Commentary on
Expositio in librum Boetii De hebdomadibus, lecture 2
(Quotations from the writings of J. F. Wippel)
In his commentary on Boethius’s De hebdomadibus Aquinas uses the
expression actus essendi twice, in
lecture 2: “Sicut possumus dicere de eo
quod currit sive de currente quod currat inquantum subiicitur cursui et participat
ipsum, ita possumus dicere quod ens sive id quod est sit inquantum participat
actum essendi. (…) Sed id quod est,
accepta essendi forma, scilicet suscipiendo ipsum actum essendi, est, atque
consistit, idest in seipso subsistit; non enim ens dicitur proprie et per se
nisi de substantia cuius est subsistere.”
“It is under this third kind [of participation,
that whereby an effect participates in its cause], as we have seen, that
participation of beings in esse is to
be placed” (The Metaphysical Thought,
477 n. 93).
Since the publication of Cornelio
Fabro’s works on participation (in 1939 and 1960), the In librum Boetii De hebdomadibus
expositio has received considerable attention. Thus, before offering my own
commentary on the context surrounding the text where Aquinas explicitly employs
the expression actus essendi in his
In De hebdomadibus, I shall first
review some of the comments that have been offered by other authors in the
relatively recent period since Fabro's books.
A. John F. Wippel
From the passages from John F. Wippel’s The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas reported below we take the following points:
(a) Wippel states that the
general consensus among scholars is that Aquinas’s notion of actus essendi is completely missing from
Boethius himself. It is to be recognized therefore that Aquinas transforms the Boethian axiom diversus est esse and id quod est into the
axiom diversum est actus essendi and id
cui convenit actus essendi.
(b) In Aquinas’s explanations of the Boethian axiom, Wippel finds an argumentation for the real distinction between essence and act of being.
(c) Regarding the participation
of ens in actus essendi, which Aquinas describes as a case of the concrete
participating in the abstract, Wippel insists on saying that this participation
is a case of the participation of the effect in its cause. Wippel considers the
participation of ens in actus essendi as a more fundamental kind
of participation than any of the other kinds mentioned explicitly by Aquinas, namely,
the participation of the subject in accidents, the participation of matter in
form, the participation of the particular in the universal, and the participation
of the individual in the species. According to Wippel the participation of ens in actus essendi is not at all reducible to anyone of these.
(d) In addition to calling attention to the
participation of a particular ens in
its own actus essendi, Wippel also elaborates
on the participation of ens in esse commune, and on the participation
of ens in Ipsum Esse Subsistens. Wippel suggests that all of these ways of participating
in esse are instances of the participation
of the effect in its cause.
Here are excerpts from John F.
Wippel’s The Metaphysical Thought of
Thomas Aquinas (Washington ,
D.C.
Concerning Aquinas’s
interpretation of the axiom diversum est
esse et id quod est, Wippel affirms that “As Aquinas interprets him,
Boethius here distinguishes between esse
and ‘that which is’ as between that which is signified abstractly, for instance
by an expression such as ‘to run,’ and the same thing when it is signified
concretely, as by an expression such as ‘one who runs’ (currens). Thus while esse
and ‘to run’ are signified abstractly, like whiteness, ‘that which is’ or being
(ens) and ‘one who runs’ are
signified concretely, like a white thing” (The
Metaphysical Thought, 99).
Footnote: Leon .
50.270:39-271:45: “Aliud autem significamus per hoc quod dicimus esse et aliud per
hoc quod dicimus id quod est, sicut et aliud significamus cum dicimus currere
et aliud per hoc quod dicitur currens. Nam currere et esse significantur
in abstracto sicut et albedo; sed quod est, idest ens et currens, significantur
sicut in concreto, velut album.”
“Nonetheless, Thomas also finds
Boethius spelling out the distinction between these two, that is, between esse and ‘that which is,’ in three ways,
each of which Thomas develops far more fully than does Boethius” (The Metaphysical Thought, 99).
“First of all, esse is not signified as the subject of
being, just as the act of running (‘to run’) is not signified as if it were the
subject which runs. Just as we cannot say that the act of running (‘to run’)
itself runs, neither can we say that esse
itself exists. And if ‘that which runs’ is signified as the subject of running,
so do we signify ‘that which is’ as the subject of being (subjectum essendi). And if we can say of one who runs that he does
so insofar as he is subject to running and participates in it, so we can say
that a being, or ‘that which is,’ exists insofar as it participates in the act
of being” (The Metaphysical Thought,
99).
Footnote: Leon .
50.271:48-49. Note in particular: “…et ideo sicut possumus dicere de eo quod
currit sive de currente quod currat inquantum subiicitur cursui et participat
ipsum, ita possumus dicere quod ens sive id quod est sit inquantum participat
actum essendi.” As Fabro points out, Thomas here introduces one of the most
original insights into his Commentary on the Boethian text, and one which is
completely missing from Boethius himself, that is, his identification of esse as it is realized in a finite being
as the act of being: “…sed id quod est,
accepta essendi forma, scilicet suscipiendo ipsum actum essendi, est, atque consistit, idest in seipso
subsistit” (Leon. 50.271:61-63). For Fabro see Participation et causalite selon S. Thomas d’Aquin, p. 270. For
different medieval and contemporary ways of understanding the meaning of esse in Boethius himself see Fabro, La nozione metafisica, pp. 100-103. Also
see Geiger, La participation, pp.
