreover, we are moving from a diversity in the conceptual or
intentional order, a diversity in the realm of meanings and accounts of words,
to statements about the presence or lack of a corresponding diversity in the
things to which the words refer” (Boethius and Aquinas, 211-212).
“Not only is there a
difference of account between ens
or quod est
and esse,
in the composite things of this world there is a real difference as well. Here
we have a locution that led to talk of the Real Distinction, and the context
makes what the contrast intended is. ‘Est autem considerandum, quod ea quae
supra dicta sunt de diversitate ipsius esse et eius quod est, est secundum
ipsas intentiones; hic autem ostendit quomodo applicetur ad res’ (n. 31).
Whether we are speaking of simple or composite things, when we use the terms ens and esse they will have different
accounts, different modes of signifying, and certain restraints will follow on
those modes. Now this poses a problem when what we are talking about are simple
things. We have no choice but to use a language which is suggestive of
complexity, and the reason is that our language is fashioned to express what we
first know and what we first know are complex, composite, things” (Boethius
and Aquinas, 212).
Footnote:
This was St. Thomas
“‘Est ergo considerandum,
quod sicut esse et quod est differunt in simplicibus secundum intentiones, ita
in compositis differunt realiter’ (n. 32)” (Boethius and Aquinas,
212).
“A question we can put at
this point is this. Is it the identification of esse and quod est in simple things which is taken
to be evident and their non-identity in composite things that requires showing,
or the reverse? The remark of Thomas we have just recalled makes it clear what
his view is. The complexity in our language is a sign of what is most knowable
by us, namely, composite things. The major concern then would be to guard
against attributing to the things being spoken of the complexity of our talk
about them” (Boethius and Aquinas, 212).
“The question would be unintelligible
if we had not seen that the status of being an axiom, a communis animi conceptio,
does not exempt from being dependent for its manifestation on another. But,
needless to say, the manifestation of an axiom could scarcely be a matter of
demonstration or proof, since that would require a middle term and axioms are
immediate. And what Thomas tells us is that the real diversity of quod est
and esse
in composite things is clear from the forgoing: quod quidem manifestum est ex praemissis.
What are the elements of this manifesting?” (Boethius and
Aquinas, 212-213).
1.
Dictum est enim supra quod ipsum esse
a.
neque participat aliud, ut eius ratio constituatur ex multis;
b.
neque habet aliquid extraneum admixtum, ut sit in eo compositio accidentis;
c.
et ideo ipsum esse non est compositum.
2.
Res ergo composita non est suum esse.
[In
the footnote McInerny provides the following translation:] “It was said above
that (1) existence itself (a) neither participates in anything, such that its
account would be composed of many (b) not has anything extraneous mixed with
it, such that there is in it a composition with accidents, (c) therefore
existence itself is not composed. (2) Therefore, the composed thing is not its
existence” (lectio 2, n. 32).
“Would it make any sense to speak
of this as a proof of the real distinction between esse and quod est
in composite things? There is one ideo and one ergo in the sequence, which might lead the
unwary to think a demonstration is being claimed. But clearly this is not the
case. It seems obvious enough that 1a and 1b mention the kind of complexity not
to be found in ipsum esse
and thus enable us to know what would be meant by calling it simple. They could
be called a conjunction of modi
tollentes. If something participates in another such
that its account is composed of many elements, it is composite. But this is not
the case with ipsum esse,
so it is not composite. And so too with 1b. But what are we to make of the ergo in 2? If ipsum esse
is simple, as has been shown, it follows that a composite thing is not
existence” (Boethius and Aquinas, 213).
Footnote:
Whether or not the translation of the Posterior Analytics included in PL 64 is that
made by Boethius, he would have been aware of chapter 7, Book Two of that work.
“At vero si demonstrabit quid est, et quia est, et qualiter eadem ratione
demonstrabit, definito enim unum aliquid, et demonstratio, id autem quod est et
quid est homo, et esse hominem, aliud est. Postea per demonstrationem dicimus
necessarium esse demonstrare omne quia est, nisi substantia sit, esse autem non
substantia ulla est, non enim est genus, quod est, demonstratio itaque erit
quia est, quod quidem et non faciunt scientiae. (…)” PL 64, 748D-749A.
“But 2 says more; the
composite thing is not its
existence. [The statement in] 2 can seem to be merely 1c converted: ipsum esse non est compositum
converts to compositum non est
ipsum esse. The ergo then would simply be the sign of the
converted form being yielded by the original proposition” (Boethius
and Aquinas, 213-214).
Footnote:
Boethius wrote extensively of conversion of propositions as well as of the
relation of propositions on the Square
of Opposition
“But, again, 2 is not just
the converted form of 1c. How should we understand this?” (Boethius
and Aquinas, 214).
“The most straightforward
way would be this. A composite thing cannot be identified with one of its
components, particularly one that has just been shown to be incomplex. But quod est
is a compound of what
receives existence and the existence
received. If this complexity were only in the intentional order, the thing
would not be composite, but simple. This enables us to understand the relative
swiftness with which Thomas establishes the sense of (3a:) [Omni composito aliud est esse,
aliud ipsum est].
What is being asserted is assented to straight off when we know what is being
said” (Boethius and Aquinas, 214).
“Anyone who knows what a
composite thing is will know that its existence is diverse from what it is. A
composite thing is something that has come into being as a result of a change
and is thus composed of matter and form. For it to be is for the form to inhere
in, to actuate, the matter. But for the form so to inhere in the matter is not
what the form is, nor what the matter is, nor what the conjunction of them is.
