What is a Dianoetic Habit?

Entry 0598: What is a Dianoetic Habit? 
  

The phrase dianoetic habit has been used to describe the habits of the speculative intellect, intellectus, sapientia and scientia (in Greek nous, sophia and episteme).

The habits of the practical intellect are ars and prudentia (in Greek, techne and phronesis).

In a more restricted way the adjective dianoetic is the opposite of noetic. In these contexts noetic refers to the human intellect's non-discursive, immediate grasping of elements of knowledge, as is for example the activity of the habit intellectus principiorum. Dianoetic, on the other hand, refers to the acquisition of elements of knowledge through the process of reasoning (ratiocinatio).

The Latin recta ratio factibilium refers to the Greek poiesis from poiein  (facere, to make).

The Latin recta ratio agibilium refers to the Greek praxis from prattein (agere, to do).

The Greek doxa is simply opinion in the order of knowledge.

Aquinas on the Angelic Knowledge of the Singular

Entry 0597: Aquinas on the Angelic Knowledge of the Singular 
  

What is specific to the nature of the angelic intellect that the human intellect does not possess?

As part of non-discursive knowledge, Aquinas points to the specific awareness of the real that exists in the angelic intellect. Angels know the real world immediately through  intellectus. (1)

(1) “Sic igitur omnia materialia in ipsis Angelis praeexistunt, simplicius quidem et immaterialius quam in ipsis rebus, multiplicius autem et imperfectius quam in Deo. Omne autem quod est in aliquo est in eo per modum eius in quo est. Angeli autem secundum suam naturam sunt intellectuales. Et ideo sicut Deus per suam essentiam materialia cognoscit ita Angeli ea cognoscunt per hoc quod sunt in eis per suas intelligibiles species” (Summa theologiae, part I, question 57, article 1, corpus). “Sicut autem ab intellectu divino effluunt res naturales secundum formam et materiam ad essendum ex utraque ita effluunt formae intellectus angelici ad cognoscendum utrumque, et ideo Angeli per formas innatas cognoscunt res in sua singularitate et universalitate inquantum sunt similes formis factivis, scilicet ideis in mente divina existentibus quamvis ipsae non sint rerum factivae” (De veritate, question 8, article 11, corpus).

Angels know universals but more importantly they have complete knowledge of each and all singulars in the real material world, and this knowledge is complete without the discourse of reason. “It is true that the universal exists in the intellect,” Aquinas says when discussing the angels’s knowledge of the singular, but the universal is not the only thing that exists in the intellect. In the intellect there is also being: ens in intellectu est in plus quam universale. (2) 

(2) Aquinas is replying to the following objection: “Universale contra singulare distinguitur per hoc quod universale est in intellectu, singulare autem extra intellectum. Sed universale nunquam est extra intellectum. Ergo nec singulare unquam est in intellectu, et sic non potest per intellectum cognosci” (De veritate, question 8, article 11, obj. 7). Response: “Ad septimum dicendum quod quamvis universale habeat esse in intellectu tamen ens in intellectu est in plus quam universale, et ideo in processu est fallacia consequentis” (De veritate, question 8, article 11, ad 7). “Ens est in rebus et in intellectu” (Summa theologiae, part I, question 16, article 3, ad 1).

From the moment of their creation angels receive intelligible species that are not only likenesses of forms but also likenesses of the individual matter of the things of nature. (3)

(3) “Substantiae separatae cognoscunt non solum universalia sed etiam singularia in quantum species intelligibiles in eas a divina arte emanantes sunt similitudines rerum et secundum formam et secundum materiam” (De anima, question 1, article 20, corpus). “Formae immateriales quae sunt in intellectu Angeli sunt rerum similitudines etiam quantum ad principia materialia” (In III Sententiarum, distinction 3, question 3, article 3, ad 2). “Superiores intellectus sunt universalioris virtutis in cognoscendo ut scilicet per intelligibilem speciem utrumque cognoscant, et universale et singulare” (De substantiis separatis, chapter 16).

The human intellect, on the other hand, was made only for universals. Thus Aquinas continues: “it seems proper to the human soul, as rational, to know entitas in hoc, to know being in this singular thing. But to know entitas absolute, to know being without the discourse of reason, seems to belong rather to the higher substances.” (4)

(4) Aquinas is replying to the following objections: “Secundum ordinem actuum est ordo potentiarum. Sed accipere absolute aliquid quod videtur esse intellectus est prius quam conferre quod pertinet ad rationem. Ergo intellectus est ratione prior. Nihil autem est prius seipso. Ergo non est eadem potentia ratio et intellectus. Praeterea est considerare rei entitatem absolute et entitatem rei in hoc, quarum considerationum neutra animae humanae deest. Ergo oportet in anima humana esse duas potentias quarum una cognoscatur entitas absoluta quod est intellectus, et alia entitas in alio quod videtur esse rationis, et sic idem quod prius” (De veritate, question 15, article 1, obj. 11 and 12). Response: “Ad undecimum dicendum quod utrumque cognoscit anima sed per eamdem potentiam. Hoc tamen proprium esse humanae animae videtur in quantum est rationalis quod cognoscat entitatem in hoc. Entitatem vero absolute cognoscere magis videtur esse substantiarum superiorum, ut ex auctoritate supra inducta patet” (De veritate, question 15, article 1, ad 11). The “ex auctoritate supra inducta” refers to the passage from book V of Boethius’s De consolatione quoted in the reply to the second objection in this same article. In the context of the distinction between intellectus and ratio, the expression “absolute accipere” designates the activity of simple intellection of the angelic intellect.