46-45; P. Hadot, “La distinction de l’etre et de l’etant dans le De hebdomadibus de Boece,” Miscellanea Mediaevalia 2: Die Metaphysik im
Mittelalter (Berlin , 1963), pp. 147-53; S.
Schrimpf, Die Axiomenschrift des Boethius
(De hebdomadibus) als philosophisches Lehrbuch des Mittelalters (Leiden ,
1966). The general (if not universal) consensus is that however Boethius may
have understood and contrasted esse
and id quod est—and there is much
disagreement concerning this—he did not distinguish them in Thomistic fashion
as act of being and essence. However, for a different reading, see R. McInerny,
“Boethius and Saint Thomas Aquinas,” Rivista
di Filosofia neo-scolastica 66 (1974), pp. 219-45, and more recently, Boethius and Aquinas, pp. 161-253.
“Hence in this immediate context,
Thomas understands by esse the act of
being” (The Metaphysical Thought,
99).
“Secondly, Boethius states that
‘that which is’ can participate in something, but esse itself cannot. It is in explaining this second difference that
Thomas introduces the description and divisions of participation we have been
considering. Thomas immediately turns from this description of participation to
explain why esse (the act of being)
itself cannot participate in anything else, even though ‘that which is’ or the
subject which exists can. Precisely because esse
is signified in abstract fashion, it cannot participate in anything else in the
second general way Thomas has singled out, that is, as a substance participates
in its accident or as matter participates in form. This is so, we may presume,
because both a substantial subject and matter are signified concretely, and, as
we have seen, esse is signified
abstractly” (The Metaphysical Thought,
99-100).
Footnote: “Non enim
potest participare aliquid per modum quo materia vel subiectum participat
formam vel accidens quia ut dictum est ipsum esse significatur ut quiddam
abstractum” (Leon. 50.271:87-91).
“Neither, continues Thomas, can esse participate in anything else in the
first general way, that is, as a less universal concept participates in one
which is more universal. (Thomas does acknowledge in passing that in this
general way some things which are signified abstractly may be said to
participate in others, for instance, whiteness in color.) This kind of
participation will not apply in the case of esse
itself because there is nothing more general than esse in which it could participate. Esse itself is most universal (communissimum).
Therefore esse is participated in by
other things, but cannot itself participate in anything else” (The Metaphysical Thought, 100).
Footnote: “Similiter
autem nec potest aliquid participare per modum quo particulare participat
universale … sed ipsum esse est communissimum, unde ipsum quidem participatur
in aliis, non autem participat aliquid aliud” (Leon . 50.271:91-97).
“On the other hand, being (ens), even though it too is most universal,
is expressed in concrete fashion. Therefore while being cannot participate in
anything in the way the less universal participates in the more universal, it
does participate in esse in the way
something concrete participates in something abstract. Thomas comments that
this is what Boethius has in mind in another of his axioms to the effect that
‘what is’ can participate in something, but that esse itself cannot do so in any way” (The Metaphysical Thought, 100).
Footnote: See Leon .
50.271:97-105. Note especially: “Sed id quod est sive ens, quamvis sit communissimum,
tamen concretive dicitur, et ideo participat ipsum esse, non per modum quo
magis commune participatur a minus communi, sed participat ipsum esse per modum
quo concretum participat abstractum.”
“We shall pass over Thomas’s
discussion of the third difference between esse
and ‘that which is’ as he finds this in Boethius’s text. Of greater interest
for our immediate purposes is Thomas’s acknowledgment that being (ens) can participate in esse in the way in which something taken
concretely participates in something taken abstractly. If we were to stop at
this point, we would not yet be justified in thinking that he here defends any
kind of real diversity or real composition of esse (act of being) and ‘that which is’ within participating beings.
We should note that in the following context Thomas writes that for something
to be a subject in the unqualified sense, that is, a substance, it must
participate in esse itself” (The Metaphysical Thought, 100).
Footnote: “Dicit,
quod ad hoc quod aliquid sit simpliciter subiectum participat ipsum esse. … Nam aliquid est simpliciter per hoc
quod participat ipso esse; sed quando iam est, scilicet per participationem ipsius
esse, restat ut participet quocumque alio,
ad hoc scilicet quod sit aliquid” (Leon. 50.272:180-195).
“This is important because it
indicates that if something is to serve as a subject for an accident, it must
itself exist. And in order for it to exist, it must participate in esse, or as Thomas has also phrased it,
in the actus essendi (act of being). Here,
then, we find Thomas very deftly inserting his own metaphysics of esse taken as act of being into his
Commentary on Boethius” (The Metaphysical
Thought, 100-101).
Footnote: In addition
to other passages from the Commentary on the De hebdomadibus (see n. 14 above [: Leon. 50.271:48-49 and Leon.