The form explains the kind of existence the composite thing enjoys, but it is
not the efficient cause of its own inherence in the matter. For a composite
thing to be is for its parts to continue to cohere, for its form to inhere in
its matter. For it thus to be in act, to be actual, is what is meant by its existence,
suum esse”
(Boethius and Aquinas, 214).
“That nothing more arcane
than this is in play is clear when we go on to the comment on (3b:) [Omne simplex esse suum et id quod est unum
habet]. If there are simple things, there can be in them
no real diversity of quod est
and esse.
If there were, they would be composite and not simple. This is not a proof that
there are such simple things. Indeed, so far as the De hebdomadibus
is concerned, there is only one such simple thing, the First Good, the creator
of complex things and the explanation of both their existence and their
goodness” (Boethius and Aquinas, 214-215).
“We can thus see the
appropriateness of the ordering of the axioms bearing on the composite and the
simple as St. Thomas
“When Thomas turns to (3b:)
[Omne simplex esse suum et id
quod est unum habet], he reminds us of the obvious,
namely that our notion of simple things is arrived at by negating composition
in them. Since there is composition and composition, there are degrees of
simplicity. Something can be called simple because it lacks a certain kind of
complexity, yet involve another kind. Typically, Thomas begins with corporeal
things that are relatively simple, as the elements are simpler bodies than
mixed bodies whose composition involves contraries. Nonetheless, the basic
composition in physical bodies is that of matter and form, since this follows
on the very fact that they are physical or natural, that is, have come into
being as the result of a change. Matter is the subject which persists through
the change, and form is the determination it receives as the result of the
change” (Boethius and Aquinas, 215-216).
“By comparison with physical
substance then, if there were a substance that is form alone, it would be
simple. Thomas uses the plural, as Boethius did not, since such subsistent
forms admit of variety and plurality. “If then some forms were found not to be
in matter, each would be simple insofar as it lacked matter, and thus quantity
which is a disposition of matter, but because each form would be determinative
of existence, none of them would be
existence, but all would have
existence” (Boethius and Aquinas, 216).
Footnote:
“Si ergo inveniantur aliquae formae non in materia, unaquaeque earum est quidem
simplex quantum ad hoc quod caret materia, et per consequens quantitate, quae
est dispositio materiae, quia tamen quaelibet forma est determinativa ipsius
esse, nulla earum est ipsum esse, sed est habens esse” (lectio 2, n. 34).
“We see here an application
of the Boethian omne namque esse
ex forma est that he himself did not grasp. In the
composite thing, its esse
can be said to be constituted, as it were, by the principles of its essence (quasi constituitur per principia essentiae),
but chiefly by its form” (Boethius and Aquinas, 216).
Footnote:
In IV Metaphysic.,
lectio 2, n. 558. In Boetii De
trinitate, q. 5, a. 3, c.: “Secunda operatio respicit
ipsum esse rei, quod quidem resultat ex congregatione principiorum rei in
compositis, vel ipsam simplicem naturam rei concomitatur ut in substantiis
simplicibus.”
“Thomas waives the
difference between Plato and Aristotle on the Ideas, and cites them as
examples. Nor is this unusual. Thomas will always agree with Aristotle’s
rejection of the Forms or Ideas when taken to be the separate counterpart of
common names of sensible things. But he will eagerly embrace the Forms as ways
of grasping simple things” (Boethius and Aquinas, 216).
Footnote:
On this see the remarkable prologue to St.
Thomas
“That which is truly,
through and through, simple will not be a subsistent form of being, but
subsistent existence itself. And here we must say that there can be only one
truly simple thing, and this is God” (Boethius and Aquinas, 216).
Footnote:
“Id autem erit solum vere simplex, quod non participat esse, non quidem
inhaerens, sed subsistens. Hoc autem non potest esse nisi unum; quia si ipsum
esse nihil aliud habet admixtum praeter id quod est esse, ut dictum est,
impossibile est id quod est ipsum esse, multiplicari per aliquid diversificans:
et quia nihil aliud praeter se habet admixtum, consequens est quod nullius
accidentis sit susceptivum. Hoc autem simplex unum et sublime est ipse Deus”
(lectio 2, n. 35).
“In the case of De hebdomadibus, the text of Boethius
seems to be making an obvious point—it is explicitly said to be a per se nota one—when it states that diversum est esse et id quod est” (Boethius
and Aquinas, 250).
“Both Boethius and Thomas are
careful to establish the meanings of forma and esse with reference to physical substances.
Unless this is first done, the extension of the diversity [of esse and quod est]
to subsistent forms cannot coherently be carried off. More importantly, this
background is needed to grasp the significance of Thomas’s description of God
as Ipsum esse subsistens”
(Boethius and Aquinas, 252).
(The
observation that the axiom diversum
est esse et id quod est is a self-evident axiom is presented by McInerny in
several other of his works. See his “Boethius
and Saint Thomas Aquinas,” Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 66 [1974]:
219-245; Being and Predication: Thomistic interpretations [Washington,
D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1986], 55; “Saint Thomas on De hebdomadibus,” in Being
and Goodness: The Concept of the Good in Metaphysics and Philosophical Theology,
ed. Scott MacDonald [Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1991], 75-76; Praeambula Fidei: Thomism and
the God of the Philsophers [Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of
America Press, 2006], 303; and “Saint Thomas Aquinas,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, 30 September 2009.)