In human beings, the intellectual awareness of the real is complete only by looking at the singulars through the phantasm. (5)

(5) “Connaturale est homini secundum statum praesentis vitae ut non intelligat sine phantasmate” (Summa theologiae, part II-II, question 174, article 2, ad 4). See also Summa theologiae, part I, question 84, article 7, ad 1; Ibid., question 85, article 1, ad 5; and In De Memoria et Reminiscentia, lecture 2, no. 7.

Just as men have a specific way of knowing that the external material world is real, so does God and angels. Indeed an “awareness” that the created world is real, is far superior in God and in angels than it is in man. (6)

(6) “Artifex autem increatus, scilicet Deus, non solum producit formam sed etiam materiam. Unde rationes ideales in mente ipsius existentes non solum sunt efficaces ad cognitionem universalium, sed etiam ad singularia cognoscenda a Deo. Sicut autem illae rationes ideales effluunt in res producendas in esse suo naturali in quo particulariter unumquodque subsistit in forma et materia, ita procedunt in mentes angelicas ut sint in eis principium cognoscendi res secundum suum totum esse in quo subsistunt. Et sic per species influxas sibi ab arte divina, Angeli non solum universalia sed etiam particularia cognoscunt sicut et Deus. Est tamen differentia in duobus. Primo, quia ideae quae sunt in mente divina sunt formae factivae rerum et non solum principia cognoscendi, sed species quae recipiuntur in mente angelica sunt solum principia cognoscendi et non sunt factivae, sed exemplatae a factivis. Secundo, quia intellectus quanto est altior et perspicacior tanto ex uno potest plura cognoscere. Et quia intellectus divinus est altissimus, per unam simplicem essentiam suam omnia cognoscit, nec est ibi aliqua pluralitas formarum idealium nisi secundum diversos respectus divinae essentiae ad res cognitas. Sed in intellectu creato multiplicatur, secundum rem, quod est unum secundum rem in mente divina, ut non possit omnia per unum cognoscere, ita tamen quod quanto intellectus creatus est altior, tanto pauciores habet formas ad plura cognoscenda efficaces. Et hoc est quod Dionysius dicit, XII cap. Cael. Hierarch., quod superiores ordines habent scientiam magis universalem in inferioribus; et in Lib. De causis dicitur quod intelligentiae superiores habent formas magis universales: hoc tamen observato, quod in infimis Angelis sunt formae adhuc universales in tantum quod per unam formam possunt cognoscere omnia individua unius speciei, ita quod illa species sit propria uniuscuiusque particularium secundum diversos respectus eius ad particularia, sicut essentia divina efficitur propria similitudo singulorum secundum diversos respectus. Sed intellectus humanus qui est ultimus in ordine substantiarum intellectualium habet formas in tantum particulatas quod non potest per unam speciem nisi unum quid cognoscere, et ideo similitudo speciei existens in intellectu humano non sufficit ad cognoscenda plura singularia, et propter hoc intellectui adiuncti sunt sensus quibus singularia accipiat” (Quodlibeta, no. 7, question 1, article 3, ad 1).

David M. Vidal on ens subsistens

Entry 0596: David M. Vidal on the Meaning of ens subsistens 
  

David M. Vidal explains why ens properly speaking “is the first substance or the subsisting subject that is supported by the act of being or esse as its ultimate foundation.”

David M. Vidal “The Subsisting Subject in Light of the Thomistic Notion of ens,” The Incarnate Word 4 (2017): 129-160.

Ariberto Acerbi on Knowledge of the Transcendental Notions

Entry 0594: Ariberto Acerbi on Knowledge 
of the Transcendental Notions  

In his article “Aquinas’s Commentary on Boethius’s De Trinitate,” Ariberto Acerbi raises the issue of the operation whereby the human intellect knows the transcendental notions. Thus he writes in n. 19: “The intellectual operation at the origin of the transcendental notions appears to have to be entirely distinguished from abstraction, commonly understood” (325). The issue is addressed tangentially, and no detailed answer is given.

Acerbi indicates, however, that the operation seems to be a process of induction, for regarding the resolution to the final extrinsic cause, he argues, the necessity of nature’s dependence upon “a principle which is not in turn material and mutable” is “induced by starting from the ontological structure of matter and becoming” (325). In addition to this, it is stated that the transcendental notions “are able to be applied indifferently to material or immaterial reality” (325n19).

The author goes on to propose that at the bottom of the method of metaphysics there is a “non intentional intellectual function” which “consists in the habitual knowledge of being and of the relative principles” (333n34). Metaphysics, Acerbi explains, can reflexively detect and take up this function as the basis of its own method.

Acerbi concludes with no further explanation: “In such a perspective, the noetic priority of the transcendental notions upon abstraction, (…) appears to us to be able to be confirmed as far as to lead back their content to that radical intellectual apprehension (noesis) always acting in which consists the habitus principiorum” (333n34).

See Ariberto Acerbi, “Aquinas’s Commentary on Boethius’s De Trinitate,” The Review of Metaphysics 66 (December 2012): 317-338.