50.271:61-63]), one may consider a later text such as Quaestiones disputatae De anima, q. 6, ad 2: “Ad secundum dicendum
quod ipsum esse est actus ultimus qui participabilis est ab omnibus, ipsum
autem nihil participat; unde si sit aliquid quod sit ipsum esse subsistens,
sicut de Deo dicimus, nihil participare dicimus. Non autem est similis ratio de
aliis formis subsistentibus, quas necesse est participare ad ipsum esse et
comparari ad ipsum ut potentiam ad actum” (Leon. 24.1.51:268-275). Here we have
in outline form the elements of Thomas’s mature doctrine of participation of
beings in esse, and a confirmation of
the views expressed in his Commentary on the De hebdomadibus: esse is the ultimate act which can be participated
in by all; esse itself does not
participate in anything; if there is a subsisting esse—God—this participates in nothing; other subsisting forms
(angels) must participate in esse and
be related to it (their act of being) as potency to act.
“This becomes even clearer as
Thomas turns to another Boethian axiom: in every composite, esse and the composite itself differ.
Here Thomas finds Boethius formulating axioms which pertain to the nature of
the one (unum) rather than of being (ens), as had until now been the case. And,
comments Thomas, at this point Boethius has shifted from diversity in the order
of intentions to diversity in the order of reality: “… just as esse and that which is differ in the
order of intentions, so in composite entities do they differ really [realiter]” (The Metaphysical Thought, 101).
Footnote: Leon .
50.272:196-198. Note “… et est considerandum quod ea quae supra dicta sunt de
diversitate ipsius esse et eius quod est, est secundum ipsas intentiones. Hic
ostendit quomodo applicetur ad res… Est ergo primo considerandum quod sicut esse et quod est differunt secundum intentiones, ita in compositis differunt
realiter” (Leon. 50.272:196-273:206).
“In order to support this, Thomas
first recalls a point which we have already considered—that esse itself does not participate in
anything else so that its intelligible content (ratio) might consist of different factors. He also recalls another
point which until now we have not mentioned—that esse does not admit of the addition of anything extrinsic to its
formal content. Therefore, he quickly concludes, esse itself is not composed. But if it is not, then a composite or
composed entity cannot be identified with its esse (act of being). Here, then, we seem to have an argument for
the real distinction between essence and act of being in composite entities,
although not one of Thomas’s more usual arguments for that conclusion” (The Metaphysical Thought, 101).
Footnote: “Quod
quidem manifestum est ex praemissis. Dictum est enim supra quod ipsum esse
neque participat aliquid ut eius ratio constituatur ex multis, neque habet
aliquid extraneum admixtum, ut sit in eo compositio accidentis; et ideo ipsum
esse non est compositum; res ergo composita non est suum esse…” (Leon. 50.273:206-213). For the point that esse admits nothing extrinsic into its
formal content see Leon .
50.271:114-272:146. For further discussion of this argumentation see Ch. V
below nn.80, 81. Cf. McInerny, Boethius
and Aquinas, pp. 211-15.
In chapter V, n. 80, Wippel
writes: “Leon .
50.273:206-213, cited above in Ch. IV, n. 21[: ‘Quod quidem manifestum est ex
praemissis. Dictum est enim supra quod ipsum esse neque participat aliquid ut
eius ratio constituatur ex multis, neque habet aliquid extraneum admixtum, ut
sit in eo compositio accidentis; et ideo ipsum esse non est compositum; res
ergo composita non est suum esse…’].
For the concluding remark—[which in the body of the chapter is translated as follows:
‘And therefore {Boethius} says that in every composite esse is one (thing) and the composite itself which is by
participating in esse (ipsum esse) is
something other’]—see 273:213-215: ‘et ideo dicit, quod in omni composito aliud est esse [ens] et aliud ipsum compositum, quod est participando ipsum esse.’ Brackets mine. In interpreting this passage I have
omitted the term ens [highlighted in
brackets] since in the immediately preceding and following context Thomas
compares and contrasts esse and quod est, and the omission of ens seems to be required by the
philosophical sense of the text. Owing to the hospitality of Fr. J. E.
Hinnebusch of the Washington , D.C.
Leonine Commission, C. Bazán, K. White and I were recently able to review the
microfilms of the manuscripts containing this part of Thomas’s treatise which
are housed here in Washington .
While the vast majority of the nine manuscripts we could consult do include ens and therefore support the Leonine
reading, two of them, each constituting an independent witness in the
manuscript tradition, omit ens (L4=Leipzig, Universitatsbibliothek 482, f.
99ra, 14th century; and V6=Vatican Library 808, f. 44va, early 15th
century). But the strongest evidence pointing to omitting ens is, in my opinion, philosophical and contextual. For the point
that esse admits of nothing
extraneous to its intelligible content see Leon . 50.271:114-272:146. In brief
Thomas bases this on the fact that esse
is considered abstractly.”
In chapter V, n. 81, Wippel
writes: “McInerny denies that Thomas intends for this to be a demonstration of
a real distinction between esse and quod est. It is true that one might
expect Thomas to introduce another step after writing that esse itself is not composed, i.e., that esse itself cannot be identified with any composite thing, and then
by conversion reach the conclusion that a composite thing is not esse. But as McInerny notes, Thomas
writes that a composite thing is not its esse.
See McInerny, Boethius and Aquinas,
pp. 213-14. I would suggest, however, that Thomas reasons as follows: If ipsum esse cannot be identified with any
composite thing because esse itself
is not composed, then no composite can be identified with esse, whether it (esse)
is taken abstractly or as realized in a concrete existing composite entity.”
“One might immediately ask,
however, about finite or caused simple entities. Will essence and esse be distinct in them? It seems that
some other kind of argumentation will be required to establish this. In
apparent anticipation of our query, Thomas insists that in any simple entity, esse and ‘that which is’ are really
identical. Otherwise the entity would not really be simple. In explaining this
Thomas notes that something is simple insofar as it lacks composition. Since
something may lack a given kind of composition without lacking all composition,
it may be simple in a qualified sense without being completely simple. Thus
fire and water, two of the elements for Thomas and his contemporaries, are
called simple bodies because they are not composed of contraries, as are
mixtures. But each is still composed both of quantitative parts and of matter
and form. Should we find certain forms which do not exist in matter and which
are simple in the sense that they lack matter-form composition and quantitative
parts, it will not immediately follow that they are perfectly simple. Since any
such form must still determine its esse,
it follows that no such form is esse
itself. It simply has esse” (The Metaphysical Thought, 101-102).
Footnote: See Leon .
50.273:216-235. Note in particular: “Quia tamen quaelibet forma est
determinativa ipsius esse, nulla earum est ipsum esse, sed est habens esse…”
“Here Thomas has introduced one
of his favorite ways of expressing the fact that created entities, in this
case, created separate substances, participate in esse (the act of being). They have esse, but are not their esse
(act of being). By saying that every such form must determine its esse, I take Thomas to mean that because
every such form enjoys a given kind of being, the determination or
specification of its kind of being must come from the side of its form or
essence, not from the side of its act of being (esse)” (The Metaphysical
Thought, 102).
“In fact, in an interesting
thought experiment, Thomas argues that even if, for the sake of discussion, we
grant with Plato that there are certain subsisting immaterial forms or ideas
such as a form for human beings and another for horses, every such form will
still be determined with respect to its kind or species. Hence no such subsisting
form could be identified with the act of being in general (esse commune). Each such form would only participate in esse commune. The same will hold,
continues Thomas, if with Aristotle we defend the existence of separate and
immaterial substances above the world of sensible things. Each of these,
insofar as it is distinct from the others, is a given specific kind of form and
therefore participates in esse. No
such substance, whether it be a Platonic form or an Aristotelian separate
substance, will be perfectly simple” (The
Metaphysical Thought, 102).
Footnote: Leon .
50.273:236-249. Note especially: “…manifestum erit quod ipsa forma immaterialis
subsistens [a Platonic form], cum sit quiddam determinatum ad speciem, non est
ipsum esse commune, sed participat illud ... unaquaeque illarum [Aristotelian
separate substances], inquantum distinguitur ab alia, quaedam specialis forma
est participans ipsum esse, et sic nulla earum erit vere simplex.”
“Each will be composed of
itself—form—and of the esse (act of
being) in which it participates. There can be only one completely simple being,
continues Thomas, and this does not participate in esse, but is subsisting esse.
This, of course, is God” (The
Metaphysical Thought, 102).
Footnote: Leon .
50.273:249-258. Note Thomas’s reason here for saying that such a being can only
be one: “…quia si ipsum esse nihil aliud habet admixtum praeter id quod est
esse, ut dictum est, impossibile est id quod est ipsum esse multiplicari per
aliquid diversificans … ”
“This discussion is helpful for a
number of reasons. First of all, here Thomas has clearly distinguished between
a diversity of esse and ‘that which
is’ which applies only to the order of intentions, and a real distinction
between them. Secondly, he has offered two ways of establishing real
distinction between them, one directed to composite entities taken in the usual
sense of matter-form composites, and another which applies to finite simple
entities such as pure spirits. Even the latter cannot be identified with the act
of being taken in general (esse commune),
since every such being is a given kind of being and must, therefore, determine
and specify the esse it has. In this
text, therefore, Thomas has closely connected participation in esse with his theory of real distinction
between essence and act of being. In fact he has so closely linked them that he
immediately moves from the fact that such entities merely participate in esse to the conclusion that no such
entity is truly simple (which is to say it is composed)” (The Metaphysical Thought, 103).
Footnote: See the
texts cited in nn. 22 and 23 above. {Note 22 reads as follows: See Leon.
50.273:216-235. Note in particular: “Quia tamen quaelibet forma est
determinativa ipsius esse, nulla earum est ipsum esse, sed est habens esse…” And
Note 23 reads: Leon . 50.273:236-249. Note
especially: “…manifestum erit quod ipsa forma immaterialis subsistens [a
Platonic form], cum sit quiddam determinatum ad speciem, non est ipsum esse
commune, sed participat illud ... unaquaeque illarum [Aristotelian separate
substances], inquantum distinguitur ab alia, quaedam specialis forma est
participans ipsum esse, et sic nulla earum erit vere simplex.”}
“This text also tells us that in
speaking of participation of beings in being, on some occasions at least,
Thomas means thereby that they participate in the act of being in general or in
esse commune. With these thoughts in
mind, we may now attempt to see how Thomas’s understanding of participation of
beings in esse fits into his earlier
threefold division of participation” (The
Metaphysical Thought, 103).
“We may immediately conclude from
the above that the participation of beings in esse cannot be reduced to the first kind of participation singled
out by Aquinas, whereby a less universal notion or concept participates in one
that is more general or universal. Such participation belongs to the logical or
intentional order, and does not entail real distinction between the participant
and that in which it participates. But, as we have now seen, participation of
beings in esse clearly does” (The Metaphysical Thought, 103).
“What, then, of the second kind
of participation, wherein a subject participates in its accidents, or a given
instance of matter participates in substantial form? This, too, evidently
involves real participation and real diversity between the participating
subject and the participated perfection, that is, between substance and
accident, or between prime matter and substantial form. Nonetheless, it seems
clear enough that for Thomas, participation of beings in being (esse) cannot be reduced to this kind of
participation any more than to the first kind” (The Metaphysical Thought, 103).
“First of all, in order for the
subject to participate in accidents, Thomas has noted that the subject itself
must exist. And it exists only insofar as it participates in esse. Participation in esse is clearly more fundamental than
that of a substance in its accidents. The same may be said of participation of
matter in form. Indeed, according to Aquinas, if a matter-form composite is to
exist, it must participate in esse” (The Metaphysical Thought, 103).
Footnote: See n. 14
above. On matter-form composites participating in esse see De substantiis
separatis, c. 8 (Leon .
40.D55:210-218, 225-228). Cf. te Velde, Participation
and Substantiality, p. 79, and n. 31 (for a reference to my earlier
treatment of this). [Note 14 reads a follows: Leon . 50.271:48-49. Note in
particular: “…et ideo sicut possumus dicere de eo quod currit sive de currente
quod currat inquantum subiicitur cursui et participat ipsum, ita possumus
dicere quod ens sive id quod est sit inquantum participat actum essendi.” As
Fabro points out, Thomas here introduces one of the most original insights into
his Commentary on the Boethian text, and one which is completely missing from
Boethius himself, that is, his identification of esse as it is realized in a finite being as the act of being: “…sed
id quod est, accepta essendi forma,
scilicet suscipiendo ipsum actum essendi, est,
atque consistit, idest in seipso subsistit” (Leon. 50.271:61-63). For Fabro
see Participation et causalite selon S.
Thomas d’Aquin, p. 270. For different medieval and contemporary ways of
understanding the meaning of esse in
Boethius himself see Fabro, La nozione
metafisica, pp. 100-103. Also see Geiger, La participation, pp. 46-45; P. Hadot, “La distinction de l’etre et
de l’etant dans le De hebdomadibus de
Boece,” Miscellanea Mediaevalia 2: Die
Metaphysik im Mittelalter (Berlin , 1963),
pp. 147-53; S. Schrimpf, Die Axiomenschrift
des Boethius (De hebdomadibus) als philosophisches Lehrbuch des Mittelalters (Leiden , 1966). The general (if not universal)
consensus is that however Boethius may have understood and contrasted esse and id quod est—and there is much disagreement concerning this—he did
not distinguish them in Thomistic fashion as act of being and essence. However,
for a different reading, see R. McInerny, “Boethius and Saint Thomas Aquinas,” Rivista di Filosofia neo-scolastica 66
(1974), pp. 219-45, and more recently, Boethius
and Aquinas, pp. 161-253.]
“Moreover, in the case where
matter is said to participate in form, a third thing (res) or a tertium quid
results, that is, the essence of the material thing which includes both its
form and its matter. However, as Thomas brings out on other occasions—for
instance, in his considerably later and very full discussion of participation
in Quodlibet 2, q. 2, a. 1 of Advent 1269—it is not in this way that essence
and esse (act of being) unite in a
creature. No tertium quid results
from their union. Essence and esse do
not unite in a created separate substance—an angel—as if they were two
different parts of the angelic substance. “Thus, therefore, in an angel there
is a composition of essence and esse;
this, however, is not a composition as of parts of substance, but rather as of
substance and of that which unites with the substance (adhaeret substantiae)” (The
Metaphysical Thought, 103-104).
Footnote: Quodlibet
2, q. 2, a. 1 is addressed to this question: “…utrum angelus substantialiter
sit compositus ex essentia et esse.” See Leon . 25.2.214-15. Note in
particular: “Sic ergo in angelo est compositio sicut ex essentia et esse, non
tamen est compositio sicut ex partibus substantiae, sed sicut ex substantia et
eo quod adhaeret substantiae” (p. 215:74-76). For the date see Leon .
25.1.ix*. But cf. pp. 111*-112*.
“And in replying to the same
objection in this same article, Thomas notes that in some cases a third thing (res tertia) does result from things
which are joined together, as humanity or human being results from the union of
soul and body. But on other occasions this is not the case. Rather, something
is composed of itself and of something else” (The Metaphysical Thought, 104).
Footnote: The first
objection reasons that the essence of an angel is the angel itself. If,
therefore, an angel were composed of essence and esse, it would be composed of itself and something else. This is
rejected by the objection as unfitting (Leon. 24.2.214:13-18). Note from
Thomas’s reply: “…aliquando autem ex his quae simul iunguntur, non resultat res
tertia … et in talibus aliquid componitur ex seipso et alio …” (p. 215:81-86).
“Hence, we may conclude, in the
case of an angel we have a composition of the angelic essence and of a distinct
esse (act of being), which itself is
neither an essence nor a ‘thing’ not even a part of an essence” (The Metaphysical Thought, 104).
Wippel summarizes his reflection
as follows:
“At this point it may be helpful
for us to sum up the various features of Thomas’s understanding of the
participation of beings in esse which
have so far emerged from our discussion. The participation of beings in esse is more fundamental than the other
kinds of participation, for it alone accounts for the fact that a given entity
actually exists. No tertium quid or
third thing results from the union of the participating principle (essence) and
that in which it participates (esse).
The participated perfection—esse—cannot
be predicated univocally of the various subjects which participate in it, but
only analogically. The participating principle, or essence, specifies the kind
of esse which is received, and
therefore also establishes the kind of entity which results from this
participation. The participating principle also limits esse, although as yet we have not developed this point. The
participated perfection is not included in the nature or essence which
participates in it, but is really distinct from the essence. Therefore essence
and esse can only enter into
composition with one another. While esse
may be described as accidental insofar as it is not included within the essence
of the participating subject, it is not to be regarded as if it were a
predicamental accident. The participated perfection (esse) unites with the participating subject as act to potency, so
as to result in a being that is not merely accidentally but essentially one, an
unum per se. Finally, as we shall see
below in Section 3 of this chapter, neither the participating principle
(essence) nor the participated principle (esse)
can exist without the other” (The
Metaphysical Thought, 108-109).
“Granting all of this, however,
one may still wonder how Thomas’s view of the participation of beings in esse can be fitted into his threefold
division of participation. Since it is not reducible either to logical
participation or to the kind of real participation whereby matter participates
in form or a subject participates in its accidents, what remains? As we have
seen above, in his Commentary on the De hebdomadibus Thomas notes that being (ens)
participates in esse in the way
something concrete participates in something abstract. However, he has not
identified participation of the concrete in the abstract with any of three
divisions. Hence it seems that the only possible remaining member of that
division is that wherein an effect participates in its cause, and especially if
it is not equal to the power of its cause. As is well known, Thomas often
refers to beings other than God as participating in esse. On some occasions he means by this that they participate in esse commune, as we have seen from his
Commentary on the De hebdomadibus” (The Metaphysical Thought, 109).
Footnote: See n. 17
above for the text. Cf. te Velde, Participation,
p. 79, although I would not want to suggest, as he does, that participation of
the concrete in the abstract is a new and fourth mode. Cf. L. Dümpelmann, Kreation als ontisch-ontologisches
Verhaltnis. Zur Metaphysik der Schöpfungstheologie des Thomas von Aquin
(Freiburg-Munich, 1969), pp. 24-27. [Note 17 reads as follows: See Leon .
50.271:97-105. Note especially: “Sed id quod est sive ens, quamvis sit communissimum,
tamen concretive dicitur, et ideo participat ipsum esse, non per modum quo
magis commune participatur a minus communi, sed participat ipsum esse per modum
quo concretum participat abstractum.”]
“On other occasions, however, he
seems to mean that creatures participate in self-subsisting esse, or in God” (The Metaphysical Thought, 109).
At least in three other occasions
Wippel explains why he considers participation of the concrete in the abstract
as a kind of participation of the effect in its cause. Here are these passages.
First, commenting on esse commune, Wippel writes:
“An extremely important
discussion is contained in Thomas’s Commentary on the Divine Names, c. V, lect. 2, dating either from 1261-1265 or from
1265-1268. Here Thomas finds Pseudo-Dionysius (=Dionysius) drawing out certain
implications from his conclusion that God is the universal cause of being, that
is, by showing that he is the cause of all particular beings including the
various levels or degrees of beings. These levels include, continues Thomas,
angelic substances in their various degrees; substances which are not bodies
but are united to bodies, i.e., souls; corporeal substances themselves;
accidents insofar as they fall into the nine supreme genera or predicaments;
and finally, things which do not exist in the nature of things but only in
thought and which are called beings of reason (entia rationis), such as genera, species, mental states (here
illustrated by opinion), and others of this kind” (The Metaphysical Thought, 114).
Footnote: In librum beati Dionysii de divinis
nominibus expositio, C. Pera, ed. (Turin-Rome, 1950), c. V, lect. 2, p.
244, n. 655. On the dating see Torrell, p. 346. Earlier in his Commentary (see
c. V, lect. 1) Thomas had commented on Pseudo-Dionysius’s view that God is the
universal cause of being. See in particular p. 234, n. 629, where Thomas
explains that all things other than God have “esse receptum et participatum et
ideo non habent esse secundum totam virtutem essendi, sed solus Deus, qui est
ipsum esse subsistens, secundum totam virtutem essendi, esse habet.” See pp.
234-35, n. 630, where he warns that Pseudo-Dionysius’s statement about God’s
being the esse for existents (ipse est esse existentibus) should not
be taken to mean that God himself is the formal esse of existents, but rather in a causal sense; p. 235, n. 631,
where Thomas comments: “et iterum omnia Ipso
participant, sicut prima forma exemplari; et non solum est causa quantum ad fieri rerum, sed et quantum ad
totum esse et durationem. …”
“Shortly thereafter Dionysius
shows that God is the cause of esse
commune itself. As Thomas interprets this, Dionysius first shows that esse is common to all things; then he
explains how esse commune stands in
relation to God. Granted the diversity in levels of being, Thomas concludes his
own discussion of the first step by noting that nothing can be described as an
existent unless it has esse. This is
what Thomas means, therefore, by referring to esse as common. It is that intrinsic principle, that act of being,
found in every existing entity, that is, every substance, which accounts for
the fact that it actually exists. As regards the second step, Thomas comments
that esse commune is related to God
and to other existents in very different fashion. In fact, Thomas spells out
three such differences” (The Metaphysical
Thought, 114-115).
Footnote: See p.
245, n. 658: “…Ostendit quod Deus est causa ipsius esse communis; et circa hoc,
duo facit: primo, ostendit quod ipsum esse est omnibus commune; secundo,
ostendit qualiter ipsum esse commune se habeat ad Deum. …” Also see nn.
659-660. Note especially: “Et licet huiusmodi dignitates essendi superioribus tantum substantiis conveniant,
tamen hoc ipsum quod est esse, ab omnibus existentibus non derelinquitur, quia nihil potest dici
existens nisi habeat esse. …”
“First of all, other existents
depend on esse commune, but God does
not. Rather, esse commune itself
depends on God. If we wonder how this can be, this becomes clearer as Thomas
develops the second and third differences. Secondly, therefore, all other
existents are contained under esse
commune itself, but God is not. Esse
commune itself rather falls under God’s power. For God’s power is more
extended than is created esse. By
this Thomas must mean that God can create many things which he does not
actually create and to which esse commune
does not actually extend” (The
Metaphysical Thought, 115).
Footnote: “…primo
quidem, quantum ad hoc quod alia existentia dependent ab esse communi, non
autem Deus, sed magis esse commune dependet a Deo; et hoc est quod dicit quod
ipsum esse commune est ipsius Dei, tamquam ab Ipso
dependens, et non ipse Deus est esse, idest ipsius esse communis,
tamquam ab ipso dependens. Secundo, quantum ad hoc quod omnia existentia
continentur sub ipso esse communi, non autem Deus, sed magis esse commune
continetur sub eius virtute, quia virtus divina plus extenditur quam ipsum esse
creatum …” (p. 245, n. 660).
“As a third difference Thomas
explains that all other existents participate in esse (esse commune, we
may presume), but that God does not. On the contrary, created esse is a kind of participation in God
and a likeness of God. This is Thomas’s way of explaining Dionysius’s statement
that esse commune “has” God. He means
that it, i.e., the entities that fall under it, participate in a likeness of
God. And in saying that God does not “have” esse,
he means that God does not participate in it. So understood, Thomas does not
here contradict his claim in his Commentary on the De hebdomadibus that esse
itself does not participate in anything else, although being (ens) does. Thomas goes on to explain
that God is an existent before every other substance and every other being and
before every aevum, not only in terms
of duration or order, but also in terms of causality. God is the cause of
existence (causa subsistendi) for all
things, and their principle of being (principium
essendi). He is also the end to which all things tend” (The Metaphysical Thought, 115).
Footnote: Ibid. Note
in particular: “Tertio, quantum ad hoc quod omnia alia existentia participant
eo quod est esse, non autem Deus, sed magis ipsum esse creatum est quaedam
participatio Dei et similitudo Ipsius; et hoc est quod dicit quod esse commune habet Ipsum scilicet Deum, ut participans similitudinem Eius, non autem ipse Deus habet esse,
quasi participans ipso esse.” Cf. the texts from Thomas’s Commentary on the De hebdomadibus cited above in nn. 15,
16, and 17. Cf. F. O’Rourke, Pseudo-Dionysius
and the Metaphysics of Aquinas (Leiden-New York-Cologne, 1992), pp. 141-43.
“Two questions might be raised
about this passage: How do other existents depend upon esse commune? And how does esse
commune itself depend on God? As regards the first question, Thomas has
indicated both that other existents are contained under esse commune, and that they participate in it. Here, then, we
return to a theme we have already considered in other texts—other existents are
said to participate in esse commune.
This accounts for the fact that they are said to have esse, but are not identical with the esse (act of being) which they have or in which they participate.
This should not be taken to imply, of course, that esse commune actually subsists as such apart from individual
existents. It rather means that every individual created existent may be viewed
as only sharing in or participating in esse,
with the consequence that the esse
(act of being) which is intrinsic to it is only a partial sharing in the
fullness of esse commune when the
latter is simply considered in itself” (The
Metaphysical Thought, 115-116).
“As for our second question, in
saying that esse commune depends upon
God, Thomas has commented that it falls under God’s power. I take him to mean
by this that every individual existent exists only insofar as it is caused by
God. Moreover, created esse has also
now been described as a likeness of God. Hence, in participating in the esse which is efficiently communicated
to it by God, the creature may also be said to participate in some way in God,
that is, in his likeness. God is its exemplar cause as well as its efficient
cause and its final cause” (The
Metaphysical Thought, 116).
“With this we have rejoined the
third member of Thomas’s earlier division of participation in his Commentary on
the De hebdomadibus, that whereby an
effect may be said to participate in its cause, and especially if it is less
perfect than its cause. Even so, I would suggest that participation of beings
in esse commune should also be placed
under this same third part of Thomas’s division, both because it does not fall
under either of the first two members, and because it is closely associated
with participation in esse subsistens.
In the case where a caused being participates in God, its first cause, it is
clear enough that the effect is less perfect than the cause. It is also worth
noting that Thomas often draws a close connection between being by
participation and being caused. Thus in Summa
theologiae I, q. 44, a. 1, he comments that if “something is found in some
thing by participation, it must be caused in that thing by that to which it
belongs essentially.” He recalls that earlier in the Summa he has already shown that God is self-subsisting being (I, q.
3, a. 4), and that esse subsistens
can only be one. Therefore all things other than God are not identical with
their esse, but participate in esse. But things which differ according
to varying degrees of participation in esse,
so as to be more or less perfectly, are caused by one first being, which is in
most perfect fashion” (The Metaphysical
Thought, 116).
Footnote: Leon .
4.455. Note in particular: “Si enim aliquid invenitur in aliquo per
participationem, necesse est quod causetur in ipso ab eo cui essentialiter
convenit. … Relinquitur ergo quod omnia alia a Deo non sint suum esse, sed
participant esse. Necesse est igitur omnia quae diversificantur secundum
diversam participationem essendi, ut sint perfectius vel minus perfecte,
causari ab uno primo ente, quod perfectissime est.”
“In replying to the first
objection within this same article, Thomas comments that it follows from the
fact that something is being (ens) by
participation that it is caused by something else” (The Metaphysical Thought, 116-117).
Footnote: According
to the objection, a relationship of effect to cause does not seem to be
included in the intelligible content (ratio)
of beings. Certain things can be understood without this relation, and
therefore they can exist without it. To this Thomas replies that while
relationship to a cause is not included in the definition of a being which is
caused, it does not follow from what is included in its intelligibility: “… quia
ex hoc quod aliquid per participationem est ens sequitur quod sit causatum ab
alio” (Leon. 4.455).
“This is important if we would
follow the philosophical order in presenting Thomas’s metaphysics of
participation. In the order of discovery one may move from one’s discovery of
individual beings as participating in esse
commune to the caused character of such beings, and then on to the
existence of their unparticipated source (esse
subsistens). Once this is established, one can then speak of them as
actually participating in esse subsistens
as well” (The Metaphysical Thought,
117).
Second, assessing Geiger’s and
Fabro’s discussions on participation, Wippel writes:
“In reacting to this, I would
first recall that neither the division of participation proposed by Fabro
between transcendental and predicamental participation nor that offered by
Geiger between participation by composition and participation by formal
similitude appears as such with these exact titles in Thomas’s texts.
Nonetheless, as we have seen from his Commentary on the De hebdomadibus and from various other supporting texts, elements
of each of the above can be found there. If I may now bypass the first member
of Thomas’s threefold division, logical participation, and concentrate on the
remaining two, I would recall that under the second division Thomas has offered
two examples that clearly involve real composition between a participant and a
participated perfection—that of matter in form, and that of a subject in its
accidents. But I have also concluded from analyzing his texts that one should
not place Thomas’s account of the participation of beings in esse under this member of Thomas’s
division. I have rather suggested that it should fall under the third major
division, that whereby an effect participates in its cause, especially when the
cause is of a higher order than the effect. However participation in esse may be understood by Thomas in a
particular context—whether as participation in esse commune, or in a finite being’s own actus essendi, or in esse
subsistens—it seems to me that it should still be placed under this third
division” (The Metaphysical Thought,
127-128).
“It should also be noted that if
the examples of participation offered by Thomas in the second division (whether
of matter in form or of a subject in its accident) involve real distinction and
composition of participant and participated perfection, one should not
automatically assume that all of the other conditions realized in these two
instances must also apply to other cases where participation involves composition.
As we have now seen in various contexts, composition is involved in Thomas’s
account of the participation of beings in esse.
A participant is united with that in which it participates (participatum) as potency to act. Within
any participating being, its essence enters into composition with its act of
being (esse). In addition to this, although
I have not yet stressed this point, Thomas insists that act as such is not
self-limiting. If one finds limited instances of act, especially of the actus essendi, this can only be because
in every such case the act principle (esse)
is received and limited by a really distinct potency principle. Hence
composition with essence is necessary if one is to account for the limitation
of esse within a given entity. On this
point Fabro is surely correct” (The
Metaphysical Thought, 128).
And third, in presenting God as
the efficient cause of the actus essendi,
Wippel writes:
